The Kosovo Crisis: A Dostoievskian Dialogue on International Law, Statecraft, and Soulcraft by Perez, Antonio F. & Delahunty, Robert J.
The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law 
CUA Law Scholarship Repository 
Scholarly Articles and Other Contributions Faculty Scholarship 
2009 
The Kosovo Crisis: A Dostoievskian Dialogue on International Law, 
Statecraft, and Soulcraft 
Antonio F. Perez 
The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law 
Robert J. Delahunty 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/scholar 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, International Law Commons, and the Military, 
War, and Peace Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Antonio F. Perez & Robert J. Delahunty, The Kosovo Crisis: A Dostoievskian Dialogue on International Law, 
Statecraft, and Soulcraft, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 15 (2009). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at CUA Law Scholarship 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Articles and Other Contributions by an authorized 
administrator of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
ARTICLES
The Kosovo Crisis: A Dostoievskian





The secession of Kosovo from Serbia in February 2008
represents a stage in the unfolding of a revolution of
"constitutional" dimensions in international law that began
with NATO's 1999 intervention in Kosovo. NATO'S intervention
called into question the authority and viability of the UN
Charter system for maintaining international peace. Likewise,
the West's decision in 2008 to support Kosovo's secession from
Serbia dealt another blow to the post-War legal rules and
institutions for controlling and mitigating great power rivalry.
Russia's later support for South Ossetia's secession from
Georgia demonstrated the potential that the Kosovo precedent
has for destabilizing the international legal order.
This Article takes the form of a five-act play, consisting of a
series of speeches and exchanges between characters drawn from
Fyodor Dostoievski's classic novel, The Brothers Karamazov.
The dialogue moves on three levels. The first level is that of
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"normal" international law-the characters engage in a
prolonged debate over the legality of Kosovo's secession that
explores the usual modalities of international legal argument.
The intention here is to demonstrate that when the internal
conceptual resources of international law have been exhausted,
they yield no decisive answer to the question of the legality of
Kosovo's secession. The second level is an attempt to grasp the
consequences for the international order of Russia's re-
emergence as a Great Power and (even more basically) of the
emergence of a "multi-polar" world. The third level is an
examination of the basic, but usually unstated, philosophical
and theological presuppositions of "the Western idea" and "the
Russian idea." The speeches in this final act of the drama
intend to show how these two rival understandings yield
corresponding views of the international order and, more
particularly, of the proper scope and limits of international law.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2080, the 200th anniversary of the publication of Fyodor
Dostoievski's celebrated novel The Brothers Karamazov,1 the Editors
discovered a remarkable document while doing research in the
archives of the Kremlin in Moscow. The document was written in the
decade before the outbreak of the so-called Third World War (2021-
2023). Readers will, of course, recall that the Third World War, like
the First (1914-1918), arose from the interaction between the
nationalism of a small power and a great power's misunderstanding
of that force. 2 Because of its interest, the Editors have decided to
translate, edit, and publish the document.
The authors of the document (identified only as "Andrei S***"
and "Alexander S***") appear to have been officials in the Russian
foreign ministry, probably instructors in public international law,
who were training students to become members of the Russian
diplomatic corps. The document may have grown out of conversations
between the instructors and their students. It has the form of a
drama or dialogue. As in Dostoievski's original novel, the document
describes a series of exchanges among the four Karamazov brothers.
Just as Dostoievski's novel portrayed the Karamazov brothers as
representing different views that reflected the tensions facing late-
imperial Russia as it was entering a new era, so perhaps the authors
of the document believed that post-Soviet Russia, in the Putin-
Medvedev years, was entering a similar era of change. The authors
had observed firsthand the collapse of Soviet communism, the
disintegration of the USSR, NATO's ensuing projection of power into
Central and Eastern Europe and other areas of former Soviet
dominance, and the economic and political traumas that Russia
underwent in the 1990s. They witnessed Vladimir Putin's successful
efforts thereafter to restore Russia's great-power status. 3  They
1. FYODOR DOSTOIEVSKI, THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV (Richard Pevear &
Larissa Volokhonsky, trans., 2000) (1880).
2. See ROBERT KAGAN, THE RETURN OF HISTORY AND THE END OF DREAMS 34-
36 (2008) (suggesting that careless management resulting in misunderstanding among
the great powers as to Taiwan could yield the same kind of unintended consequences
that gave rise to the First World War).
3. See, e.g., Jean Radvanyi, A Major Foreign Player Again, LE MONDE
DIPLOMATIQUE, Dec. 2007, available at http://mondediplo.com/2007/12/10foreignpolicy
(noting the positive effect of the political strategies adopted by Putin). Some
commentators denied that Putin's policies were successful. See Michael McFaul &
Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, The Myth of the Authoritarian Model; How Putin's Crackdown
Holds Russia Back, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2008, at 68, 68. For penetrating analyses
of the nature of the Putin rdgime and its grand strategy, see MARSHALL I. GOLDMAN,
2009]
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watched as the Putin-Medvedev era's reinstatement of traditionally
Russian, hierarchical forms of governance and its reinvigoration of
Russia's sense of cultural and moral exceptionalism led to deepening
conflicts with the West on political, strategic, and ideological
grounds. 4 Like some Western analysts of the period, they were
PETROSTATE: PUTIN, POWER, AND THE NEW RUSSIA (2008) and EDWARD LUCAS, THE
NEW COLD WAR: PUTIN'S RUSSIA AND THE THREAT TO THE WEST (2008).
One should not, however, be too swift to reach the conclusion that Russia is, or will
soon become, an "autocracy," as some analysts have done. In Russia in Search of Itself,
the leading Russian historian and scholar James H. Billington portrays a society
engaged in ranging, many-sided, and vigorous debate with itself as it tries to define its
post-Soviet identity. Billington argues that "[t]he variety and vitality of public debate
about the nature and destiny of Russia . . . suggest[] that democratic government is
already largely legitimized in Russia." JAMES H. BILLINGTON, RUSSIA IN SEARCH OF
ITSELF 138-39 (2004). He acknowledges that despite the ongoing public conversation,
there are "many possible doomsday scenarios for Russian democracy." Id. at 128. But
he offers grounds for a guarded optimism:
[I]f Russia were to succumb to negative nationalism and take a sharp
autocratic turn, it would probably not last for long. Repression would
be difficult to sustain in a vast country that has been so dramatically
opened up to political freedoms and to the outside information age. Nor
does Russia have a large enough population or the military resources to
sustain the kind of aggressive foreign policy that hypernationalistic
states generally need to maintain their legitimacy.
Id. at 88.
Billington's depiction is supported by the findings of the well-known Polity IV
Project, which studies the political r6gime characteristics of various countries from
1800 to the present and ranks the autocratic and democratic qualities of those regimes
on a 21-point scale designed to measure r6gime authority characteristics (ranging from
fully institutionalized autocracies to fully institutionalized democracies). Polity IV
Project, http:/fwww.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm (last visited Dec. 19, 2008). As
defined by the Polity IV Project, institutionalized democracy has three elements: (1) the
existence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express their
preferences; (2) institutionalized constraints on executive power; and (3) guarantees of
civil liberties. Autocracies, by contrast, suppress political competition, choose their
chief executives through a regularized process within the political 6lite, and impose few
restraints on those executives once in office. Id. A "Polity Score" is calculated by
subtracting the Autocracy score (0-10) from the Democracy score (0-10). Id. A country
that receives a score of +7 or higher may be considered a "full democracy." MONTY G.
MARSHALL & KEITH JAGGERS, POLITY IV PROJECT, POLITY IV PROJECT: DATASET USERS'
MANUAL 34 (2006), http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2OO6.pdf. In 2005
and 2006, the Polity IV Project found that Russia scored a +7. POLITY IV PROJECT,
POLITY IV COUNTRY REPORT 2006: RUSSIA 1 (2006), http://www.systemicpeace.org
polity/Russia2006.pdf. Although slightly lower than the scores for most G-8 states,
Russia-by this measure-is a democracy, rather than an autocracy. Compare POLITY
IV PROJECT, POLITY IV COUNTRY REPORT 2006: UNITED KINGDOM 1 (2006),
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/UnitedYingdom2006.pdf (calculating the country's
Polity score as +10) and POLITY IV PROJECT, POLITY IV COUNTRY REPORT 2006: CHINA 1
(2006), http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/China2006.pdf (noting a Polity score of -7).
4. Some analysts have observed with dismay the widening rift between Russia
and the West-equally attributable to the West and Russia. See Dmitri K. Simes,
Losing Russia: The Costs of Renewed Confrontation, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2007, at
36, 37-42 (detailing factors contributing. to the disintegration of the relationship
between the U.S. and Russia, including Western intervention in Kosovo in 1999);
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inclined to regard these conflicts not merely as traditional great-
power rivalries but as "civilizational" in nature. 5 They had heard
Russia's foreign minister argue that the end of the Cold War marked
the end of a 500-year period of Western global domination, that the
world had entered into a "post-American" era, and that an emerging
global leadership had to be "truly representative both geographically
and civilizationally."
6
The Editors can confidently date the creation of the document to
mid-summer 2008. That period saw two major Russian initiatives,
both linked to the Kosovo crisis, one of which was diplomatic and the
other of which was military.
First, in summer 2008, the Russian governmental leadership
launched a broad diplomatic campaign on behalf of Serbia's claim to
Kosovo, which had seceded from Serbia the previous February and
which was recognized by many states, especially EU members. 7 Two
critically important speeches by Russia's leaders articulated a new
Russian foreign policy doctrine that emphasized the core role of
international institutions and public international law-the United
Nations Charter above all. President Dmitri Medvedev laid out these
Dmitri Trenin, Russia Leaves the West, FOREIGN AFF., Jul.-Aug. 2006, at 87, 87-88
(describing circumstances surrounding Russia's shift in foreign policy); Nina
Bachkatov, EU-Russia Relations Worsen, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, Jan. 2007,
available at http://mondediplo.com/2007/01/06russia (analyzing causes of EU-Russia
rifts and the need for peaceable relations); Francis Fukuyama, Russia and a New
Democratic Realism, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2008, at 11 (noting the diminishing influence
of the U.S. and its effect on U.S.-Russian relations); William Pfaff, Who Is Responsible
for U.S. Russian Policy?, Aug. 20, 2008, http://www.williampfaff.com/modules/news/
article.php?storyid=336 (advocating a new approach towards U.S.-Russian policies); see
also Azar Gat, The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers, FOREIGN AFF. Jul.-Aug.
2007, at 59, 67-68 (suggesting that economically successful "authoritarian" capitalist
systems such as Russia's might eventually prevail over the "democratic" systems of the
West).
5. See SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE
REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER 29 (1997) (noting the increased significance of
civilizational differences on the global political stage).
6. Sergei Lavrov, Russia and the World in the 21st Century, Russ. GLOBAL
AFF., July-Sept. 2008, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/24/1210.html.
7. See Syed Hamad Ali, Who Recognises Kosovo?, THE NEW STATESMAN, July
28, 2008, http://www.newstatesman.com/middle-east/2008/07fkosovo-serbia-recognition
(noting that 43 of 192 United Nations Member States currently recognize Kosovo).
While Kosovo has been recognized by most of the major Western states, some countries
(e.g., Spain, Cyprus, and Slovakia) have withheld recognition, fearful of secessionist
movements of their own. Stephen Orth, Nadine Michel & Maike Jansen, Separatist
Movements Seek Inspiration in Kosovo, SPIEGEL ONLINE INT'L, Feb. 22, 2008,
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,druck-537008,00.html. Major non-
Western powers withholding recognition currently include Russia, China, and India.
Most Middle Eastern and Latin American states have also withheld recognition. For a
regularly updated list of states recognizing Kosovo, see Who Recognized Kosovo? The
Kosovar People Thank You, http://kosovothanksyou.com/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2008).
20091
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themes in an address to Russia's ambassadors on July 15, 2008.8
Shortly before, in a major policy statement on June 20, 2008, Russian
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov argued that
there is no reasonable alternative to a global political architecture
relying on the United Nations and the rule of international law. Let us
not forget that the UN was created even before the beginning of the
Cold War for use in a multipolar international system. In other words,
its potential can be fully tapped only now.
9
At about the same time, the Russian government announced that it
would assist the government of Serbia in securing a vote in the UN
General Assembly to obtain from the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) an advisory opinion on the legality of Kosovo's secession; 10
condemned UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon for exceeding his
legal authority by facilitating the plans of the European Union (EU)1 '
8. Dmitri Medvedev, President of Russia, Speech at the Meeting with Russian
Ambassadors and Permanent Representatives to International Organizations (July 15,
2008), available at http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/O7/15/1121_type82912
type84779_204155.shtml.
Medvedev stated:
We need to reform international institutions while strengthening the central
role of the United Nations. Our position on this remains unchanged. The
United Nations is the only thing humanity has come up with in the last
hundred years to help maintain global security.
We need multilateral diplomacy for a more equitable, democratic system of
relations. The same framework should involve mechanisms of collective
leadership by leading states, those states that have a special responsibility for
the situation in the world. And such leadership must be a [sic] truly
representative in geographic terms and in terms of different civilizations. This
is the foundation of the modern democratic architecture of international
relations.
Id.
9. Lavrov, supra note 6.
10. Sergey Lavrov, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Transcript of Remarks
and Response to Media Questions at Joint Press Conference with Serbian Minister of
Foreign Affairs Vuk Jeremic (July 17, 2008), available at http://www.un.int/russia/
new/MainRoot/docs/offnews/170708/newenl.htm. The General Assembly subsequently
adopted Resolution A/RES/63/3 (Oct. 8, 2008), which endorsed Serbia's proposal to seek
an advisory opinion from the ICJ on the legality of Kosovo's secession. See Press
Release, Backing Request by Serbia, General Assembly Decides To Seek International
Court of Justice Ruling on Legality of Kosovo's Independence, U.N. Doc. GAJ10764
(Oct. 8, 2008), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/ga10764.doc.htm.
The General Assembly may seek advisory opinions from the ICJ pursuant to Article
96(1) of the United Nations Charter, U.N. Charter art. 96, para. 1, and Article 65(1) of
the Statute of the International Court of Justice, Statute of the International Court of
Justice art. 65, 1, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, U.N.T.S. 993.
11. The European Union was formally established in 1993 but originated in
1957 as the six-member European Economic Community. The latter was itself the
outgrowth of the 1951 Coal and Steel Community. See Ernest A. Young, Protecting
Member State Autonomy in the European Union: Some Cautionary Tales from
American Federalism, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1612, 1621-40 (2002) (discussing the origins of
EU).
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to replace the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) with its
own civil administration (EULEX);12 and called for the International
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), a UN organ created by the
Security Council, to be disbanded because of its alleged bias against
Serbia. 13 The combination of these initiatives demonstrated that
Russia intended to use international law aggressively against the
West, not least over the question of Kosovo. In effect, Russia seemed
to be saying to the West that it would claim its share of "ownership"
over UN organs, including the UN Secretariat; that it expected what
it saw as honesty and impartiality from Security Council
instrumentalities such as the ICTY; and that, if the West used its
powers in the Security Council to thwart Russian aims, Russia would
seek recourse in what it hoped would be more sympathetic UN fora,
such as the General Assembly and the ICJ.
Second, on August 8, 2008, Russia began large-scale military
operations in the former Soviet Republic of Georgia. 14 The ostensible
purpose of Russia's invasion was to defend the secessionist Republic
of South Ossetia from an attack by Georgia, a former Soviet Republic
under the leadership of the President Mikheil Saakashvili. 15
Saakashvili's ties to the United States were exceptionally close: he
had applied for NATO membership, sent Georgian troops to Iraq and
Afghanistan, and named the avenue that led to the Tbilisi Airport in
12. Russian Ambassador: UN Chief Exceeding His Authority, RUSSIA TODAY,
July 26, 2008, http://www.russiatoday.com/news/news/28052; Russia Lashes Out at UN
Over Kosovo, RUSSIA TODAY, July 8, 2008, http://www.russiatoday.com/news/news/
27224; see also Charles Hawley, UN Begins Transfer of Kosovo Authority to EU,
SPIEGEL ONLINE INT'L, Aug. 19, 2008, http://www.spiegel.de/international]europe/
0,1518,573024,00.html (noting that developments in Kosovo left the EU in a "legal
limbo").
13. Guy Faulconbridge, Hague Tribunal Should Be Phased Out: Russia,
REUTERS, July 10, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSL1031834
20080710.
14. E.g., Jenny Norton, Ossetian Crisis: Who Started It?, BBC NEWS, Aug. 19,
2008, http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7571096.stm; A Scripted War; Russia and
Georgia, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 16, 2008, at 24, 24.
15. Some analysts suggested that Russia's true purpose was to retain control
over the delivery of natural gas from Central Asia by creating instability in Georgia,
thus deterring investors from putting up the capital to build a gas pipeline that skirted
Russia and ran through Georgia. James Traub, Taunting the Bear, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9,
2008, at WK.1. Undoubtedly Russia perceived the planned pipeline as a threat to its
vital interests. GOLDMAN, supra note 3, at 149-51; LUCAS, supra note 3, at 177-79;
Vicken Cheterian, Georgia: Too Little Change, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, July 2007,
available at http:/mondediplo.com/2007/07/lOgeorgia. Others argued that Russia
feared the rise of democratic, pro-Western governments like Georgia's in its traditional
spheres of influence. E.g., Robert Kagan, Op-Ed., Russia, Not the West, Is Pushing Too
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honor of U.S. President George W. Bush. 16 As several foreign policy
analysts pointed out, the Russian leadership described South Ossetia
as "Russia's Kosovo," comparing their military operations in Georgia
to the West's intervention in Kosovo. 1 7 Russia's legal argument on
behalf of its intervention in Georgia was in critical respects the
mirror image of the Western argument in support of NATO's
campaign against Serbia in 1999.18 In the Security Council debate of
August 8, 2008, Russian delegate Vitaly Churkin claimed that Russia
had intervened to prevent Georgia from carrying out "ethnic
cleansing" in South Ossetia: "How else could the events be described,
when hospitals, schools and residential areas were being destroyed
and when thousands of people were leaving the Republic?' 9 Russia
also announced plans to investigate Georgian President Saakashvili
with a view toward criminal charges before an international
tribunal,20 much as former Serbian President Milosevic had been
tried before the ICTY. 2 1 The shadow of Kosovo thus fell over the
Russian invasion of Georgia, both by feeding Russia's desire to
revenge itself on the West and by providing Russia with legal
16. See Marc Almond, Editorial, Plucky Little Georgia? No, the Cold War
Reading Won't Wash, THE GUARDIAN (London), (Aug. 9, 2008), at 29, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/aug/09/georgia.russial. Almond notes
that at the time of the Russian invasion, Georgia was spending 70% of its national
budget on its military and harbored revanchiste designs against South Ossetia because
of the defeat it had suffered there in 1992. Id.
17. Quentin Peel, Wounded Pride Ignites an Accidental War, FIN. TIMES, Aug.
10, 2008, at 9; see also Robert McMahon, In Russia-Georgia Conflict, Balkan Shadows,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., Aug. 12, 2008, http://www.cfr.org/publication/16931/
(agreeing with Peel's characterization of events in Georgia).
18. See NOAM CHOMSKY, FAILED STATES 95-97 (2007) (observing that the
common Western justification for action in Kosovo involved the protection of human
rights).
19. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Hears Conflicting
Russian, Georgian Views of Worsening Crisis as Members Seek End to Violence in
Day's Second Meeting on South Ossetia, U.N. Doc. SC/9418 (Aug. 8, 2008). A careful
reading of Churkin's argument shows that he based the right of Russian forces to
intervene on Georgia's violation of a 1996 agreement signed by Georgia, the South
Ossetian parties, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and on
a prior 1992 "basic agreement" between Russia and Georgia on the principles for the
settlement of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict. Churkin claimed that Georgia had
violated the terms of these agreements by using force against the Ossetians, including
by attacks on Russian peacekeepers. Thus, Churkin concluded, Russia was acting as a
peacekeeper and "was present on Georgian territory on an absolutely legal basis and in
line with international agreements." Id.
20. See Saakkashvili May Be Put on Trial in Russia, Say Prosecutors, RUSSIA
TODAY, Aug. 14, 2008, http://www.russiatoday.com/news/news/29005 (stating that in
light of investigation some individuals are "calling for a trial before an international
tribunal").
21. ICTY.- Milosevic Trial Exposed Belgrade's Role in Wars, HUM. RTS. WATCH,
Dec. 14, 2006, http://www.hrw.org/englishdocs/2006/12/14/yugosl14800.htm (describing
evidence exposed during the trial of Slobodan Milosevic before the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia).
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arguments for use against the West to justify Russia's recognition of
South Ossetia (as well as Georgia's other breakaway province,
Abkazia). Russia's case with respect to Georgia reworked arguments
that the West itself had fashioned with respect to Kosovo, 22 calling
into question the internal consistency of Russia's overall legal
position.
23
While the document's authors were of course unaware of the role
that the events they discussed would play in the outbreak of a new
war, they were apparently attempting to think through the
implications of the new Russian policies from the perspective of
public international law, which at that point was dominated by the
assumptions of liberal capitalism (sometimes called "globalization").
24
President Medvedev had focused on the Kosovo crisis as evidence of
the breakdown of international law;25 accordingly, the authors were
22. See Ivan Simic, Russian Recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia: New
Political Reality, PRAVDA, Aug. 29, 2008, http://english.pravda.ru/opinion/columnists/
106242-0/ (noting the argument that draws parallels between Western and Russian
justifications for intervention in Kosovo and Georgia, respectively).
23. The authors, writing in the summer of 2008, foresaw the possibility of
Abkazian and South Ossetian secession, in light of the precedent the West had set in
Kosovo. See infra text accompanying note 389; see also George Friedman, Georgia and
Kosovo: A Single Intertwined Crisis (Aug. 25, 2008), available at http://www.stratfor.
com/weekly/georgiaandkosovo.single.intertwinedcrisis. They did not, however,
address the possible implications Russian recognition of Abkazian and South Ossetian
secession might have for Russia's legal position with respect to Kosovo. Further
research in the archives may be required to discern their views on this question.
24. Compare THOMAS FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE 239-41
(2000) (noting the potential effect of globalization on conflict prevention) with
HUNTINGTON, supra note 5, at 29 (describing civilizational differences as a leading
source of post-Cold War conflict). In a June 20, 2008 speech, Foreign Minister Lavrov
denounced "the global financial economic architecture" that was "largely created by the
West to suit its own needs" and called for "a financial-economic basis" that "would
conform to the polycentricity of the contemporary world." Sergey Lavrov, Russian
Minister of Foreign Aff., Summary of Remarks at the International Symposium
"Russia in the 21st Century" (June 20, 2008), available at http://www.norway.mid.ru/
newsfp/newsfp_74_eng.html.
25. Medvedev emphasized the Kosovo developments as illustrative of an
emerging characteristic of the post-Cold War international environment, one that now
required a Russian response:
I am convinced that with the end of Cold War the underlying reasons for
most of bloc politics and bloc discipline simply disappeared. We simply do not
need to return to that paternalistic system whereby some states decide for all
the others. The behaviour of states in the international arena is now much
more varied and independent.
But I would like to emphasise that this behaviour should not involve actions
that constitute a violation of international law. This represents an
unacceptable disregard for the very idea of individual security, which lies at the
heart of the concept of the security of states themselves.
Unfortunately, some of the most painful recent episodes have involved
precisely this sort of violation, in particular, the unilateral proclamation of
independence of Kosovo and the subsequent recognition of it as a state. Legal
2009]
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seeking to find new foundations on which international law might be
erected. Their objectives were both practical and philosophical. In
practical terms, they were exploring ways in which international law
and institutions might be refashioned so as to narrow the widening
conflicts between Russia and the West. But they also believed that
the differences between the West and Russia reflected in the Kosovo
affair required a fundamental reconsideration of the premises of the
international legal system and the state of affairs in Europe.
26
Kosovo, in short, was the immediate stimulus for considering
different understandings of the international legal order and, beyond
that, fundamental differences in world views. The Editors speculate
that, given their extensive citation to Western, principally U.S.,
sources, the authors intended their document to reach the U.S. legal
and political intelligentsia so as to influence the thinking of the new
administration taking power in 2009.
The authors assigned the representation of the various legal and
doctrinal positions to different Karamazov brothers. Dmitri
Karamazov, a military officer in Dostoievski's novel, emerges as the
spokesman for the views of Putin's and Medvedev's Russia on
international law. Ivan Karamazov, in the novel a youthful writer
and intellectual, defends the legal position of the EU and other
Western powers. Alyosha Karamazov, a Russian Orthodox
seminarian in the novel, here seeks to moderate the conflict between
the brothers and to reconcile their views into a more just and
comprehensive synthesis. Smerdyakov, who in the novel is the
illegitimate son of the brothers' father Fyodor Karamozov and who is
employed as a household servant on the Karamazov estate, appears
to represent no coherent principle at all but rather is the spirit of
decisions in such an instance must be achieved by reaching agreement among
all parties involved in such a process and affected by these decisions.
It would certainly have been simpler for us to distance ourselves from this
problem and say that, for the European Union, Kosovo is almost what Iraq has
proved to be for the United States. And certainly our partners have been
guided by their own sense of responsibility, their own plans for stabilization.
All this is true. But meanwhile, much more importantly, once again
international law has been undermined, along with one of the fundamental
principles of coexistence among states, one that affects the way Europe and the
world will develop.
Medvedev, supra note 8.
26. On this subject, Medvedev observed:
I am convinced that we have reached a stage in world development that
requires substantive, even philosophical approaches. We need to regularly
consult history or, for obvious reasons, its most negative scenarios will repeat
themselves. We must draw lessons from it and stop trying to revise history to
suit the prevailing political conditions.
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negation and anarchy.27 In important respects, the dialogue echoes
the great debate between "Westernizers" and "Slavophiles" that has
been going on since the reforms of Czar Peter the Great and that even
now "somehow endures" in Russia.
28
The authors sought to unfold progressively the foundational
assumptions of competing understandings of international law as
revealed in the differing Western and Russian responses to the
Kosovo crisis. They started their dialogue by having the Karamazov
brothers discuss the conventional materials of international law
applicable to the Kosovo situation-in particular, United Nations
Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1244 (1999).29 The characters
thereafter consider the underlying principles and policies of
international law, and then explore conflicting perspectives about
what ought to be the basic mode of interpretation of such
constitutional instruments as the UN Charter. At the end of the
dialogue, two new characters-also taken from Dostoievski's novel-
make an appearance. These characters are, respectively, the Grand
Inquisitor and Father Zossima. In Dostoievski's novel, the Grand
Inquisitor is a character, perhaps Ivan's alter ego, in a piece of
imaginative writing that Ivan narrates in a lengthy conversation with
Alyosha. In that setting, the Grand Inquisitor is thought to embody
Dostoievski's extremely hostile vision of the role of Latin Christianity
in forming Western Europe's culture and mentality.3 0 In the dialogue
27. Perhaps he is even a Russian nihilist inspired by Turgenev's Fathers and
Sons (1862) or modeled on characters in Dostoievski's own earlier novels, such as
Kirilov in The Possessed (1872). See generally FYODOR DOSTOYEvSY, THE POSSESSED
222-26 (Andrew R. MacAndrew trans., 1980); IvAN TURGENEV, FATHERS AND SONS 21
(Michael R. Katz trans., 1994).
28. JOHN LuKAcs, THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY AND THE END OF THE
MODERN AGE 58-59 (1993) (discussing the historical pattern of controversies between
Westernizers and Slavophiles). Even current debates within Russian foreign policy
6lites reveal differences that are similar to those between traditional Slavophiles and
Westernizers. See William Zimmerman, Slavophiles and Westernizers Redux:
Contemporary Russian Elite Perspectives 2 (National Council for Eurasian and East
European Research, Working Paper, Aug. 10, 2005), available at
http://www.ucis.pitt.edu/nceeer/2005_819-09gZimmerman.pdf (describing the 20th
century reprise of the Westernizer-Slavophile divide of the mid-nineteenth century); see
also NICOLAS BERDYAEv, THE RUSSIAN IDEA 34-71 (1948) (leading Russian Orthodox
thinker's survey of Russian nineteenth century thought on the country's nature,
history, and global mission-taking into account traditional Westernizing and
Slavophil perspectives).
29. S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999).
30. Although Dostoievski's legend of the Grand Inquisitor "may be interpreted
chiefly as directed against Roman Catholicism and revolutionary socialism . . . in
actual fact the subject is broader and deeper. It is the theme of the kingdom of Caesar,
of the rejection of the temptation of the kingdoms of this world." BERDYAEV, supra,
note 28, at 122. For studies of the Grand Inquisitor legend in The Brothers Karamazov,
see NICHOLAS BERDYAEV, DOSTOEVSKY 188-212 (Donald Attwater trans., 1960); A.
BOYCE GIBSON, THE RELIGION OF DOSTOEVSKY 182-93 (1973); KONSTANTIN
MOCHULSKY, DOSTOEVSKY: HIS LIFE AND WORK 617-22 (Michael A. Minihan trans.,
2009/
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presented here, however, the authors gave the Grand Inquisitor the
role of explaining the underlying premises behind the Western,
specifically European, view of international law, thus deepening
Ivan's earlier articulation of the fundamental objects and purposes of
that law. In the novel, Father Zossima is a Russian Orthodox monk,
Alyosha's spiritual mentor and guide. In the dialogue, as in the
novel, Zossima is the counterpoint to the Grand Inquisitor.
In translating, editing, and publishing this document, the
Editors express no views about the various opinions set forth in it.
The Editors do, however, share the underlying view of all of the
document's protagonists that much debate over issues of public
international law is disingenuous. Unfortunately, many of the
lawyers, lawyer-diplomats, and legal academics who debate
questions of public international law are lacking in the self-
consciousness that would lead them to inquire into their own basic,
but unstated, presuppositions. 31  Perhaps by presenting this
document, the Editors may stimulate more and deeper reflection of
that kind.
Kosovo: BACKGROUND
Our readers will doubtless need some review of the situation in
Kosovo as it stood seventy-two years ago in the summer of 2008. The
central facts are these:
Until its declaration of independence in February 2008, Kosovo
(or, in Albanian, "Kosova") was formally a province of about 4,200
square miles (somewhat smaller than the state of Connecticut)
located in southern Serbia. 32 In 1999, Kosovo was the scene of the
last of the four "Yugoslav wars"-Slovenia (1991), Croatia (1991-
1992), Bosnia (1992-1995), and Kosovo (1999)-that attended the
breakup of the former Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia
1971); ROWAN WILLIAMS, DOSTOEVSKY: LANGUAGE, FAITH, AND FICTION 26-35, 76-83
(2008); Albert Camus, The Rejection of Salvation, in THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV 836,
840 (Constance Garnett trans., 1976); D.H. Lawrence, The Grand Inquisitor, in THE
BROTHERS KARAMAZOV, supra at 829, 829-36.
31. Unfortunately, the Cold War experience has distorted the
consciousness of several generations of people, above all political elites,
making them think that any global policy must be ideologized ... [A]t
least two generations of political leaders were educated in a definite
ideological system of coordinates, and sometimes are simply unable to
think in categories lying outside of it.
Lavrov, supra note 24.
32. See generally NOEL MALcOLM, KOSOVO: A SHORT HISTORY (1998) (detailing
the history of the Yugoslav state).
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(SFRY or the former Yugoslavia). 33 Prior to 1999 and for many
decades before that, the population of Kosovo was overwhelmingly
Albanian in ethnicity and Moslem in faith.3 4 Historically, however,
Kosovo was an important part of the religious and cultural
inheritance of the Serbs, a Slavic and Orthodox Christian people, and
was known to them as "Old Serbia.
' '35
The former Yugoslavia became an independent state in
December 1918, almost immediately after the end of the First World
War.36 From the beginning it was an ethnically and religiously
divided state, predominantly populated by Slavic peoples, of which
the two largest groups were the Serbs and the Croats. 37 The state
was formed by the unification of the two southern states of Serbia
and Montenegro with the former Austro-Hungarian territories of
Croatia, Dalmatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. 38 (Serbia had previously
seized Kosovo from the decaying Ottoman Empire during the First
Balkan War (1912) and had thereafter annexed it.) 39 Relations
between the major ethnic groups in the Yugoslav state from 1918
onward were difficult: the Croats feared and resented what they
considered to be Serb domination of the state, while the Serbs had
joined the state precisely because they had intended to build it
around themselves. 40 Nonetheless, geopolitical realities, including
the apprehension of encroachments by Italy, Hungary, or Bulgaria,
33. PHILIP BOBBITT, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES: WAR, PEACE, AND THE COURSE
OF HISTORY 432 (2002). In addition to the four violent secessions from the former
Yugoslavia, a fifth secession occurred when the then-union of Serbia and Montenegro
in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) ended with the peaceful secession of the
latter on June 3, 2006. Yehuda Z. Blum, Was Yugoslavia a Member of the United
Nations in the Years 1992-2000?, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 800, 800 n.2 (2007). Montenegro
was admitted into the United Nations on June 28, 2006. G.A. Res. 60/264, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/60/264 (June 28, 2006).
34. PIOTR EBERHARDT, ETHNIC GROUPS AND POPULATION CHANGES IN
TWENTIETH-CENTURY CENTRAL-EASTERN EUROPE 385-94 (Jan Owsinski trans., 2003).
35. Peter Popham, Serbia Endorses Bomb Attack on Kosovo Border, THE
INDEPENDENT (London), Feb. 20, 2008, at 18 (noting the view of Serbs "who are bitterly
resentful of the fact. that the province known as the historic heartland of 'Old Serbia'
should have broken free").
36. See DAVID FROMKIN, Kosovo CROSSING 128-30 (1999) (describing the
events leading to the recognition of Yugoslavia as a nation); MARGARET MACMILLAN,
PARIS 1919, at 109-24 (2001) (detailing the circumstances of Yugoslavia's origin).
37. For a magisterial account of the peoples of the former Yugoslavia, their
origins, and their ideologies before unification, see IVO BANAC, THE NATIONAL
QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA: ORIGINS, HISTORY, POLITICS 21-115 (1984).
38. See id. at 115-40 (detailing the establishment of the Yugoslav state).
39. See id. at 296 (describing the Serbian occupation and annexation of Kosovo
in 1912-13).
40. See MACMILLAN, supra note 36, at 110 (describing the "separate
nationalisms" growing in the region).
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tended to hold the union together. 41 Inter-ethnic conflict broke out,
however, with the invasion of Yugoslavia by Nazi Germany in the
spring of 1941.42 Joining in the German victory "was the Croatian
Ustase leader Ante Pavelic, who became Croatia's wartime leader"
and eventually oversaw the killing of nearly half a million ethnic
Serbs.43 Resistance to the German occupation was divided between
forces loyal to the pre-war monarchy and Communist partisans led by
Josip Broz, himself an ethnic Croat who was better known by his nom
de guerre "Tito.
' 44
The Communist movement took power at the conclusion of the
Second World War and proclaimed the Federal People's Republic of
Yugoslavia in November 1945. 45 This Yugoslav state was constituted
on the principle of what might be called ethno-federalism. 46 The
state's "federal" structure consisted of six constituent "republics"-
Serbia (including the province of Kosovo), Croatia, Slovenia,
Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Montenegro, whose boundaries
were defined, with the notable exceptions of the Albanian majority in
Kosovo and the Hungarian majority in Vojvodina, largely in terms of
population distribution by ethnicity.47 According to the 1991 census,
41. See FROMKIN, supra note 36, at 141-43 (noting the perceived external
threats to the Yugoslav state which allowed "the new borders to harden in the public
mind").
42. See MALCOLM, supra note 32, at 290 (detailing the circumstances of the
German invasion and Yugoslavia's unconditional surrender).
43. FROMKIN, supra note 36, at 145.
44. See id. at 146 (noting that Broz became better known as "Tito"); MALCOLM,
supra note 32, at 297-302 (describing the two resistance movements that emerged
during the German invasion).
45. See RICHARD C. FRUCHT, EASTERN EUROPE 431 (2005) (noting that the
Communist-controlled Consituent Assembly established the Federal People's Republico
of Yugoslavia on November 29, 1945).
46. This federal structure was sacrosanct, it being seen as one of the
pillars of the communist Yugoslavia that emerged as a result of the
Partisan struggle during World War II. Thus it appeared as a cardinal
figure of all of communist Yugoslavia's constitutional documents [from
1946 to 1974]. However, in reality the Yugoslav state in the immediate
post-World War II years was a highly centralised [sic] state due to
political control exercised by the highly centralised [sic] [Communist
Party of Yugoslavia]. In this respect the leadership role of Tito was
crucial.
PETER RADAN, THE BREAK-UP OF YUGOSLAVIA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 147 (2002).
47. As one scholar reports:
The boundaries of the constituent republics corresponded more or less to the
territorial distribution of particular ethnic groups, so that each ethnic group
inhabited a particular constituent republic. However, some ethnic groups, such
as the Serbs, formed significant minorities within constituent republics other
than their own. There were also ethnic groups which did not have their own
constituent republic, such as the Albanians and the Hungarians, who were
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the last before the Yugoslav wars began, "five of the six republics
were substantially mono-ethnic"; Bosnia was the exception. 4 8
Slovenia was 88% Slovene; Croatia 78% Croat; Serbia 66% Serb;
Macedonia 65% Macedonian; Montenegro 62% Montenegrin.
4 9
Because Albanian Kosovars boycotted the 1991 census, their exact
numbers are unknown, but they are believed to have been 85% of the
population of Kosovo. 50 However, substantial ethnic Serb minority
populations existed outside Serbia, particularly in the Republics of
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Serbia's acceptance of the post-
1945 system of internal borders was therefore conditional upon the
Yugoslav federation's remaining centralized.5 1
Persisting ethnic tensions within the former Yugoslavia, though
in general successfully suppressed by the Tito regime, led to
constitutional changes in 1963 and again in 1974.52 Under the 1974
constitution, which remained in force until the SFRY's breakup, a
Presidential Council directed the government's affairs at the federal
level.53 The Council consisted of the heads of the six republics
together with the heads of the autonomous provinces Kosovo and
Serbia.54 The chair of the Council rotated among its members. 55 The
1974 constitutional arrangements "gave the autonomous provinces of
Kosovo and Vojvodina a status equivalent in most ways to that of the
six republics themselves," including the right to issue their own
constitutions, and confirmed rights earlier granted to the autonomous
provinces to a role in federal economic decision making and even
foreign policy. 56 Indeed, some analysts contend that Yugoslavia's
Communist r~gime had deliberately 'gerrymandered' the
Constitution 'as a means of weakening the state's largest ethnic
element,' the Serbs.' 57  As a result, the 1974 constitution was
extremely unsatisfactory to many Serbs, who preferred a more
concentrated respectively in the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and
Vojvodina, within Serbia.
THOMAS D. MUSGRAVE, SELF-DETERMINATION AND NATIONAL MINORITIES 114 (1997).
48. MICHAEL MANN, THE DARK SIDE OF DEMOCRACY 363 (2005).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. RADAN, supra note 46, at 152.
52. See FROMKIN, supra note 36, at 146 (noting the manner in which ethnic
unrest contributed to changes to the constitution).
53. See HEIKE KRIEGER, THE Kosovo CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 1
(2001) (describing this presidential council as a "federal presidency" composed of "two
representatives of each republic and one from each autonomous province").
54. See id. (detailing the composition of the collective federal presidency).
55. See id. (describing the rotational leadership of the collective presidency).
56. MALCOLM, supra note 32, at 327. Malcolm suggests that the 1974
constitution did not take the further step of making Kosovo a "republic" largely for fear
that it might secede and join with Albania. Id. at 328.
57. MANN, supra note 48, at 365 (quoting WALKER CONNOR,
ETHNONATIONALISM 333 (1994)).
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centralized state, 58 despite ethnic Serbian predominance in the
federal Yugoslav Army and the federal governmental apparatus.5 9 A
well-known memorandum written in 1986 by sixteen members of the
Serb Academy of Arts and Sciences set forth the causes of Serb
dissatisfaction with the existing Yugoslav state.60 In particular, the
authors of the memorandum claimed that Kosovo was experiencing
the "physical, political, legal and cultural" genocide of the province's
Serb population, owing to the intimidation and discrimination they
allegedly encountered at the hands of the Kosovar Albanian
provincial authorities. 61 The complaints expressed by these Serbian
intellectuals, while controversial, were by no means groundless. As
one scholar points out, there is "a strong argument" that the failure of
the Kosovar Albanian majority after the grant of provincial autonomy
in 1974 to reassure the Kosovar Serb minority that its rights and
interests would be respected lay behind much of the trouble that was
to ensue in the 1980s.
62
During the Cold War, Yugoslavia, as a "non-aligned" (if also
Communist) state, occupied a special place in NATO strategy that
gave it continuing access to Western credit and Western markets.
The conclusion of the Cold War, however, coupled with the foreign
debt crisis of the late 1980s, cost Yugoslavia its niche position in the
global economy and exposed it to competition from newly independent
Central European states. The resulting strains destabilized
Yugoslavia, encouraged its most "Westernized" components (Slovenia
and Croatia) to seek independence, and fed the rise of nationalist and
secessionist movements throughout the federation.6 3 In the late
1980s, Slobodan Milosevic, a former Communist opportunistically
drawing on Serbian nationalism, began to emerge as Serbia's leading
political figure. 64 Milosevic first gained prominence in April 1987 in
the small town of Kosovo Field, next to the site of the famous battle of
June 28, 1389, in which the forces of the Serb medieval empire under
Prince Lazar Hrebeljanovi6 were defeated by the army of the
Ottoman Sultan Murad 1.65 Milosevic, visiting the town as a
Communist Party deputy leader, witnessed Kosovar Albanian police
58. See id. at 364-65 (describing Serbian frustrations with the 1974
constitutional changes).
59. See id. at 365 (noting the degree of Serbian predominance).
60. Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences (1986),
available at http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/KosovolKosovo-Backgroundl7.htm.
61. Id.
62. Michael Mccgwire, Why Did We Bomb Belgrade?, 76 INT'L AFF. 1, 4 (2000).
63. Id. at 2.
64. MANN, supra note 48, at 369-76 (detailing the rise of Milosevic beginning
in the late 1980s).
65. Some scholars question whether the Serb forces even suffered defeat at
Kosovo Field. In any case, Serbia's loss of independence was not complete until 88
years later, with the fall of Smederevo. BRANIMIR ANZULOVIC, HEAVENLY SERBIA: FROM
MYTH TO GENOCIDE 38-39 (1999).
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beating Serbs-an event he may have prearranged-and was
televised exclaiming, "[N]ever again will you be beaten. '66 Milosevic
became President of Serbia in May 198967 and, in breach of the 1974
constitution, revoked Kosovo's and Vojvodina's status as autonomous
provinces in 1989.68 Thereafter Milosevic instituted a program of
discrimination against Kosovo's ethnic Albanian majority, leading to
their exculsion from employment, education, and health care
benefits.6 9 The Albanian Kosovars fought back and, in a referendum
organized by para-governmental institutions, voted for
independence. 70  Likewise, an underground parliament and
government, led by Ibrahim Rugova as President, were created in
1992.
71
Kosovo was not itself the site of major armed conflict during the
second (Croatian) and third (Bosnian) Yugoslav wars, but it was
keenly interested in the 1995 Dayton Accords, under which the
international community imposed a settlement to the war in
Bosnia. 72 The Albanian Kosovars had expected that the Dayton
Accords would grant them some future status, but instead they found
66. MANN, supra note 48, at 370.
67. KRIEGER, supra note 53, at 524.
68. MANN, supra note 48, at 370. Serbia's leadership had sought on various to
change Kosovo's de facto status as a republic under the federation's 1974 constitution
but had been unsuccessful because of the objections of the other republics. RADAN,
supra note 46, at 197. However, continued pressure by the Kosovar Albanians for
formal republican status for Kosovo throughout the 1980s provoked Serbia to take
unilateral action to change its constitution in 1989 and again in 1990 to curtail
Kosovo's autonomy. Id. The two key events were a 1989 amendment to the Serbian
constitution, followed by a new constitution for Serbia in 1990. Id.
Some scholars date the current crisis in Kosovo to these 1989-1990 constitutional
changes, which were accompanied by other Milosevic-inspired measures against the
Albanian Kosovars. MIRANDA VICKERS, BETWEEN SERB AND ALBANIAN: A HISTORY OF
Kosovo 234-35 (1998); Richard Caplan, International Diplomacy and the Crisis in
Kosovo, 74 INT'L AFF. 745, 748, 751 (1998).
69. See Caplan, supra note 68, at 751 (describing Albanian expulsion from
employment and education); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/HELSINKI, OPEN WOUNDS: HUMAN
RIGHTS ABUSES IN Kosovo 126 (1993) (explaining that in July and August 1990 the
health care system in Kosovo was placed under "emergency management" by the
Serbians leading to massive layoffs of Kosovar Albanian healthcare workers).
70. See Assembly of the Republic of Kosova, Results of the Referendum (Oct. 19,
1991), reprinted in FORMER YUGOSLAVIA THROUGH DOCUMENTS: FROM ITS
DISSOLUTION TO THE PEACE SETTLEMENT 765-66 (Sneiana Trifunovska ed. 1999)
(stating that of the 1,051,357 eligible voters of Kosova, 87.01% participated in the
referendum, and of those 87.01%, 99.87% voted in favor of independence).
71. For a detailed account of political developments in Kosovo between 1989
and 1992, see RADAN, supra note 46, at 198-200.
72. See Paul C. Szasz, Introductory Note, General Framework Agreement for
Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosn. & Herz.-Croat.-Yugo., Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M.
75 (1996) [hereinafter Dayton Peace Accords] (explaining the implementation of the
General Framework Agreement and the role of the international community in
concluding the treaty).
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themselves ignored.73 Their frustration led to the formation of the
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which began an insurgency targeting
Serb security forces. 7 4  The Serbian authorities retaliated with a
program of systematic reprisals and village clearances against the
Albanian Kosovars. 7 5 These measures intensified throughout 1998.76
On September 23, 1998, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution
1199 (1998), which expressed "[g]rave concern[]" over "excessive and
indiscriminate use of force" by the Serb security forces and military
that had "resulted in numerous civilian casualties and ... the
displacement of over 230,000 persons from their homes. '7 7 The
Resolution further expressed alarm over an "impending
humanitarian catastrophe" and reaffirmed the Council's commitment
to "a peaceful resolution of the Kosovo problem which would include
an enhanced status for Kosovo, a substantially greater autonomy, and
meaningful self-administration. s7 8  Nonetheless the inter-ethnic
conflict grew worse, culminating in a massacre in the village of Ra~ak
in January 1999 that left forty-five Albanian Kosovars dead.
79
In February 1999, the so-called Contact Group-France,
Germany, Italy, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United
States 8 0-summoned Serb and Albanian Kosovar negotiators to a
conference in Rambouillet, France, in order to secure their agreement
to an interim settlement.8 1 The talks failed: the Kosovar Albanian
delegation was persuaded to sign on to the Rambouillet plan only
73. See Mark S. Ellis, The Consequences of the Kosovo Conflict on Southeastern
Europe, 34 INT'L LAW. 1193, 1194 (2000) (explaining that Dayton created expectations
among Kosovar Albanians for "some degree of independence" but that Kosovo was left
off the agenda at Dayton and this signaled to Kosovo's leaders that their efforts to gain
international support would be fruitless).
74. See MALCOLM, supra note 32, at 353-55 (explaining that after Kosovo was
ignored at Dayton, some Kosovar Albanians began taking more "direct action"
including shootings and bombings targeted at Serb officials and that by the summer of
1997 a group calling itself the "Kosovo Liberation Army" was claiming responsibility
for the attacks).
75. See MANN, supra note 48, at 387 (explaining how Serb police attempted to
wipe out the KLA in 1998); see also Eleanor Lumsden, An Uneasy Peace: Multilateral
Military Intervention in Civil Wars, 75 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 795, 828-29 (2003)
(noting that Serbian forces began to carry out reprisals on both the rebel forces and
Albanian villagers and civilians).
76. See generally Lumsden, supra note 75, at 829 (noting that in 1998 Milosevic
began a program of ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians).
77. S.C. Res. 1199, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1199 (Sept. 23, 1998).
78. Id.
79. Timothy W. Crawford, Pivotal Deterrence and the Kosovo War: Why the
Holbrooke Agreement Failed, 116 POL. SCI. Q. 499, 519 (2001).
80. Marc Weller, The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo, 75 INT'L AFF. 211, 212
(1999).
81. Ivo H. DAALDER & MICHAEL E. O'HANLON, WINNING UGLY: NATO'S WAR TO
SAVE KOSOVO 76-77 (2000).
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with extreme difficulty, while the Serbs refused to sign at all.8 2 Soon
after, the Serbs renewed their offensive against Kosovo.8 3 At that
point, Western military forces in the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) intervened with air strikes against Serbia and
its forces in Kosovo.8 4 The NATO air war began on March 24, 1999,
and continued until June 9, 1999.85 The NATO countries did not
secure authorization from the UN Security Council under Chapter
VII of the UN Charter for their use of force.8 6 Following NATO's air
attacks, Serb forces in Kosovo massively intensified their efforts at
ethnic cleansing, driving over 800,000 Albanian Kosovars out of
Kosovo.
87
On June 10, 1999, Milosevic agreed to withdraw Serb forces from
Kosovo, opening the way to an international settlement.88 This
settlement was embodied in SCR 1244 (1999), which forms the first
major topic discussed in the following dialogue.8 9 Broadly speaking,
SCR 1244 authorized the establishment of a United Nations civil
administrative mission, UNMIK, in Kosovo, and the deployment of a
NATO-led security force (KFOR) into that province. 90 Kosovo was
thus placed under a transitional UN administration pending the
outcome of a negotiation process intended to resolve its final political
status.
91
82. For analysis of the Rambouillet Conference, see Mccgwire, supra note 62, at
7-10, 13-15. Mccgwire argues that the Western powers in the Contact Group set up
the Conference to fail, thus positioning themselves to make war on Serbia. Id. at 13.
83. See JOHN JANZEKOVIC, THE USE OF FORCE IN HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION: MORALITY AND PRACTICALITIES 179 (2006) (describing how the "Serbian
military and police forces immediately stepped up the intensity of their operations
against the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo" once the Serb delegation walked out of the
Rambouillet conference).
84. Id. at 180 (noting that the U.S. and NATO began Operation Allied Force
after the Serbs refused to comply with the Rambouillet peace proposal).
85. NATO's Role in Relation to the Conflict in Kosovo, http://www.nato.int/
kosovo/history.htm [hereinafter NATO's Role] (last visited Dec. 19, 2008).
86. See JANZEKOVIC, supra note 83, at 181 (explaining that NATO acted
without a UN mandate).
87. For a full account of the 1999 war and its background see DAALDER &
O'HANLON, supra note 81.
88. See NATO's Role, supra note 85 (describing the NATO withdrawal from
Kosovo on June 10 after verifying the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces following the
conclusion of the Military-Technical Agreement on June 9, 1999).
89. S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 29.
90. Id. 5; see also United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo, UNMIK
Fact Sheet (July 2008), available at http://www.unmikonline.org/intro.htm (discussing
the establishment of UNMIK).
91. See Enrico Milano, Security Council Action in the Balkans: Reviewing the
Legality of Kosovo's Territorial Status, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 999, 1003 (2003) (describing
the UN transitional administration); see also S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 29, 11(a)
("promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial autonomy
and self-government in Kosovo").
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The costs of the United Nations' activities in administering
Kosovo were substantial: since 1999, the U.N. has spent
approximately US$53 billion in Kosovo, or roughly US$2,800 per
capita per year-"160 times the average yearly per capita aid for all
developing countries combined. ' 92  Nonetheless, Kosovo remains
impoverished, with close to half its residents living on less than
US$4.80 a day and with youth unemployment at around 75%, and it
is reported to be riddled with corruption and dominated by organized
crime figures.93 Allegations of corruption and criminality have also
been leveled against UNMIK administrators. 94 Moreover, despite the
presence of KFOR, ethnic violence, now largely directed against
Serbs, has persisted in Kosovo.
95
As detailed more fully in the dialogue, the political process failed
to resolve the question of Kosovo's final status in a manner acceptable
to all the parties of interest. In the view of the Western powers, it
appeared that any agreement between the Serbian authorities and
the Kosovar Albanians was simply out of reach. On February 17,
2008, Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia. 96 On February
18, the EU Foreign Ministers agreed to provide a wide range of
political, military, diplomatic, and financial support to the new state
of Kosovo.9 7 Several major Western governments, including the U.S.,
UK, France, Germany, and Italy, swiftly recognized Kosovo as a
sovereign, independent state.98 The Serbian government, supported
by Russia, has vigorously contested the legality both of Kosovo's
secession and of the Western powers' support for it.99
Kosovo's Albanians differ from their Serb neighbors ethnically,
religiously, and linguistically. 100  The pre-1998 history of Serb-




95. See INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON Kosovo, THE FOLLOW-
UP OF THE KOsOVO REPORT: WHY CONDITIONAL INDEPENDENCE? 19 (2001), available at
http://www.alb-net.com/pipermaillalbsa-info/2001-November/002393.html (finding
KFOR's inability to restrain violence against Kosovo's Serb minority "the greatest
single failure since the NATO intervention" and "a moral disgrace").
96. Dan Bilefsky, Kosovo Declares Independence, INT'L HERALD TRIB, Feb. 18,
2008, at 1.
97. Press Release, Council of the European Union, 2851st Council Meeting,
General Affairs and External Relations 2 (Feb. 18, 2008), available at
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms-Dataldcs/pressDatalengena9888.pdf.
98. Nicholas Kulish & C.J. Chivers, Kosovo Independence Gets Mixed Reaction
Worldwide, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 19, 2008, at All.
99. See id. (explaining that the Serbian President described Kosovo as a "false
state" and that Russia believed the declaration to be "null and void").
100. See Jonathan I. Charney, Self-Determination: Chechnya, Kosovo and East
Timor, 24 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 455, 460 n.18 (2001) (noting that the Albanians in
Kosovo are distinct from the "majority population in terms of language, ethnicity,
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Albanian relations was unquestionably marked by severe conflict,
including mass ethnic cleansing.1 0 1  Yet, the closely entwined
histories of Kosovo and Serbia also included periods of coexistence
and symbiosis. From a long-term perspective, "Kosovo was
essentially a pluralistic society, where various ethnic groups
coexisted, many languages were spoken and all major religions of the
Balkans were represented."'10 2 Kosovo today, however, is effectively a
"cleansed," mono-ethnic zone. Since NATO's intervention in 1999,
about two-thirds of the ethnic Serb population of Kosovo, or some
200,000 people, have been forced out.
10 3
religion, culture, and social organization"); see also MALCOLM, supra note 32, at 10-40
(discussing the development of the culture, language and religion of the Albanians).
101. See, e.g., MALCOLM, supra note 32, at 335 (describing the deaths of Kosovar
Albanians in the 1980s).
102. GER DUIJZINGS, RELIGION AND THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY IN Kosovo 9
(2000).
103. See MANN, supra note 48, at 356 (noting that during 1999, Kosovar
Albanians pressured almost 200,000 Serbs, amounting to two-thirds of the population,
to leave Kosovo).
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THE Kosovo COLLOQUIES: A DRAMA IN FIVE ACTS








A Russian army officer and military
lawyer; half-brother of Ivan and Alyosha
A westernizing, secular Russian
journalist with a legal training, perhaps
including post-graduate study at a
famous U.S. law school
A seminarian; the youngest brother
A servant in the Karamazov household;
the illegitimate child of Fyodor
Karamazov, father of Dmitri, Ivan, and
Alyosha
The Cardinal-Archbishop of Seville and
the friend and teacher of Ivan
A Russian Orthodox monk and
Alyosha's spiritual guide
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Act I: Kosovo and the United Nations Security Council
Alyosha:
Honored guests, Brothers: The conversation we are about to
engage in is not simply for the purpose of entertainment. True, one of
our long, light-filled Russian summer evenings lies before us. We
have dined well. And we have the joy of each other's company. But
the matter we are discussing is one of fundamental importance to our
country and the world. You might not think so at first. Our subject
is the legality of Kosovo's declaration of independence in February
2008 and the role of the great powers of the Western world-the
European Union (EU) and the United States- in bringing about and
seeking to entrench that independence. In itself, the fate of Kosovo
might seem to be inconsequential. What is it but a poor, small,
backward region of the Balkans, "vgritable piriphdrie de la
pdriphdrie," as one French scholar put it?10 4 But when we reflect, we
shall see that much is at stake. I think the legal question from which
we start will gradually unfold into questions of much greater
magnitude. We shall be driven to consider how best to fulfill the
purposes of the United Nations Charter-or whether to supplant the
Charter with some other kind of constitutional order in world affairs.
We shall have to examine the relation between the discourse of public
international law and the rivalries of the great powers, including our
own country. And we may even have to consider whether the
differences that have emerged in the international community over
the fate of Kosovo are not merely the outcome of different
understandings of international law or even of the clash of vying
great powers' interests and ambitions but rather rest on fundamental
differences between visions of the world-differences, if I may so put
it, not simply between the West and Russia but between the Western
"idea" and the Russian "idea."'
10 5
Although you, Brother Dmitri, are a soldier and you, Brother
Ivan, are a journalist, both of you are lawyers. Brother Smerdyakov,
I understand you benefited from years of informal training at the feet
of your master, our father, Fyodor Karamazov. So I hope and expect
that you all will demonstrate finely honed legal skills. Let us
together prove the falsehood of the Marquis de Custine's remark that
104. See DUIJZINGS, supra note 102, at 5 (quoting French social geographer
Michel Roux).
105. Dostoievski himself used the formula "the Russian idea" as early as 1856,
and frequently thereafter. JAMES P. SOANLON, DOSTOEVSKY THE THINKER 198 n.3
(2002). The term was widely used by Russian intellectuals throughout the nineteenth
century and has again become current in the post-Soviet period. Id.
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the strength of the Russians "does not lie in mind, but in war"!10 6 But
in showing our adroitness at legal argument, let us always remember
that our aim is to discover what is true and just.
Dmitri:
Brother Ivan, your U.S. and Western European friends-I will
usually refer to them collectively as "the West"-have violated
international law by setting up the Albanian Kosovar entity in
Kosovo as an independent "state." And, as President Medvedev has
recently emphasized, our Russia takes international law-and above
all, the law of the United Nations Charter-extremely seriously,
considering it to be the basis of stability and peace in international
affairs.
107
Here I will argue that, under the ordinary rules for the
interpretation of treaties, Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1244
(1999),108 which governs the international community's dealings with
Kosovo, bars the West's action. One need only pick up the Resolution
to read that it "reaffirm[s] the commitment of all Member States to
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia and the other States of the region."'1 9 By unilaterally
bringing about the secession of Kosovo from the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia-or Serbia, as it now isn°0 -and attempting to sustain
that "state" in being without either Serbia's consent or the Security
Council's approval, the Western powers, in my view, have clearly
violated their obligation under Article 25 of the UN Charter "to accept
and carry out the decisions of the Security Council.""'
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and SCR 1244.
International treaty law governs under the proper interpretation of
SCR 1244, for that Resolution represents a solemn international
agreement or "treaty" whose interpretation is governed by the
provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(VCLT)." 2 Thus, SCR 1244 should be read in accord with its text,
106. MARQUIS DE CUSTINE, EMPIRE OF THE CZAR: A JOURNEY THROUGH ETERNAL
RUSSIA 616 (Daniel J. Boorstin ed., 1989) (1843).
107. See Medvedev, supra note 8 ("[I]nternational law ... is the set of rules that
has been and remains the most solid foundation for relations between nations.").
108. S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 29.
109. Id. pmbl.
110. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (describing the history of
secessions from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia).
111. U.N. Charter art. 25.
112. See R. (on the application of Al-Jedda) v. Sec'y of State for Defence [2007]
UKHL 58, [2008] 1 A.C. 332 (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.) (holding that Security
Council Resolutions have legal effect under UN Charter art. 103 of superseding
contrary treaties, including European Convention on Human Rights); see also Sir
Michael Wood, The Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial Lectures, The UN Security Council
[VOL, 42.'15
THE KOSOVO CRISIS: A DOSTOIEVSKIAN DIALOGUE
object and purpose and, as necessary, its negotiating history as
reflected in the Security Council debate concerning its adoption.
113
SCR 1244, so read, clearly contemplated that the final political status
of Kosovo would be decided through negotiations between the
Albanian Kosovar entity and Serbia, would not involve the
dismemberment of Serbia's territory without its consent, and would
be subject to review and approval by the Security Council.
The plain meaning of SCR 1244 deprives any state, including
Serbia itself, of any rights it might previously have enjoyed under
general principles of international law unilaterally to effect or to
recognize changes in the political status of Kosovo. SCR 1244
reserved the question of Kosovo's final political status for later
determination by the international community acting through the
Security Council.114 The text, as well as the debate of the Security
Council when it adopted the Resolution, establishes clearly that the
Security Council was to remain seized of the matter.115 That
continues to be true today. The February 2008 Security Council
debate over Kosovo's declaration of independence demonstrated
vigorous dissent from the West's narrow interpretation of SCR
1244.116 Because a treaty may be amended only by a subsequent
and International Law, First Lecture: The Legal Framework of the Security Council
(Nov. 7, 2006), available at http://www.lcil.cam.ac.ukllectures/2006sir-michael_
wood.php (surveying case law to the effect that under art. 103 mandatory provisions of
Security Council Resolutions binding on Member States set aside to the extent of the
conflict any contrary obligations under other treaties).
113. See Michael C. Wood, The Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions, 2
MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 73, 89-95 (1998) (stating that interpretation of Security
Council resolutions should take into consideration the "plain meaning," "the object of
its object and purpose," and the "travaux pr~paratoires").
114. See S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 29, 10, 11(e), 21 (describing the role of the
transitional administration as including the "development of provisional democratic
self-governing institutions" and referencing the political process to "determine Kosovo's
future status" while deciding to "remain actively seized in the matter").
115. Thus, Mr. Dejammet, the French delegate, stated that "[t]he Security
Council will remain in control of the implementation of the peace plan for Kosovo....
Those of us who wish to recall the primacy of the Security Council for the maintenance
of international peace and security, as established by the Charter, have been satisfied."
U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4011th mtg. at 12, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4011 (June 10, 1999). Mr.
Burleigh, the U.S. delegate, stated that "[i]t is important to note that this resolution
provides for the civil and military missions to remain in place until the Security
Council affirmatively decides that conditions exist for their completion." Id. at 14.
Others besides the major Western powers took a similar view. For instance, the
Argentine delegate, Mr. Petrella, stated that the resolution "lays the foundation for a
definitive political solution to the Kosovo crisis that will respect the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" and "confirms the central
and irreplaceable role of the United Nations." Id. at 19.
116. See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Meets in Emergency
Session Following Kosovo's Declaration of Independence, With Members Sharply
Divided on Issue, U.N. Doc. SC/9252 (Feb. 18, 2008), available at http://www.un.orgl
NewsJPress/docs/2008/sc9252.doc.htm (describing statements by the Serbian, Russian
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agreement of the parties, 117 in this case requiring the assent or
abstention of Russia as a veto-bearing member of the Security
Council, the original "standstill" agreement reflected in SCR 1244
must govern the rights and duties of all the members of the United
Nations. SCR 1244 was adopted pursuant to Chapter VII, which
makes it binding on states and, through them, international
organizations-including the EU-pursuant to articles 25 and 48 of
the UN Charter."1
8
Prior Understanding of and Practice Under SCR 1244. My
interpretation is hardly novel. In 2005, the Western powers in the
Contact Group for Kosovo joined with Russia in agreeing that "[t]he
UN Security Council will remain actively seized of the matter [of
Kosovo's final political status]. The final decision on Kosovo's status
should be endorsed by the UN Security Council."119  Although the
Security Council's membership and that of the Contact Group are not
identical, all of the Council's permanent members except the People's
Republic of China belong to the Contact Group. Hence it would not
be unreasonable to see this statement as a "subsequent agreement
between the parties regarding the interpretation of [SCR 1244] or the
application of its provisions,"' 120 or at least as "subsequent practice in
the application of [SCR 1244] which establishes the agreement of the
parties regarding its interpretation.''
Furthermore, this straightforward interpretation of SCR 1244
fully comports with the background interpretive principles respecting
Serbia's "essentially ... domestic jurisdiction"'12 2 and its "sovereign
equality"'12 3 which form part of the relevant "context" under the VCLT
for interpreting SCR 1244.124 These textually-grounded
and Chinese delegations that Kosovo's declaration of independence was "a flagrant
violation of resolution 1244").
117. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 39, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT] (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) ("A treaty may be
amended by agreement between the parties."). For purposes of this Article, the Authors
treat as identical the VCLT and the language of the proposed treaty governing the law
of treaties relating to international organizations. See Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties Between States and International Organizations or Between International
Organizations, Mar. 21, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 543 (not entered into force). Whether there is
an emerging customary law of treaty interpretation for international organizations in
contexts other than Security Council resolutions that differs from the rules of the
VCLT is a question better left for another day.
118. U.N. Charter arts. 25, 48.
119. The Contact Group's Guiding Principles for a Settlement of Kosovo's Status,
KIM INFO NEWSLErrER, Nov. 14, 2005, http://www.kosovo.net/news/archive/2005/
November 15/2.html (emphasis added).
120. VCLT, supra note 117, art. 31(3)(a).
121. Id. art. 31(3)(b).
122. U.N. Charter art. 2, 1 7.
123. Id. art. 2, T 1.
124. VCLT, supra note 117, art. 31(3).
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interpretative principles may be disregarded by the members of the
United Nations, if at all, only when the Security Council
unambiguously decides to limit their application in order to address
threats to international peace and security pursuant to Chapter VII.
No one, much less the Security Council, has authoritatively
determined that such a threat to international peace and security
justifies the Albanian Kosovar entity in declaring Kosovo's
independence or other states in recognizing it.
Alyosha:
Brother Ivan, perhaps you would like to speak to this reasoning?
Dmitri's interpretation of the text of the Resolution certainly seems
plausible.
Ivan:
Thank you, Brother Dmitri, for your lucid presentation.
Unfortunately I cannot agree with your interpretation of SCR 1244.
As I shall argue, that Resolution simply does not speak to the
question of whether Kosovo was at liberty to declare its independence
from Serbia.
The highest and best authority for the interpretation of SCR
1244 would, of course, be the Security Council itself.125 But the very
fact that we are having this conversation demonstrates that the
Security Council was unable as a collective body to agree upon a
definitive interpretation. So we must try to interpret it on our own.
The Text of SCR 1244. Without necessarily accepting your view
that a SCR is on all fours with a treaty, Dmitri, I agree with you that
primacy must be given to a good faith interpretation of the Resolution
"in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to [its]
terms."126  And the Resolution does indeed "reaffirm [ the
125. See Delimitation of the Polish-Czechoslovakian Frontier (Question of
Jaworzina), Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 8, at 37 (Dec. 6) (articulating
the international legal principle of ejus est interpretare legem cuius condere, "it is an
established principle that the right of giving an authoritative interpretation of a legal
rule belongs solely to the person or body who has power to modify or suppress it"); see
also Wood, supra note 113, at 82-83 (explaining that "[o]nly the Security Council, or
some body authorized to do so by the Council, may give an authentic interpretation in
the true sense.")
126. VCLT, supra note 117, art. 31(1); see also Legal Consequences for States of
Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding
Security Council Resolution 276, Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, at 53 (June 21)
(noting considerations in interpreting a Security Council resolution are "the terms of
the resolution to be interpreted, the discussions leading to it, the Charter provisions
invoked and, in general, all circumstances that might assist in determining the legal
status of the resolution of the Security Council.").
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commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other States of
the region."'1 27 Moreover, in defining the scope of this commitment,
this preambular clause adds "as set out in ... Annex 2. ''128 Annex 2,
in turn, provides for "a political process toward the establishment of
an interim political framework agreement providing for substantial
self-government for Kosovo" and also that the fulfillment of this
objective will be sought in accordance with the subordinate principle
of "taking full account of ... the principles of sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia."'
129
But how much weight should we give to this rather formulaic
declaration? The Resolution's reference to Yugoslavia's "territorial
integrity" appears only in the preamble, not in its operative part.
When we examine the operative paragraphs of the Resolution,
however, we find no such commitment to maintain the sovereignty of
Serbia over Kosovo in perpetuity. 130 Preambles to SCRs are of little
interpretative worth because "they tend to be used as a dumping
ground for proposals that are not acceptable in the operative
paragraphs.'
13 1
What we find instead in the operative part of the Resolution-
that is, SCR 1244, paragraph 1-is the Council's clear and emphatic
decision "that a political solution to the Kosovo crisis shall be based
on the principles" set forth in the annexes attached to the Resolution,
which are to be treated as integral parts of its text. 132 Further, the
operative language of the Resolution in paragraphs 11(a) and 11(f)
"[d]ecides" that the main responsibilities of the UN civil presence in
Kosovo will include "[p]romoting the establishment, pending a final
settlement, of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo"
and, "[i]n a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from
Kosovo's provisional institutions to institutions established under a
political settlement.'1 33 No one could have known in advance what
the contents of that final political settlement would be: they might as
well have included independence for Kosovo as Serbia's continuing
sovereignty over it. Thus, the Resolution did not preclude
independence as an outcome any more than it promoted it-it was
127. S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 29, pmbl.
128. Id.
129. Id. annex 2, 8.
130. Id. Serbian Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic was therefore mistaken, in
Ivan's view, to assert that SCR 1244 "placed a Chapter VII obligation-a binding
obligation-on all the member-states of the United Nations to respect the borders of
[his] country." Vuk Jeremic, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia,
Remarks Before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament (Feb. 20,
2008), http://www.kosovo.net/news/archive/2008/February-21/l.html.
131. Wood, supra note 112, at 87.
132. S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 29, 1.
133. Id. 11(a), (f).
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simply neutral as between those alternatives. 134  Further, the
substantial autonomy that the Resolution contemplated for Kosovo
was plainly an interim arrangement intended to survive only pending
a final settlement rather than an affirmation of Serbia's
inextinguishable sovereignty over Kosovo.
The Annexes to the Text. The same conclusions are fortified by a
careful reading of the two Annexes to SCR 1244, which constitute an
integral part of the Resolution's text.135 Both Annexes call for a
''political process" directed towards the establishment of "an interim
political framework agreement" that will take account of "the
principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity" of Serbia. 136 But
while the Resolution thus affirmed the continuation of Serbian
sovereignty on an interim basis, it did not address whether that
sovereignty would be an element of the final settlement of the Kosovo
crisis. In short, then, nothing in the operative language of SCR 1244
barred Kosovo's independence.
The Rambouillet Accords. Finally, let me also draw attention to
the references in both of the Annexes to the 1999 Rambouillet
Accords. Although the Rambouillet Accords did not expressly hold
out the promise of independence for Kosovo, Chapter 8 of those
Accords did contemplate the convening in 2002 of "an international
meeting.., to determine a mechanism for a final settlement of
Kosovo, on the basis of the will of the people, opinions of relevant
authorities, each Party's efforts regarding the implementation of this
Agreement, and the Helsinki Final Act."137 Certainly there is more
than a little ambiguity in this clause. It does not represent an
explicit commitment to a binding referendum on independence for
Kosovo; indeed, the word "referendum" is not used. Further, the
allusion to the Helsinki Final Act could well be taken to affirm the
principle of the inviolability of borders.138 Moreover, considerations
134. See Bartram S. Brown, Human Rights, Sovereignty, and the Final Status of
Kosovo, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 235, 260 (2005) (stating the Resolution avoids choosing
any particular final status) (citing S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 29, 11(a)).
135. S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 29, annex 1-2.
136. Id.
137. Ramboullet Accords, Proposed Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-
Government in Kosovo, Feb. 23, 1999, ch. 8, art. 1, 3, available at
http://www.commondreams.org/kosovo/rambouillet.htm (emphasis added).
138. See Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
princ. III, Aug. 1, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292 (discussing participating states' shared
principles regarding the inviolability of frontiers), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/
humanrts/osce/basics/finact75.htm. Under a very natural and persuasive reading, the
Helsinki Final Act does not recognize a right of secession. See ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-
DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL APPRAISAL 289 n.17 (1995) (stressing that,
under the Helsinki Declaration, minority groups are not entitled to secession); Hurst
Hannum, Rethinking Self-Determination, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 29 (1993) (arguing the
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other than the will of the people, including the opinions of
international law experts, were to be taken into account in devising
the mechanism for a final settlement.13 9 Nonetheless, when the
article speaks of deciding Kosovo's final political status on the basis of
the will of the people, it unmistakably envisages that the Kosovar
people would play the. leading role in decision for or against
independence. Furthermore, the U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright, in a February 22, 1999 communication to the Kosovar
Albanian delegation at Rambouillet, realistically described the
relevant language of the Accords "as confirming a right for the people
of Kosovo to hold a referendum on the final status of Kosovo after
three years.
'140
So while it would be an exaggeration to say that, by
incorporating the Rambouillet Accords, SCR 1244 overtly guaranteed
an eventual referendum in Kosovo on the question of independence, it
should have been entirely obvious to all the parties concerned that
SCR 1244, like the Rambouillet Accords, placed substantial weight on
the will of the people of Kosovo in deciding their final political status.
Indeed, as I have already noted, the text of Annex 2 alone is sufficient
to warrant an interpretation of SCR 1244 that prefers the vindication
of the Kosovars' right to self-government to Yugoslavia's right to
territorial integrity.
Alyosha:
Ivan, I noticed that you hesitated to agree that SCR 1244 is a
treaty subject to the governing rules of the VCLT. Could you tell us
why? It would be best if we could get as much agreement as possible.
Helsinki language "must be understood in the context of the principles of the
inviolability of frontiers (principle III) and the territorial integrity of states (principle
IV).... There was no suggestion at Helsinki... that the right of self-determination
could justify secession by an oppressed minority."). But see RADAN, supra note 46, at
64-65 (criticizing Cassese's interpretation of the Helsinki Final Act).
139. Thus, as the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs of the UK House of
Commons found, "[tihe language was carefully chosen to leave open the possibility of a
referendum without committing the international community to one." Select
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Fourth Report, 1999-2000, H.C. 28-I, 59, available at
http://www.publications.parliament.ukpa/cm199900/cmselect/cmfaff128/2809.htm.
140. Id. 60 (quoting Albright's letter); see also Mccgwire, supra note 62, at 8.
To persuade the KLA to sign [the Rambouillet Accords], the United States is
reported to have committed itself to early elections, to retention by the militias
of their personal weapons, to preventing any future Yugoslav challenges to the
interim or final political status of Kosovo, and to considering the issue of
independence if regional and international circumstances permitted .... [I]t
seems that the clincher was an informal promise by Madeleine Albright that a
referendum on self-determination would be held after three years.
Mccgwire, supra note 62, at 8.
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Ivan:
Dmitri supposes that SCRs are literally treaties. I think instead
that they are treaty-like. I do not think that SCRs can literally be
treaties within the meaning of the VCLT if only because they are not
"international agreement[s] between States. '14 1 Rather, on their very
face, they are the decisions of a collective but unitary body, the
Security Council. Further, they enter into force without any of the
customary formalities of a proper treaty-they are not ratified, for
instance. 142 Considering them as treaties rather than as treaty-like,
Dmitri seems to regard them as a species of international legislation.
And it is certainly true that, under UN Charter Article 25, they
create legal obligations that the member states have agreed to "accept
and carry out."'1 43 I see them, however, as the orders of an executive
body-which the Security Council surely resembles144-rather than
as formal treaties or laws. As executive orders, they of course impose
legal obligations on those subject to them. But they are usually
addressed to particular contingencies and circumstances, and so
should not be understood as remaining in force indefinitely unless the
Council formally revokes or modifies them. 14 5 If the underlying
circumstances change sufficiently, the obligations they once created
will cease to be binding. We must not allow the analogy between
SCRs and treaties, however helpful or illuminating it may be in many
cases, to hold us too tightly in its grip.
Alyosha:
So we cannot even agree on what rules to follow in interpreting
SCR 1244! Perhaps you would like to speak to this matter, Dmitri?
141. See VCLT, supra note 117, at art. 2, 1(a) (defining a treaty as "an
international agreement concluded between States").
142. Rather, member nations are automatically bound by the U.N. Charter to
"accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council" without any ratification
procedure. U.N. Charter art. 25.
143. Id.
144. Analogizing the Security Council to an "executive" under national law may
be helpful, but only if not pressed too far. See Wood, supra note 112, 22 (arguing the
Security Council only acts as an executive in one area of U.N. activity, "the
maintenance of international peace and security").
145. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 629, pmbl., 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES1629 (Jan. 16, 1989)
(addressing the limited scope of affairs in Namibia and South Africa and calling for
specific, discrete action on the part of the Secretary-General); see also David M.
Malone, Security Council, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE UNITED NATIONS 124-25
(Thomas G. Wiess & Sam Daws eds., 2007) (describing the difficulty in implementing
Security Council Resolutions containing broad sanctions and ambitious agendas, and
describing the limited, regional nature of most resolutions).
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Dmitri:
What I think is altogether missing from Ivan's clever but
sophistic construal of the text of SCR 1244 is any appreciation of the
object and purpose of the Resolution. And still less does Ivan
consider the Resolution's relationship to the larger objects and
purposes of the United Nations Charter. Even if you do not agree,
Ivan, that the VCLT applies in full to the interpretation of the
Resolution, surely you will concede that we may consider the






So, then, what is the object and purpose of SCR 1244? At a very
basic level, the Resolution reflects the agreement of the great powers
to manage the problem of Kosovo collectively and so to avoid
unilateral actions. And why that choice for collective, consensual
decision making? To ensure order and stability in the great powers'
relations.
Remember that the doctrine of the "self-determination of
peoples"-which is now invoked by the Albanian Kosovars and their
Western sponsors to justify the claim to an independent state of
Kosovo 14 7-was precisely what, in light of distribution of so many
ethnic groups across the frontiers of the post-Versailles states, led
Europe to war in 1939.148 Hitler, too, could and did invoke that
doctrine in the Rhineland, in Austria, in the Sudentenland, and
finally in Danzig. 149 The post-World War II world was not about to
permit the frontiers of Europe to be revised again by the unilateral
actions of nationalist leaders. The UN Charter's mechanism of
146. See VCLT, supra note 117, art. 31, 1 ("A treaty shall be interpreted in
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.").
147. Raymond Detrez, The Right to Self-Determination and Secession in
Yugoslavia, in CONTEXTUALIZING SECESSION 124 (Bruno Coppieters & Richard Sakwa
eds., 2003).
148. James E. Falkowski, Secessionary Self-Determination: A Jeffersonian
Perspective, 9 B.U. INT'L L.J. 209, 224 (1991).
149. Ryan Goodman, Humanitarian Intervention and Pretexts for War, 100 AM.
J. INT'L L. 107, 113 (2006) (citing AMOS YODER, WORLD POLITICS AND THE CAUSES OF
WAR SINCE 1914, at 58 (1986)); Elizabeth Warner, Unilateral Preferences Granted to
Foreign National Minorities by a Kin-State: A Case Study of Hungary's "Status Law",
35 GEO. J. INT'L L. 371, 390 (2004).
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collective decision making was intended to address and remedy
problems such as that.150 SCR 1244, which of course is a creature of
the Charter, needs to be interpreted in light of the Charter's larger
objects and purposes. Central to those objects and purposes is a
determination to protect the general peace and order of Europe, in
preference both to particularist claims of self-determination by ethnic
or national minorities and to unilateral efforts by the leading
European powers to project their own power into contested areas like
the Balkans. SCR 1244 must be read to further international
governance and, accordingly, international stability, rather than to
invite renewed international anarchy.
Ivan:
Brothers, Dmitri challenges me to show that my interpretation of
SCR 1244 is consistent with that Resolution's, and the UN Charter's,
broader objects and purposes. Very well. I shall argue that the open
and acknowledged failure, after nine years, of the negotiations over
the future of Kosovo called for in the Resolution-despite the
intensive efforts of the United Nations and the EU-U.S.-Russia
troika as intermediaries-clearly justified Kosovo's decision to declare
its independence from Serbia. My argument will enable me to answer
Dmitri's objection that the position of the Western powers poses a
threat to the peace and order of Europe. On the contrary, I shall
argue that the creation of an independent state of Kosovo represents
a major step toward bringing peace, order, human rights, and
economic progress to a vital but troubled part of Europe.
The Future Status Process. To do this, I must first explain how
the process of seeking an agreed-upon settlement to the problem of
Kosovo-as we all agree the Resolution contemplated-played out in
the nine years between 1999, when the Council adopted that
Resolution, and 2008, when Kosovo declared its independence. Sadly,
that process ran into the ground. What we must also grasp, however,
is that despite its ultimate failure, the process was characterized by
conscientious efforts to implement the Council's intention of reaching
consensus, to use the good offices of UN intermediaries to the fullest
extent possible, and to accommodate fairly the interests of all the
parties most closely concerned with the future of Kosovo, including
Russia.
Let us begin by considering the "future status" process in some
detail, focusing first on the role of the UN from 2005 onward, and
150. See U.N. Charter art. 1, 3 (stating that a purpose of the U.N. is to
"achieve international cooperation').
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then on the efforts of the EU-U.S.-Russia troika in the months
immediately preceding Kosovo's independence. 151
The Ahtisaari Report. In 2007 the Special Envoy of the
Secretary-General reported on Kosovo's future status to the
Secretary-General in the Ahtisaari Report that, although he and his
team had "held intensive negotiations with the leadership of Serbia
and Kosovo over the course of the past year" to achieve "a political
settlement that [would] determine[ the future status of Kosovo," it
had become
clear ... that the parties are not able to reach an agreement on
Kosovo's future status .... [B]oth parties have reaffirmed their
categorical, diametrically opposed positions: Belgrade demands
Kosovo's autonomy within Serbia, while Pristina will accept nothing
short of independence .... It is my firm view that the negotiations'
potential to produce any mutually agreeable outcome on Kosovo's
status is exhausted. No amount of additional talks, whatever the
format, will overcome this impasse.
1 5 2
Finding that "Kosovo's state of limbo cannot continue," the Special
Envoy accordingly recommended that "the only viable option for
Kosovo is independence."'1 53 The Secretary-General, in transmitting
this report to the Security Council, stated: "I fully support ... the
recommendation made by my Special Envoy."'1 54 Thus, two highly
placed and objective observers from the United Nations--one of whom
151. The future status process got underway based on the recommendation of
the October 2005 report of Kai Eide, the Secretary-General's special envoy, charged
with undertaking a comprehensive review of the situation in Kosovo. The Secretary-
General, Letter Dated 7 October 2005 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the
President of the Security Council, at 1, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/2005/635 (Oct. 7, 2005), available at http://www.unosek.org/docreflKaiEidereport.pdf.
152. Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Report of the Special Envoy of the
Secretary-General on Kosovo's Future Status, 1-3, delivered to the Security Council,
U.N. Doc. S/2007/168 (Mar. 26, 2007) [hereinafter Ahtisaari Report] (prepared by
Martti Ahtisaari), available at www.unosek.org/docref/report-english.pdf.
153. Id. 4.
154. The Secretary-General, Letter Dated 26 March 2007 from the Secretary-
General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, at 1, delivered to the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2007/168 (Mar. 26, 2007). Further, Secretary-General
Ban Ki-Moon stated in 2007 that "any further delay or prolongation of this issue [of
Kosovo's final status] is not desirable, not only for Balkan states, but also for all
European countries" and that "if Kosovo's future status remains undefined, there is a
real risk that the progress achieved by the United Nations and the Provisional
Institutions in Kosovo can begin to unravel." See Press Release, Statement Issued on
20 July 2007 by Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom and the United
States of America, Co-Sponsors of the Draft Resolution on Kosovo Presented to the




THE KOSOVO CRISIS: A DOSTOIEVSKIAN DIALOGUE
was to be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2008 15 5-have found that
the negotiations over the future of Kosovo had completely and
irretrievably broken down by the spring of 2007.
The Contact Group. What is more, the EU-U.S.-Russia troika
on Kosovo came to effectively the same conclusion in their Report of
December 4, 2007.156 For four months from August 2007 onward,
Representatives of the EU, the U.S., and Russia, with the blessing of
the Secretary-General and the support of the Special Envoy, joined
representatives of Belgrade and Pristina in "the most sustained and
intense high-level direct dialogue since hostilities ended in Kosovo in
1999. ' '157 They explored a wide variety of possible solutions to the
question of Kosovo's future, "ranging from independence to autonomy,
as well as alternate models such as confederal arrangements, and
even a model based on an 'agreement to disagree,' in which neither
party would be expected to renounce its position but would
nonetheless pursue practical arrangements designed to facilitate
cooperation and consultation between them."'158 They also discussed
"other international models, such as Hong Kong, the Aland Islands
and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).' 159 But in the
end, "the parties were unable to reach an agreement on the final
status of Kosovo. Neither party was willing to cede its position on the
fundamental question of sovereignty" over Kosovo.
160
155. Mr. Ahtisaari was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2008, largely for his
efforts in Kosovo. Press Release, The Norwegian Nobel Committee, The Nobel Peace
Prize 2008 (Oct. 10, 2008), available at http://nobelprize.org/nobel-prizes/peace/
laureates/2008/press.html.
156. REPORT OF THE EU/U.S./RuSsIA TROIKA ON KosovO (Dec. 4, 2007),
available at http://www.swp-berlin.org/transferlkosovo/troikareport.htm [hereinafter
TROIKA REPORT].




Indeed, now that Kosovo has been, to all practical purposes, removed from the
control of the Serbian administrative and legal system, it is even more
unrealistic to imagine that Kosovar Albanians could be willing again to accept
the presence of Serb officials, to pay taxes to Belgrade or to seek passports from
a state that expelled half of them, destroying their identity papers to make sure
the bond was permanently severed, even if different people, are, at least for the
time being, in charge.
INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON Kosovo, THE FOLLOW-UP OF THE
Kosovo REPORT: WHY CONDITIONAL INDEPENDENCE? 24-25 (2001), available at
http://www.alb-net.comlpipermaillalbsa-info/2001-November/002393.html; see also
Press Release, Joint Statement by UN Ambassadors of the United Kingdom, France,
Croatia, Belgium, Italy, Germany and the United States (Feb. 17, 2008), available at
http://ukun.fco.gov.ukl en/newsroomI?view=News&id=3297494 (Kosovo's independence
"represent[s] the conclusion of a status process that has exhausted all avenues in
pursuit of a negotiated outcome.").
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In these circumstances, it was surely no violation of SCR 1244,
or more generally of fundamental Charter values and principles, for
Kosovo to declare its independence two months later, and for the U.S.
and several major EU states to recognize the reality of that new
nation. Over the period from 2005 to the end of 2007, both the UN
and the most interested outside powers-the EU, Russia, and the
U.S.-had sought to bring Serbia and Kosovo to the final status
agreement envisaged by SCR 1244.161 The Secretary-General's
Special Envoy and his team spent over a year seeking to find a
compromise solution.162 After the failure of that UN initiative, the
troika of major powers, with UN sanction and support, energetically
sought to bridge differences that proved to be irresoluble. 163 And in
the end, the Western powers supported an outcome-the
independence of Kosovo-that the UN Secretary-General's Special
Envoy had firmly recommended and that the UN Secretary-General
had endorsed. Far from showing a lack of concern for the values of
the Charter, the wishes of the Security Council, and what might be
called the comity of Europe-Eastern no less than Western-the
Western powers' conduct, therefore, has shown the purest and most
conscientious regard for all of them.
Rather than threatening the peace and order of the Balkans, or
indeed of Europe-as, Brother Dmitri, you assert-the Western
powers' actions in supporting Kosovo's independence will contribute
significantly to those ends-unless, of course, Russia seizes on the
occasion as yet another pretext for returning to its autocratic past.
164
As the Special Envoy said,
Uncertainty over its future status has become a major obstacle to
Kosovo's democratic development, accountability, economic recovery
and inter-ethnic reconciliation. Such uncertainty only leads to further
stagnation, polarizing its communities and resulting in social and
political unrest. Pretending otherwise and denying or delaying
resolution of Kosovo's status risks challenging not only its own stability
but the peace and stability of the region as a whole.
1 6 5
Dmitri:
I was certain, Brother Ivan, that sooner or later you would refer
us to the Ahtisaari Report.166 Let me say first that the Special Envoy
was overreaching insofar as he suggested that the impasse in
161. TROIKA REPORT, supra note 156, 3-4.
162. Id. 3.
163. Id. 11.
164. See Kagan, supra note 15 (describing the 2008 Russian conflict in South
Ossetia as part of Russia's determined efforts to stop the pro-Western trend in the
region).
165. Ahtisaari Report, supra note 152, 4.
166. Id.
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negotiations undercut the continuing applicability of SCR 1244.167
Even if the Special Envoy judged that the situation was in impasse,
he could not speak for the Security Council as a whole, which made
no finding that further negotiations were pointless, much less that
Kosovo was at liberty to secede from Serbia.
The West's Bad Faith in the Negotiations. You claim that the
final status negotiations broke down despite the conscientious efforts
of the West to bring the dispute to an end on terms agreeable to all. I
deny that. Indeed, the so-called troika has unraveled. The West
demonstrated obvious bad faith in the very period on which you
concentrate-that is, the period after the Secretary-General
presented the Ahtisaari Report to the Security Council in the spring
of 2007. The United States thereupon circulated in the Council a
draft resolution that would have replaced SCR 1244 and laid the
groundwork for Kosovo's independence. 168 That draft, and later
revisions of it through the early- to mid-summer of 2007, failed to win
the support of Russia, which persisted in objecting to an imposed
settlement for Kosovo without Serbia's consent. 169 Notwithstanding
the failure to achieve consensus within the Security Council, while
visiting Italy and Albania in June 2008, President Bush made several
public statements unequivocally supporting independence for
Kosovo. 170 Secretary of State Rice also told the Kosovo Unity Team in
a meeting on July 23, 2007, that the United States supported
Kosovo's independence. 171 Given that firm, unequivocal, and public
backing from the United States for Kosovo's independence even while
final status negotiations were still ongoing, how could Kosovo have
accepted anything less than independence? 172 The United States and
167. Perhaps the Special Envoy was attempting to reprise his earlier experience
in birthing Namibian independence as the Secretary-General's special representative
for the implementation of UN Resolution 435 (Sept., 29, 1978) in 1988-1990, pursuant
to SC Resolutions 629 and 632 (1989). See S.C. Res. 435, 7 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/435
(Sept. 29, 1978) (reiterating the Security Council's objective to transfer power to the
people of Namibia); S.C. Res. 629, supra note 145, T 1 (setting a date for the
implementation of Resolution 435); S.C. Res. 632, 7 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/632 (Feb.
16, 1989) (expressing approval for the Secretary-General's report on Namibia and
deciding to implement Resolution 435).
168. Warren Hoge, U.S. May Bypass the U.N. for Kosovo Independence, N.Y.
TIMES, July 14, 2007, at A6.
169. Id.
170. JULIE KIM & STEVEN WOEHREL, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
REPORT FOR CONGRESS: Kosovo AND U.S. POLICY: BACKGROUND AND CURRENT ISSUES
20 (June 20, 2008), available at http://www.usembassy.it/pdf/otherRL31053.pdf.
171. Sue Pleming, Kosovo Tells U.S. It Will Not Declare Independence, REUTERS,
July 23, 2007, available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUKN23367
89720070723.
172. The troika's final, intensive meetings with Kosovar and Serbian negotiators
did not begin until August 2007-i.e., after President Bush and Secretary Rice had
made their comments. See TROIKA REPORT, supra note 156, T 4 (Dec. 4, 2007)
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its allies were plainly determined to secure independence for Kosovo,
regardless of SCR 1244 and regardless of the Security Council's
wishes. As they had done in 2003 over Iraq, the United States and its
allies, having failed to receive the Council's authorization for its
proposed course of action, simply took the matter into their own
hands, in violation of their Charter obligations. 173 Indeed, on this
occasion, their conduct was even more egregious than it had been
over Iraq in 2003, for then they had at least a colorable argument
that the resumption of hostilities against Iraq was authorized by the
SCR 1441 (2002) and its predecessors, SCR 678 (1990) and 687
(1991),174 while on this occasion, there was plainly no basis
whatsoever for arguing that their conduct was authorized by SCR
1244.
Ivan:
I can only say, Dmitri, that the Albanian Kosovars hardly needed
the encouragement of the West to hold out for independence. In a
1991 referendum that took place in Kosovo right under the noses of
the Serbian authorities, a claimed 87% of the voters of the province
took part, and 99% of them voted in favor of independence. 175 That
was well before the ethnic cleansings of 1998 and 1999. Moreover,
between 1999 and 2008, the Kosovars grew accustomed to living
without Serbia's interference. If they were intransigent during the
final status negotiations, those are the reasons why, Dmitri; they did
not need the West to stiffen their backs.
Dmitri:
Even if the attitude of the Albanian Kosovars has not changed,
that of the Serbians has. The eight years that have passed since
adoption of SCR 1244 have also witnessed fundamental changes in
the internal political order of Serbia. Serbia has democratized.
Slobodan Milosevic was overthrown in 2000, then extradited to stand
trial on war crimes charges before the ICTY in the Hague. 176 Other
(explaining that the troika's four-month effort began in August 2007 as a renewed
effort following earlier rounds failed of negotiations). Rice made her comments in July
2007. Pleming, supra note 171. Bush made his in June. Kim & WOEHREL, supra note
170, at 20.
173. JOHN F. MURPHY, THE UNITED STATES AND THE RULE OF LAW IN
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 170 (2004) (citing Steven R. Weisman & Felicity Barringer,
Powell Attacks Validity of the Work by Weapons Inspectors in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17,
2003, at Al).
174. See id. at 169-73 (describing various possible interpretations of SCR 1441).
175. MALCOLM, supra note 32, at 347; VICKERS, supra note 68, at 251.
176. Suzanne Daley, Milosevic Faces Single Trial Asked by Hague Prosecution,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2002, at A4.
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alleged Serbian war criminals, most recently Radovan Karadzic, 177
have been arrested and surrendered to the Hague. Your view gives
Serbia no credit for those changes, Ivan.
Our question is whether the continuing impasse in the
negotiations between Serbia and the Kosovo entity nullified SCR
1244. I say that it did not. Despite the impasse, SCR 1244 remained
in force and imposed a persisting obligation to refer the matter back
to the Security Council. The customary international law of treaty
interpretation, which applies also to this Resolution, obligates the
parties to resolve interpretative disagreements in "good faith.
178
That obligation, in turn, requires the disputing parties to act only on
the basis of mutual consent, not unilaterally. This at least the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) taught us in the Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros case. 179 The implication of a continuing duty to resolve a
disputed question by mutual consent accords with common law and
civil law notions of good faith in negotiation of adjustments to
changing circumstances in contract performance.1 80 Thus, general
principles of treaty interpretation that should govern the reading of
SCR 1244 further support the continuing need for a collective
determination of the Kosovo situation.
Ivan:
Dmitri, your view of the durability of the Resolution reminds of a
story of "Russian peculiarity" that Otto von Bismarck tells in his
mdmoires.'8 1 Bismarck was serving in 1859 as Prussia's Ambassador
to the Court of Czar Alexander II. During the Imperial Court's
customary spring promenade in the palace gardens, the Czar
happened to notice a solitary sentry standing in the middle of the
vast palace lawn. The Czar asked the sentry why he had been
stationed at that isolated spot, and the sentry could only answer,
"Those are my orders." The Czar made further inquiries and learned
that a sentry had been ordered to stand both summer and winter at
that spot. But he could not learn the source of the original order.
Finally, an old servant came forward with a story that his father had
told him as a youth. One spring morning many decades before, the
Czarina Catherine the Great had caught sight of a snowdrop in bloom
177. See Julian Borger, Radovan Karadzic, Europe's Most Wanted Man, Arrested
for War Crimes, THE GUARDIAN (U.K.), July 22, 2008, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jul/22/warcrimes.internationalcrime/print
(reporting on Karadzic's arrest in July 2008 on charges of genocide and war crimes).
178. VCLT, supra note 117, art. 31.
179. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 56 (Sept. 25).
180. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981).
181. 1 OTTO VON BISMARCK, BISMARCK: THE MAN & THE STATESMAN 250 (A.J.
Butler trans., 1898).
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unusually early. She gave the order that that flower was not to be
plucked. And so, for perhaps eighty years after, a sentry had been
stationed at the same place, all the year round! No doubt, once he
had learned of the origin of this custom, Czar Alexander must have
ordered it abolished. But surely the Palace Guard should have taken
the initiative earlier?
Dmitri:
And your views remind me of another part of Bismarck's
mdmoires, Dmitri-the place where that old cynic says that "eternal
duration is assured by no treaty between Great Powers," that even
the Triple Alliance merely had "the significance of a strategic
position," and that one must never depart "from the attitude of
toujours en vedette.'' 18 2 The same kind of cynicism prompted a later
German chancellor to declare that the treaty that guaranteed Belgian
neutrality was merely "a scrap of paper," so that Germany was free to
invade Belgium in 1914.183 Judge for yourselves where such cynicism
leads.
Alyosha:
Brothers, brothers, do not be angry!
Smerdyakov:
Dmitri, I heard you refer briefly to the West's contradictory
views about the need for the Security Council to authorize the
resumption of hostilities in Iraq in 2003. On that occasion, the Anglo-
Americans found themselves on one side of the question of the
persisting effects of earlier Resolutions by the Council, and the
continental European powers-Russia, France, and Germany-were
arrayed on the other side.18 4 I would enjoy hearing you say more
about that.
Dmitri:
Certainly, Smerdyakov. You are alluding, of course, to those EU
member states' 2003 rejection of the Anglo-American claims that the
182. See 2 OTTO VON BISMARCK, BISMARCK: THE MAN & THE STATESMAN 284
(A.J. Butler trans., 1898) ("Always on guard.").
183. The Chancellor in question was Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, who
disputed the interpretation given to his remark. 'Scrap of Paper,' German Version, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 25, 1915, at 1.
184. Steven R. Weisman & Felicity Barringer, Powell Attacks Validity of the
Work by Weapons Inspectors in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2003, at A17.
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U.S. and UK could invade Iraq pursuant to SCRs 678 (1990), 687
(1991), and 1441 (2002) without obtaining a new SCR authorizing the
resumption of hostilities.'8 5 I think that some reflection on that
important episode of the Council's history will provide yet another
argument against Ivan's interpretation of SCR 1244.
The Security Council and Iraq (2003). Brothers, I do not wish to
reopen the controversy that the leaders of continental Europe had
with the Anglo-Americans in 2003. The debate has been endless.
x8 6
But you will no doubt recall that SCR 1441 provided that, if the
Council's designated agents, led by Hans Blix, determined that Iraq
was not in compliance with its disarmament obligations under SCR
687, then the Council would meet to "consider the situation," and it
concluded by stating that the Council remained "seized" of the
matter. 18 7 Russia made clear her view that a fresh SCR would be
necessary to determine the consequences that would flow should Mr.
Blix's team find persisting Iraqi violations.' 8 8 This understanding
was affirmed in the French statement at the adoption of SCR 1441,
asserting that, upon a report by Mr. Blix that Iraq had violated its
obligations, "the Council would meet immediately to evaluate the
seriousness of the violations and draw the appropriate
conclusions."'1 9  Indeed, the Press Release of the Security Council
185. MURPHY, supra note 173, at 169 (citing Bob Sherwood, Military Force: Pre-
Emptive Defence or Breach of International Law?, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2003, at 17).
186. The debate at the 100th annual meeting of the American Society of
International Law, with Professors Ruth Wedgewood, for the United States, Philippe
Sands against the United States, and Christine Chinkin, Yoram Dinstein and Judge
Diane Wood serving as the bench is reprinted in Debate: Adjudicating Operation Iraqi
Freedom, 100 ASIL PROC. 179, 179-202 (2006); see also Lori Fisle Damrosh & Bernard
H. Oxman, Agora: The Future Implications of the Iraq Conflicts, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 553,
553-57 (2003), reprinted in THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INT'L LAW, SELECTIONS FROM
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW: FUTURE IMPLICATIONS OF THE IRAQ CONFLICT
(Jan. 2004) (describing the range of views that exists, with excerpts from relevant
Security Council Resolutions and from Contemporary Practice of the United States
Relating to International Law); William H. Taft & Todd F. Buchwald, Preemption, Iraq,
and International Law, 97 AM. J. INTL L. 557, 557-63 (2003) (presenting the U.S. State
Department Legal Advisor's statement and defense of U.S. legal position).
187. S.C. Res. 1441, 12, 14, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (Nov. 8, 2002).
188. The Russian Ambassador stated that "in the event of any kind of
disagreement about disarmament matters-it is the heads of UNMOVIC and IAEA
who will report that to the Security Council, and it is the Council that will consider the
situation that has developed." U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4644th mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc.
SIPV.4644 (Nov. 8, 2002).
189. The French ambassador made reference also to a joint statement to be
issued later that day by France, Russia, and China "stressing the scope of the text of
the resolution just adopted." Id. at 5. In that joint statement, the three veto-wielding
members of the Security Council that did not invade Iraq made clear their
understanding that they had not authorized the other two permanent members of the
Council to invade Iraq. Russia, France, and China declared:
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itself reports the view of the Council's member states, particularly its
permanent members, that the Council itself would be the final
decision maker in determining the significance and consequences of
any violations by Iraq. 190 Russia and France-joined by Germany,
which shortly thereafter took a seat as a non-permanent member of
the Security Council-have maintained that view throughout the
occupation of Iraq, even when acquiescing in the adoption of
subsequent SCRs intended to deal with the consequences of the
invasion.191
This history is relevant to our discussion of SCR 1244 because of
the doctrine of estoppel. Estoppel is a generally accepted principle of
international law that serves as a subsidiary means of interpretation
of a treaty-including, as I maintain, an SCR. 192 Thus, even if the
Resolution 1441 (2002) adopted today by the Security Council excludes any
automaticity in the use of force. In this regard, we register with satisfaction the
declarations of the representatives of the United States and the United
Kingdom confirming this understanding in their explanations of vote, and
assuring that the goal of the resolution is the full implementation of the
existing Security Council resolutions on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction
disarmament. All Security Council members share this goal.
Press Release, Joint Statement from the Popular Republic of China, the Federation of
Russia, and France (Nov. 8, 2002), available at http://www.un.int/france/
documents-anglais/021108cs franceirak_2.htm.
190. Also speaking after the vote, Council members said that their views
had been taken into account in the final version of the draft, which was
co-sponsored by the United States and the United Kingdom. The
representative of France welcomed the two-stage approach required by
the resolution, saying that the concept of "automaticity" for the use of
force had been eliminated. The representatives of China and the
Russian Federation stressed that only UNMOVIC and the IAEA had
the authority to report violations by Iraq of the resolution's
requirements.
Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Holds Iraq in 'Multilateral Breach"
of Disarmament Obligations, Offers Final Chance to Comply, Unanimously Adopting
Resolution 1441 (2002), U.N. Doc. SC/7564 (Nov. 11, 2002).
191. Thus, SCR 1483 (2003) did not (in Dmitri's view) ratify this invasion, for
Russia, Germany, and France made clear in supporting that Resolution that it was
their intent to ensure respect for international humanitarian law by the occupying
powers and to rebuild the framework for collective decision making. See U.N. SCOR,
58th Sess., 4761st mtg., at 3-7, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4761 (May 22, 2003) (an ambassador
from each country describing its intent in supporting the Resolution).
192. See Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thail.), 1962 I.C.J. 6, 39-51
(June 15) (treating estoppel as a general principle of international law); id. at 143-44
(Spender, J., dissenting) (stating elements of estoppel concept); VCLT, supra note 117,
art. 31, 3(c) (instructing courts to consider as a general rule of interpretation "[any
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties");
MARTTi KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL ARGUMENT 357-58 (2005) (describing bases of estoppel doctrine and noting
difficulty of distinguishing it from "acquiescence"). See generally HERSCH
LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW WITH
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EU could construct a plausible interpretation of SCR 1244 that would
free its member states to intervene in the internal affairs of Serbia, at
least some of its leading member states that had previously taken the
opposite position at to SCR 1441 would be estopped from adopting
that interpretation.
So, Ivan, why now do Germany and France abandon Russia in
their approach to the interpretation of SCRs? Can it really be that
these members of the EU have now changed their minds about the
meaning of SCR 1441? Should it not now be clear that the correct
position is that another SCR is required in order to determine the
consequences of Kosovo's purported secession? Is not recognition of
this declaration by the members of the EU no less a threat to the
Republic of Serbia than was the Anglo-American invasion to the
territorial integrity and political independence of Iraq? Or does
Western hypocrisy know no bounds?
Ivan:
This is nothing but smoke and mirrors, Dmitri, disguised as
argument. If the cases were identical, then of course you might have
a legitimate argument that some members of the EU who also
happen to sit as permanent members of the Security Council should
have to explain their apparent change of legal position. But we do
not even have to reach such questions, because the cases are plainly
inapposite. SCR 1244, under Dmitri's reading, goes to the question of
state recognition-an area that could at best be described as an
implied or incidental Chapter VII power of the Council, but which is
in general a power retained by the member states. Indeed, insofar as
the Charter expressly vests anything resembling the power of
recognizing states in the organs of the United Nations, it divides that
power between the Security Council and the General Assembly.193 By
contrast, the Anglo-American coalition's use of force against Iraq in
defiance of SCR 1441 went to the very heart of the Council's Chapter
VII powers concerning international peace and security. You mistake
a penumbral power for a core one. So even if a state argued that SCR
1441 barred the use of force while the Council was seized of the
matter, that would not compel it to take the same position with
respect to a resolution that reached beyond use of force issues. But I
suppose the Cartesians at the Quai d'Orsay would have still more to
say in demolishing your suggestion.
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (1970) (discussing use of general
principles of private law, such as estoppel, to fill in the gaps of public international
law).
193. See U.N. Charter art. 4, 2. ("The admission of any such state to
membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General
Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.").
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Alyosha:
Brothers, we seem to be unable to agree on the meaning of SCR
1244. Our attempt to discover that meaning has led us to consider
how the various parties understood, and sought to implement, the
Resolution during the final status negotiations. And that discussion
in turn has brought us to consider the changes that have taken place
in both Serbia and Kosovo in the eight years since the Resolution was
adopted. I am wondering now whether we need to isolate and discuss
a related, but distinct, question: not what the Resolution means, but
whether it remains in effect.
Rebus Sic Stantibus. Let me be more precise. Let us assume, for
the sake of the argument, that Dmitri is right about the Resolution's
original meaning. Suppose, that is, that as originally understood in
1999, SCR 1244 imposed an obligation to return the question of
Kosovo's final status to the Council, thus impliedly forbidding Kosovo
from seceding. My question is whether the Resolution, so understood,
was still in effect in early 2008? Or in other words, would the rebus
sic stantibus doctrine, as formulated in VCLT Article 62, justify the
termination of or withdrawal from that obligation by the parties to
it? 194 You may recall the tests that Article 62 sets forth:
(1) A "fundamental change of circumstances.., has occurred with
regard to those existing at the time of the conclusion" of SCR
1244;
(2) That change "was not foreseen by the parties";
(3) The "existence of [the] circumstances" that obtained when SCR
1244 was adopted "constituted an essential basis of the consent
of the parties to be bound" by it; and
(4) "The effect of that change is radically to transform the extent of
the obligations still to be performed" under SCR 1244.195
Ivan:
Alyosha, my argument to this point has concerned the meaning
of SCR 1244, not whether it remains in effect. Reading it as I do, I do
not take it to have imposed an obligation to refer the question of
Kosovo's final status back to the Council once it had become clear
that the negotiations had reached a truly irresoluble impasse.
Nonetheless, accepting for the sake of the argument your assumption
194. See VCLT, supra note 117, art. 62 (setting forth the doctrine in which a
fundamental change in circumstances may be invoked as a ground for terminating or
withdrawing from a treaty).
195. Id.
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about the Resolution's original meaning, I would indeed contend that
under Article 62's rebus sic stantibus doctrine, the parties are
relieved of any continuing obligation to prolong negotiations, whether
between Kosovo and Serbia or in the Council.
Application of the Tests. Plainly, the expectation that Kosovo
and Serbia would eventually come to an agreement over Kosovo's
final status was "essential" to the adoption of SCR 1244, which would
have made no sense on any other assumption. Moreover, after years
of intense but fruitless effort to reach such an agreement, it is fair to
say that a "fundamental change of circumstances" that "was not
foreseen" in 1999 has in fact occurred. So the key question is whether
the effect of that change "is radically to transform" the obligations
still to be performed.
If we consider the parties to SCR 1244 to be only the members of
the Security Council, and look only to their still-to-be-performed
obligations, it might at first appear that no such radical
transformation has occurred-in 2008, as in 1999, they are only
obliged (in Winston Churchill's expression) to "jaw jaw. '196 But what
if the parties are taken to include Kosovo and Serbia? If one believes,
as I do, that SCR 1244 imposed special obligations on both Kosovo
and Serbia, then is it not reasonable to consider whether those
obligations have been radically transformed in the intervening nine
years since SCR 1244 was adopted? If so, then I think it can hardly
be denied that Kosovo's obligations have become appreciably and
intolerably more burdensome. Dmitri's interpretation of SCR 1244
would permit Serbia to hold Kosovo hostage indefinitely, enabling it
to block the province's political and economic development in
perpetuity simply by refusing to come to terms with it. But that
liability, surely, was not part of the original agreement that SCR
1244 embodied.
The same conclusion follows even if you were to reply that SCR
1244 gave Russia (as a permanent member of the Council), rather
than Serbia, the leverage to stymie Kosovo's future development
indefinitely. On the contrary, SCR 1244 plainly assumed that the
Council would also reach an agreement on Kosovo's final status
within a reasonable period of time. Postponing the decision on
Kosovo's final status indefinitely until the Council can reach
agreement would be to force Kosovo to undergo unforeseen and
irreparable harm. For that reason, even under the VCLT, the rebus
sic stantibus doctrine would justify the determination that there was
no further obligation under SCR 1244 to resume final status
negotiations within the Council.
196. See RESPECTFULLY QUOTED: A DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 359 (Suzy Platt
ed., 1989), available at http://www.bartleby.com/73/1914.html.
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Dmitri:
Pre-VCLTLaw. Let me remind you that it was Russia's attempt
to invoke this doctrine in the light of the shifting balance of power in
the decades following the Crimean War that led to the decisive
rejection of the rebus sic stantibus doctrine in modern international
law.197 The 1871 London Declaration on rebus sic stantibus embodied
that rejection, and its basic policy was carried forward in the
commitment in Article 26 of the VCLT to pacta sunt servanda,
198
together with the narrow exception carved out in Article 62.199 And
not for nothing has international law come to that conclusion: few
doctrines have been as mischievous. What could do more to
destabilize inter-state relations that were solemnly ratified in a
treaty than to allow any party to that treaty to decide for itself that
its obligations had grown so burdensome that it was no longer bound
to perform them? Treaties would soon become "scraps of paper"
indeed in such a legal universe.
Contemporary Practice of States. In current practice, moreover,
when states want to address the problem of changing circumstances
by allowing parties unilateral rights to opt out, particularly in
international security contexts such as arms control agreements, they
use explicit language in so-called extraordinary events clauses, which
are explicitly self-judging.20 0 Nothing like such a clause can be found
in SCR 1244.
197. David J. Bederman, The 1871 London Declaration, Rebus Sic Stantibus
and a Primitive View of the Law of Nations, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 10-14 (1988). In his
1870 essay Treaty Obligations, the British philosopher John Stuart Mill acknowledged
some force in Russia's claim to be no longer bound by the 1856 treaty that had ended
the Crimean War, but criticized Russia because:
[S]he showed no desire whatever that the wound [she] inflicted upon the
confidence, so necessary to mankind, in the faith of treaties, should be the
smallest possible. She showed herself perfectly indifferent to any such
consequence. She made her claim in the manner most calculated to startle
mankind, and to destroy their faith in the observance of all treaties which any
one of the contracting parties thinks it has an interest in shaking off.
John Stuart Mill, Treaty Obligations, in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN STUART
MILL, VOL. XXI-ESSAYS ON EQUALITY, LAW AND EDUCATION (John M. Robson ed.,
1984), available at http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com-staticxt&staticfile=show.php
%3Ftitle=255&chapter-21690&layout=html&Itemid=27.
198. VCLT, supra note 117, art. 26.
199. Id. art. 62.
200. See, e.g., Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons art. X, July 1,
1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 (stipulating a "supreme [national] interests"
exception).
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The Rationale of the Doctrine. Moreover, the rationale for this
doctrine is plainly inapplicable when the parties to an agreement
have agreed, as they have here, to future collective determination of
the issue. Can there be any doubt that permitting new unilateral
determinations on matters that were to be decided collectively would
be inconsistent with the procedural decision embedded in SCR 1244-
namely, that the status of Kosovo would be decided at a later date by
the Security Council itself, rather than by individual members states
acting on the basis of their own judgment alone? Finally, as Article
62(2)(a) of the VCLT makes clear, to the extent that SCR 1244
confirms the boundaries of Serbia so as to include Kosovo, the




Pre-VCLT Law. I draw rather different conclusions from your
sources, Dmitri. The London Declaration reads in its entirety:
[I]t is an essential principle of the Law of Nations that no Power can
liberate itself from the engagements of a Treaty, nor modify the
stipulations thereof, unless with the consent of the Contracting Parties
by means of an amicable agreement.
2 0 2
The idea at the core of the London Declaration is that no state should
be "a judge of its own cause"-and "rebus sic stantibus is the ultimate
form of self-judgment. '20 3 Very well; but what if an "amicable
agreement" among the contracting parties simply is not possible?
Must a state remain bound by its treaty obligations, no matter how
radically conditions have changed since the treaty's adoption, unless
all the other contracting parties "amicably agree" to relieving it of its
obligation? The London Declaration is silent on the question of what
is to happen if there is no chance whatever of an "amicable
agreement." And that, unfortunately, is the case here. So under pre-
VCLT customary law, at least as reflected in the London Declaration,
we seem to have no answer to the question whether SCR 1244 was
violated either by Kosovo's unilateral act of secession or by the
Western powers' support of that act.
201. VCLT, supra note 117, art. 62(2)(a) (stating that the doctrine of
fundamental change in circumstances "may not be invoked as a ground for terminating
or withdrawing from a treaty" if "the treaty establishes a boundary").
202. The London Declaration, Jan. 17, 1871, 18 Martens Nouveau Recueil 278
(1873), as quoted in Bederman, supra note 197, at 3.
203. Bederman, supra note 197, at 38-39 (emphasis added).
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Alyosha:
Brothers, what do you think the Security Council would have
done if Kosovo had not declared independence and the final status
question had been referred back to it?
Smerdyakov:
Let me answer, Alyosha! Doing that would merely have
substituted one impasse for another. First, the permanent members
of the Council obviously disagree with one another, and their
disagreements are as deep and unyielding as the disagreements
between Belgrade and Pristina.
Second, even if the members of the Council truly wished to break
the impasse, what, realistically, could they do? The Council would
surely have been unwilling to authorize Kosovo to secede, if only
because some Members would undoubtedly question whether the
Council's Chapter VII powers enable it to carve out part of the
territory of a member state, in arguable contravention of Article 2(4)
of the Charter. On the other hand, the Council would surely also
have been unwilling to authorize Serbia to reassert its sovereignty
over Kosovo, even nominally: to do that would risk the renewal of
violence in the area. After nine years of enjoying some form of
autonomy from Belgrade, Pristina is in no mood to surrender its
gains, and the Council hardly wishes to see everything that it has
accomplished in Kosovo under the r6gime of SCR 1244 go up in
smoke. Partition also is not an option: both Belgrade and Pristina are
adamantly opposed to that. Would the Council decide on some other
compromise, then, such as the so-called Hong Kong solution-one
state, two systems--or co-equal status for Kosovo as a "republic" in a
union with the republics of Serbia and Montenegro? No again,
because both parties to the future status negotiations have also
rejected those formulas, and the Council would surely find it difficult,
or rather impossible, to force such a solution on two, or even three,
unwilling, uncooperative parties.
Ivan:
You see, Dmitri, your legal theory faces a recalcitrant reality:
there must be an end to process when a decision is absolutely
inescapable, but it is also certain that process cannot yield a result.
Dmitri:
But do you see, Ivan, that your very pragmatic outcome faces a
recalcitrant law?
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Smerdyakov:
It's all about the land, who owns the land. As always! Get it if
you can, keep it if you can. Ha, ha!
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Act II: International Law's Relation to the Charter:
Questions of International Legal Method
Alyosha:
Bravo, Brothers! Both of you have given stout-hearted defenses
of your positions. But your arguments leave me more uncertain than
ever how to decide between you. I doubt one can ever come to the
truth about these questions until the basic presuppositions that
underlie your positions are revealed. You must disclose how your
differing interpretive methods relate to your views of the foundational
principles in international law. I have in mind chiefly the principles
governing the status of peoples and states, such as self-determination
and recognition. If you remain at the level of what I might call mere
legal dialectic-as you have hitherto done-then I think the question
of the legality of Kosovo's secession will remain irresoluble. Let us
see if we can come to agreement as to which of your views better fits
with our common understanding of these foundational principles.
Then perhaps we can say we have found the truth as to this matter.
Smerdyakov:
Alyosha, I would like to hear Ivan's description first. Indeed, one
might even say the burden of persuasion is on Ivan to show why the
Kosovars have any special rights here, since, under the principle of
the S.S. Lotus Case, the presumption must be that states are free to
act with respect to areas of their jurisdiction unless an established
rule of international law limits that freedom. 20 4 And Kosovo is part
of Serbia.
Alyosha:
Isn't that the very question that we are discussing, Brother
Smerdyakov? Do you really mean that this matter can be decided by
who carries the burden of persuasion? This is no some trivial matter
to be litigated in the courts, in which gaps about the meaning of the
law are decided, implicitly, by procedural rules. We are discussing a
matter of fundamental concern, the very existence of states in a moral
and legal order, not some case about chickens, in which, when it is
204. S.S. 'lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 4, 26-27 (Sept.
7), available at http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1 9 27.0 9 .07_lotus/.
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unclear whether either party can carry the burden of persuasion, the
procedural posture of the case dictates the substantive result.
20 5
Smerdyakov:
What an evasive circularity you have created for us, Alyosha.
But don't we have to decide who speaks first; isn't there a first-mover
advantage in legal argument as much as in our beloved national
game of chess? I prefer to counterattack, with the black pieces.
Should we not be similarly explicit in explaining the relation between
substance and procedure in the international law game? If, for
example, our procedure gives Dmitri the burden to speak first, might
it not be because we think that states are merely the forms through
which peoples exercise their collective rights, privileging Ivan's
position that the Kosovars have a right to a state as our default
position. Similarly, if we impose that burden on Ivan, is it not
because we believe states are the true constituent elements, the real
right holders, in the international legal system, giving Dmitri the
high ground in the argument? Isn't the truth-as you call it-merely
the decision adopted based on the procedural forms that structure the
decision-making process, including the identity of our speakers and
the order of their speeches and the order of our voting, if any?
20 6
Alyosha:
Not at all, Brother. I will admit that your sophistries raise
important methodological questions about the pursuit of truth, but
they do not call into question the fact that our Brothers' debate is
premised on the proposition that we can come to a correct answers
here, so long as we let the conversation continue without arbitrary
205. Alyosha's reference to chickens is, of course, an allusion to a staple in the
Contracts casebook literature, Frigaliment Imp. Co. v. BNS Int'l Sales Corp., 190 F.
Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (holding, after an exhaustive discussion of all available
interpretive materials, simply that the movant had not carried the burden of
persuasion to show that a contract had been formed; but hinting that, had the other
party carried the burden of persuasion, it also probably would not have been able to
carry the burden of persuasion). See also Antonio F. Perez, The Passive Virtues and the
World Court, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 399, 429-36 (1997) (discussing continued viability of
presumptions of legality generated by the Lotus principle in specialized contexts, such
as the use of nuclear weapons).
206. For a rational choice theory rationale for this position see KENNETH J.
ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1970) and WILLIAM H. RIKER,
LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE THEORY OF
DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE (1982) (emphasizing decision-making
incoherence based on effects of procedural rules). There are, of course, many other non-
rationalist accounts of this position.
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closure. 20 7  Let me ask you, however, to explain further the
foundational constitutional questions you claim are relevant here,
because I think you have usefully expanded our conversation.
Smerdyakov:
Very well. Then let me try to explain my doubts by asking you to
resolve them. Do you or do you not agree that the meaning of
Resolution 1244 depends on the meaning of the UN Charter?
Alyosha:
If I may speak for Dmitri and Ivan, our Brothers have
acknowledged as much. One clearly describes the Resolution as a
treaty made pursuant to the Charter; the other describes it as a
creature of somewhat less dignity but still made pursuant to the
Charter and to be legally understood as falling within its ambit. In
the search for a correct answer, I ultimately see no difference in these
two positions, because they each suggest that the meaning of the
Charter does, indeed, inform the interpretation of the Resolution.
Smerdyakov:
Precisely. So you will then agree that our Brothers cannot agree
on the meaning of SCR 1244 until they have agreed on the nature of
the Security Council's powers under the Charter and, further, on the
relationship between the United Nations' powers and the powers of
states. Another way of expressing this would be to ask the following
methodological questions: Does it continue to serve analysis in
international law to start with the assumption that states retain all
powers they have not delegated expressly to the United Nations? Or
is it now more useful to start with the assumption that the
international community now exercises all its powers through the
United Nations, so much so that even the existence of states is now
premised on collective recognition through decisions by the General
Assembly and Security Council? I take it that this is very much what
was at stake in the ICJ's Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the
207. Alyosha's attitude here is based on his conception of Christian charity in
seeking mutual understanding of the truth and thus agreement on foundational
premises; it is to be distinguished from non-foundational justifications for discourse.
See, e.g., JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A
DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 3-6 (William Rehg trans., 1996)
(advancing a theory of "communicative reason" in which the object of all human speech
is mutual understanding largely in terms of procedural fairness); John Rawls, The Idea
of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765, 801 (1997) (explicating conception of
reasoned agreement through "overlapping consensus" on conflicting foundational
conceptions).
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Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, in which a majority could not be
found to answer the question whether a state, even in order to ensure




How fiendish! I see, Smerdyakov, that you are simply re-
creating at a higher level of abstraction our debate about procedure-
i.e., "who carries the burden of persuasion?" If states acting
individually are the holders of all residual powers not expressly
delegated to their international instrumentality, the United Nations,
then states would be presumed to be free to recognize Kosovo. Under
this view, Dmitri would bear the burden of persuasion that SCR 1244
bars recognition. If, however, states are constituted through
collective recognition in a UN decision-including even the current
members of the U.N., when their credentials are accepted and their
votes counted-then states would not be free to recognize Kosovo
until they had established their right to do so. Under this view,
assuming as a threshold matter that the question of Kosovo's status
had become (as it most clearly became in SCR 1244) a subject matter
of which the Security Council had become "seized," then Ivan would
bear the burden of establishing that the Western powers may
recognize Kosovo. You have simply restated the foundational
questions in procedural terms, when we should be addressing
foundational questions with no procedural presumptions.
Very well. To allow us to move forward, Brother Smerdyakov,
will you let me ask our Brothers what their answers might have been
had there been no Security Council Resolution? If we cannot agree
that the Security Council Resolution, taken in isolation, has
answered the question, perhaps we can agree than an answer can be
found on some other, more general set of grounds? Let us proceed,
then, Ivan and Dmitri, to your views on the general international law
principles that might govern this situation had there not been a
Security Council Resolution. My understanding, based on what you
have already said, is that Dmitri believes that the West's conduct,
including recognition of Kosovo, violates Serbia's sovereign rights,
and that Ivan believes that Kosovo is entitled to self-determination
and secession. But let me not put any other words into your mouths.
Smerdyakov's timely questions can be deferred for the time being.
208. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226 (July 8), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?pl=3&p2=4&k
=el&p3=4&case=95.
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Smerdyakov:
Yes, Brothers, by all means proceed. But let me warn you that
you will have to return to the questions Brother Alyosha would have
us set aside for now and, perhaps, forever. But one must face all
difficulties with courage, my Brothers, and it is clear that the
"relevant rules of international law," under VCLT article 31(3)(c),
"shall be taken into account" in the interpretation of a treaty, such as
the UN Charter itself.20 9 Perhaps Ivan, you would be prepared to
consider even SCR 1244 as a treaty that cannot be properly
interpreted without reference to the relevant background rules of
international law respecting self-determination, if you were to
discover a convenient interpretation of that background. And
perhaps, Dmitri, you might become reluctant to call SCR 1244 a
treaty (although doing so has enabled you to profit from that
"treaty's" negotiating history), if that assumption required you to
accept a conclusion that diminished Russia's place in the world. So I
reserve the right to renew what Alyosha calls my "procedural"
questions: first, the relative priority of state sovereignty and the
entitlement to self-determination, not just as stated in SCR 1244 but
in the context of the UN Charter and international law as a whole,
and second, whether the United Nations is a creature constituted by
states or the very existence of states depends on their collective
recognition by the United Nations in accordance with the United
Nations' purposes and principles.
I invite you then, Brothers Dmitri and Ivan, to enrich your
responses to Alyosha's question regarding non-Charter law with
attention to these questions as well. Perhaps my questions will give
you an opportunity to reflect on your understanding of the
relationship between the law of the Charter and general international
law. But beware, because, as you reflect on these matters, I fear that
the exigencies of your rhetoric in the very small matter of Kosovo may
force you to twist your preferred understandings of the background
law and your preferred constitutional theories as to the international
legal system as a whole. I will be playing close attention, because
your words may well inspire others to act in ways you never imagined
possible.
210
209. VCLT, supra note 117, art. 31(3)(c).
210. See FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, The Brothers Karamazov, in THE BROTHERS
KARAMAZOV, supra note 30, at 588-601 (revealing that Smerdyakov interpreted Ivan's
earlier claim that, in a world in which God does not exist, "all things are possible,"
together with Ivan's departure from the town, to have given him license to murder
Fyodor Karamazov).
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Act III: Kosovo's Secession and General International Law
Dmitri:
Brothers, I turn now to the question of the legality of Kosovo's
secession from Serbia under what we are calling the background
principles of international law. Here I will make two main
arguments: first, that the principles of international law conferred no
right of secession 211 on the Kosovar Albanians, and second, that in
enabling Kosovo's secession by military, political, diplomatic, and
financial means, the Western powers committed a violation of
fundamental international legal norms that they had themselves
defended and applied to Yugoslavia.
Although international law is unquestionably committed to "the
principle of ... self-determination of peoples," as per UN Charter
Article 1(2),212 it by no means follows that any national minority
2 13
may secede at will from an existing state and declare itself an
independent state. This is true even if the national minority is
numerous, shares a common history, religion, and culture, occupies a
contiguous territory in which it is a clear majority, and would be fully
viable if formed into a state. The very statement in the UN Charter
that recognizes the principle of self-determination of "peoples"
subordinates that principle to the end of "develop[ing] friendly
relations among nations. '214 Furthermore, Article 2(4) of the Charter
prohibits member states "from the threat or use of force against the
211. Dmitri follows James Crawford's definition of "secession" as "the creation of
a State by the use or threat of force without the consent of the former sovereign."
JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 375 (2d ed. 2006).
But Dmitri is specifically concerned with what Crawford distinguishes as "secession
within a metropolitan State," as opposed to "the secession of a self-determination unit
and, in particular, of a non-self-governing territory." Id. at 383. In other words, Dmitri
is not considering "salt water colonialism." Lea Brilmayer, Commentaries on Lea
Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation, 16 YALE J.
INT'L L. 177 (1991)-Secession and Self-Determination: One Decade Later, 25 YALE J.
INT'L L. 283, 283 (2000). Examples of post-World War II "secessions" of the former kind
are the successful case of Bangladesh, the unsuccessful cases of Katanga and Biafra,
and the contested cases of Northern Cyprus and Chechnya. Examples of the latter kind
include the successful post-War efforts of many former European colonies in Africa and
Asia, such as Vietnam, to break away from the overseas powers that controlled them.
Algeria is also considered such a case, despite the fact that, under internal French law,
it was regarded as a part of metropolitan France. THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 57 (Bruno Simma ed., 2d ed. 2002).
212. U.N. Charter art. 1, 2.
213. A "national minority" here means an ethnic or linguistic minority within a
host state. The Kosovo Albanians in Serbia before secession were a national minority in
this sense.
214. U.N. Charter art, 1, 2.
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territorial integrity ... of any state,"2 15 and Article 2(7) shelters from
UN intervention "matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state. '2 16 Bear in mind that the overarching aim of
the UN Charter is "[t]o maintain international peace and security.
'21 7
States will nearly always resist their own forcible dismemberment,
whether at the hands of internal insurgents or at those of outside
powers. Because forcible secession will therefore ordinarily pose a
threat to international stability and peace, the policy of international
law is to disfavor it. To put it bluntly, Woodrow Wilson's statement
that "[n]o people must be forced under sovereignty under which it
does not wish to live" 18 is not now, and has never been, the law.
Rather, what has been and is still the general rule of law was
stated in 1920 by a Committee of Jurists appointed by the Council of
the League of Nations to render an opinion on the claim of the
ethnically Swedish population of the Aaland Islands to secede from
Finland and become a part of Sweden. 2 19 The Committee said:
[I1n the absence of express provisions in international treaties, the right
of disposing of national territory is essentially an attribute of the
sovereignty of every state. Positive International Law does not
recognise the right of national groups, as such, to separate themselves
from the State of which they form part by the simple expression of a
wish, any more than it recognises the right of other States to claim such
a separation.
2 2 0
Likewise, the Commission of Rapporteurs appointed by the League of
Nations after it received the report of the Commission of Jurists
issued a ruling in the Aaland Islands dispute that remains good
international law even now. 2 2 1 Do you think the authors of the UN
215. Id. art. 2, 4.
216. Id. art. 2, 7.
217. Id. art. 1, 1.
218. Woodrow Wilson, Message from President Wilson to Russia on the Occasion
of the Visit of the American Mission (June 9, 1917), reprinted in OFFICIAL STATEMENTS
OF WAR AIMS AND PEACE PROPOSALS, DECEMBER 1916 TO NOVEMBER 1918, 104, 105
(James Brown Scott ed., 1921).
219. For more on this dispute see generally JAMES BARROS, THE ALAND ISLANDS
QUESTION: ITS SETTLEMENT BY THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS (1968); RADAN, supra note 46,
at 28-30; Nathaniel Berman, "But the Alternative is Despair". European Nationalism
and the Modernist Renewal of International Law, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1792, 1862-74
(1993); Norman J. Padelford & K. Gosta A. Andersson, The Aaland Islands Question,
33 AM. J. INT'L L. 465 (1939).
220. REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, LEAGUE OF
NATIONS OFFICIAL J. 5 (Spec. Supp. No. 3, 1920), as reprinted in MUSGRAVE, supra note
47, at 34.
221. The Commission of Rapporteurs" stated:
Is it possible to admit as an absolute rule that a minority of the population of a
State, which is definitely constituted and perfectly capable of fulfilling its
duties as such, has the right of separating itself from her in order to be
incorporated in another State or declare its independence? The answer can
only be in the negative. To concede to minorities, either of language or of
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Charter, or the governments that ratified it and became members of
the United Nations, were unaware of these principles in 1945?
And if you should think that these pre-Charter opinions fail to
reflect the current state of international law, Brothers, then let me
refer you to the very exact and careful statement of the law by the
Supreme Court of Canada in its 1998 opinion Reference re: Secession
of Quebec. 22 2 While acknowledging that, in the post-Charter legal
universe, "the right of a people to self-determination" is "now so
widely recognized in international conventions that the principle has
acquired a status beyond 'convention' and is considered a general
principle of international law," nonetheless "international law expects
that the right ... will be exercised by peoples within the framework
of existing sovereign states and consistently with the maintenance of
the territorial integrity of those states."223 And leading commentators
affirm that state practice in the post-Charter world accords with this
understanding of the law. 22 4 Thus, even if one considered the Kosovar
religion, or to any fractions of a population the right of withdrawing from the
community to which they belong, because it is their wish or their good pleasure,
would be to destroy order and stability within States and to inaugurate
anarchy in international life, it would be to uphold a theory incompatible with
the very idea of the State as a territorial and political entity.
The Aaland Island Question: Report Submitted to the Council of the League of Nations
by the Commission of Rapporteurs, at 27, League of Nations Doc. B.7.21/68/106 (1921),
as reprinted in MUSGRAVE, supra note 47, at 36.
222. [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.). For an analysis of the opinion see Stephen J.
Toope, Self-Determination-Canada-Quebec-Right to Secede Under Constitutional Law
and Public International Law-Role of International Law in Canadian Courts, 93 AM. J.
INT'L L. 519 (1999).
223. Reference re: Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 113-114, 122
(Can.). More fully, the Court said:
The recognized sources of international law establish that the right to self-
determination of a people is normally fulfilled through internal self-
determination-a people's pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural
development within the framework of an existing state. A right to external self-
determination.., arises only in the most extreme of cases and, even then,
under carefully defined circumstances .... The international law principle of
self-determination has evolved within a framework of respect for the territorial
integrity of existing states. The various international instruments that support
the existence of a people's right to self-determination also contain parallel
statements supportive of the conclusion that the exercise of such a right must
be sufficiently limited to prevent threats to an existing state's territorial
integrity or the stability of relations between sovereign states.... There is no
necessary incompatibility between the maintenance of the territorial integrity
of existing states ... and the right of a "people" to achieve a full measure of
self-determination.
Id. 126-127, 130.
224. For example, according to James Crawford:
Since 1945 the international community has been extremely reluctant to accept
the unilateral secession of parts of independent States if the secession is
2009]
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Albanians to be a "people" within the meaning of the Charter (and
other international instruments, such as the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, that posit the right of a "people" to self-
determination), it still would not follow that they had a right,
regardless of the wishes of Serbia, to form a state of their own.
22 5
The unavailability of secession does not, however, leave the
Albanian Kosovars without a remedy. I should note that, even if the
Kosovars have a right to self-determination, it derives from their
Albanian ethnicity and (typically) Muslim beliefs; and, as recognized
by the Badinter Commission (which I will discuss in greater detail
shortly), the appropriate response to any claim of self-determination
could be to respect an entitlement for Kosovars living in Kosovo to a
right of autonomous self-government within Serbia. 226  Or self-
determination could include rights of association with, and perhaps
even citizenship in, Albania.
227
Alyosha:
Now, I am fully prepared to accept for the sake of argument that
general international law concerning self-determination-as you say,
both as reflected in the UN Charter and pre- and post-Charter
customary international law-does not establish a right to secession.
But could you not say that the breakup of the SFRY and the
opposed by the government of that State. In such cases the principle of
territorial integrity has been a significant limitation. Since 1945 no State
which has been created by unilateral secession has been admitted to the United
Nations against the declared wishes of the government of the predecessor
State. By contrast there are many examples of failed attempts at unilateral
secession, including cases where the seceding entity maintained de facto
independence for some time.
CRAWFORD, supra note 211, at 390 (citation omitted).
225. See Alfred P. Rubin, Secession and Self-Determination: A Legal, Moral, and
Political Analysis, 36 STAN. J. INT'L L. 253, 259 (2000) ("Neither treaty, practice, nor
common law precedent establishes any positive legal right to secession or independence
of any people, however grouped.").
226. Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission: Opinions on Questions
Arising from the Dissolution of Yugoslavia-Opinion No. 2, 31 I.L.M. 1488, 1498-99
(1992), available at http://www.la.wayne.edu/polisci/dubrovnik/readings/badinter.pdf
[hereinafter Badinter Commission].
227. See id. at 1497-98 (determining that "[wihere there are one or more groups
within a State constituting one or more ethnic, religious or language communities, they
have the right to recognition of their identity under international law"; that "the
principle of the right to self-determination serves to safeguard human rights. By virtue
of that right every individual may choose to belong to whatever ethnic, religious or
language community be or she wishes"; and that "one possible consequence of this
principle might be for the members of the Serbian population in Bosnia-Herzegovina
and Croatia to be recognized under agreements between the Republics as having the
nationality of their choice, with all the rights and obligations which that entails with
respect to the States concerned.").
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international recognition of those new states created regional
customary international law-a lex specialis for the Balkans?
Dmitri:
I doubt even Ivan would be prepared to argue that, my dear
Alyosha. It turns out to be the case, with surpassing irony, Brothers,
that the Western powers that have just engineered Kosovo's secession
insisted on the principle of territorial integrity throughout the 1990s
as the former SFRY was breaking up.2 2 8 Moreover, the West
consistently applied that principle in the 1990s so as to negate any
claims by minority ethnic Serbians to self-determination. 229 To be
sure, the West's professed belief in the principle of territorial
integrity was opportunistic-a matter of expediency and power
politics, not of a principled commitment to the rule of international
law. In truth, the West manipulated a "conservative" legal doctrine
to achieve extremely radical ends: the voice was Jacob's but the hands
were Esau's. 230 Thus, after a very brief period of supporting the
territorial integrity of the SFRY as a whole, the West invoked the
same principle to assist and enable the secessionist movements in
Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Nonetheless, Ivan, I will
do your Western friends the honor of taking their professions at face
value because the very fact that the West had to proclaim its fidelity
to the principle of territorial integrity so loudly demonstrates how
fundamental that principle is in international law.
We must go back to the summer of 1991, some months after the
voters of Slovenia had opted for independence in a referendum of
December 1990, and also after the voters of Croatia had chosen the
same course in May 1991.231 Faced with looming conflict between
these secessionist forces and the federal (Serbian-led) resistance, the
Western powers-including the United States, the then-European
Community (EC) and its members, and the Conference on Security
and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE)-all voiced support for
228. Richard F. Iglar, The Constitutional Crisis in Yugoslavia and the
International Law of Self-Determination: Slovenia's and Croatia's Right to Secede, 15
B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 213, 213 (1992).
229. Id.
230. Genesis 27:22. Esau was, of course, a deeply disfavored character in the
Hebrew Bible. Indeed, in commenting on Esau's "contempt" for his own birthright and
his willingness to subordinate his principles to the desire for immediate gain, Leon
Kass writes that "in no other place in Genesis does the text itself pronounce judgment
on the deeds of any character." LEON R. KASS, THE BEGINNING OF WISDOM: READING
GENESIS 384 (2006).
231. For an excellent account of the diplomatic history of the period, see JAMES
GOW, TRIUMPH OF THE LACK OF WILL: INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY AND THE YUGOSLAV
WAR 44-79 (1997).
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maintaining the SFRY's territorial integrity. 23 2 For instance, on a
June 21, 1990 visit to Belgrade, U.S. Secretary of State James A.
Baker III endorsed a statement that the CSCE had issued two days
earlier, calling for "democratic development and [the] territorial
integrity of Yugoslavia. ' 23 3 Despite this Western opinion, Croatia
and Slovenia declared their independence on June 25, 1991.234
Notwithstanding these declarations, the West initially refused to
recognize either secessionist state and continued to demand that the
SFRY's international borders remain intact.
23 5
The first of the four Yugoslav wars then broke out as SFRY
military forces were deployed into secessionist Slovenia. This
deployment produced a sudden and dramatic policy reorientation in
the West.236 After some initial hesitation, Germany supported
Slovenia's bid for independence. 237 Then, rather than holding firm to
their previous insistence on the SFRY's territorial integrity, other
Western powers began to follow the German lead. An EC Declaration
of July 5, 1991, asserting that "a new situation has arisen" as a result
232. During the period [from 1990 through mid-1991] ... international
leaders uniformly called for the continued integrity of Yugoslavia and
condemned threats of secession .... In a visit to Yugoslavia on 25-26
February 1990 Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger made
it clear to Slovenian and Croatian leaders that the United States would
not advocate the dismemberment of Yugoslavia .... Nearly sixteen
months later Secretary of State James Baker visited Yugoslavia on 21
June 1991 . . . . Baker . . . reiterated continued support for
Yugoslavia's territorial integrity.
See RADAN, supra note 46, at 155-56. Both President George H.W. Bush and the U.S.
State Department also expressed support for maintaining Yugoslavia's territorial
integrity during this time. Id. at 160. Likewise, on June 23, 1991, the EC Foreign
Ministers issued a statement declaring that the EC would not recognize any unilateral
declaration of independence by either Slovenia or Croatia; and that position was
affirmed by the European Council on June 28, 1991. Id. at 161.
233. Marc Weller, The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 569, 570 (1992).
234. Iglar, supra note 228, at 213.
235. Id.
236. Jill Smolowe, Yugoslavia: Out of Control, TIME, July 15, 1991, at 26; see
also RADAN, supra note 46, at 161-62.
237. Germany's perception of the federal Yugoslav army's intervention in
Slovenia and Croatia was colored both by its Cold War experience and by its recent
reunification. Germany seems to have interpreted the interventions as an attempt by a
Communist political and military leadership to suppress the emergence of two new
democratic states that were seeking to exercise their right of self-determination.
Moreover, having been reunited not long before, Germany was beginning to test its
strength in European and world affairs. GOW, supra note 231, at 166-69. In addition,
Germany had deep historical and cultural ties to Slovenia and Croatia, reinforced by
economic interests. Germany's strong support for an independent, nationalistic Croatia
in turn confirmed the fears of the Croatian Serbs that they could not live safely in the
new Croatia. MISHA GLENNY, THE FALL OF YUGOsLAVIA: THE THIRD BALKAN WAR 112
(1992).
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of Slovenia's and Croatia's secession, referred ambiguously both to
"the right of peoples to self-determination" and to "the Territorial
integrity of states"; the reference to "self-determination" was
apparently included at the insistence of Germany.238 European
Commission President Delors stated on July 8, 1991, that the EC had
not ruled out the possibility of recognizing Slovenia and Croatia.
239
British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd was reported to have
"qualif[iled] an early statement supporting the 'integrity of
Yugoslavia' by adding that this should not include the use of force.
240
In other words, the SFRY had the right to its pre-existing
international boundaries, but it could not use force against the rebels
and secessionists who were seeking to redraw them. Imagine telling
President Abraham Lincoln that, while the United States had a right
to possess South Carolina, it could not use force against the rebels
that had fired on Fort Sumter!
After a change in the rotating federal presidency of the SFRY,
the new President ordered federal military forces to withdraw from
Slovenia on July 19, 1991.241 But hostilities were also breaking out
in Croatia, particularly in areas predominantly populated by Serbs.
Just as the Croats were attempting to secede from the SFRY, so too
the Serbian population of Croatia (roughly 12% of the Croatian
Republic's total population or some 600,000 people in all, and a
majority in areas like Krajina)242 sought to secede from the
breakaway Croatian state.
Brothers, if you are wondering why the Croatian Serbs sought
independence from a Croatian nationalist r6gime, just remember that
between 350,000 and 750,000 Serbs were killed in Croatia during the
Second World War under the Croatian Ustase Party's pro-Nazi
government, and that the Nuremberg Trials found that the Ustase's
policy constituted genocide. 243  One Croatian Ustase leader
notoriously explained the policy this way in June 1941: "[O]ne-third
of the Serbs we shall kill, another we shall deport and the last we
shall force to embrace the Roman Catholic religion and thus meld
238. RADAN, supra note 46, at 162.
239. Id.
240. Weller, supra note 233, at 572. Britain's policy, like Germany's, was colored
by its own national experience. The British tended to view the conflicts in Yugoslavia
through the lens of the conflict in Northern Ireland, or in other words as a matter of
irremediable ethnic differences. Gow, supra note 231, at 176.
241. Weller, supra note 233, at 574.
242. MANN, supra note 48, at 363.
243. MUSGRAVE, supra note 47, at 230. The secessionist Croatian government
under Franjo Tudman did much to aggravate the fears of the Croatian Serbs, who saw
the revival of Croat nationalism as a return to Fascism. GLENNY, supra note 237, at
11-13.
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them into Croats.' '244 And, it must be admitted, near the war's end,
Serb partisans slaughtered 100,000 Croats.2 45 These memories were
still fresh in the minds of both Croatians and Serbs: Croatia's leader
Franjo Tudjman himself denied that the Croatian Ustase state was
"the creation of fascist criminals" and affirmed that it stood for "the
historic aspirations of the Croatian people. '24 6 Just as "the central
problem of a Yugoslav state is the dominance of Serbs over Croats,"
so too "the central problem of an independent Croatia is the
dominance of Croats over Serbs.
'24 7
The SFRY intervened militarily in Croatia for the stated purpose
of maintaining the nation's unity. Critics saw the intervention as
motivated instead by the desire to create a "Greater Serbia"-a new
Yugoslav nation dominated by the Serbs. 248 The West responded by
publicly considering a military intervention of its own in order "to
ensure an orderly process of change"-in other words, to enable
Croatia to secede.249 At that point, however, the Soviet Union hinted
that such Western intervention could lead to a general European war,
and the West tabled its plan for an armed intervention. 250 Instead,
the EC decided to seek intervention by a UN force.2 51 By August
1991, about one-third of Croatia was in the hands of Serb forces.
252
On August 27, 1991, the EC's concern over the increasing
violence in Croatia led it to declare that it was determined "never to
recognize changes of frontiers which have not been brought about by
peaceful means and by agreement. '2 53 Thus was announced the
West's purported conversion to the principle of territorial integrity,
but as applied to the internal boundaries of the SFRY's six
constituent republics, not as to the international boundaries of the
SFRY as a whole. "[T]he EC was clearly innovating; there was no
precedent for determining statehood on this basis. '2 54 In fact, the
West was standing the principle of territorial integrity on its head,
244. GOW, supra note 231, at 42 (quoting Deputy Leader and Education
Minister Mile Budak).
245. MANN, supra note 48, at 353-54.
246. Id. at 378.
247. GLENNY, supra note 237, at 13.
248. See, e.g., id. at 12 (noting Tudman's "obsession" with an "all-purpose
Yugoslav ideal" and therefore the elimination of individual national identity among
many Serbian states).
249. Weller, supra note 233, at 575 (remarks attributed to Willem van Eckelen,
Secretary-General of the Western European Union).
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 584.
253. Id. at 575 (quoting EPC Declaration of 27 August 1991, EPC Press Release
82/91, Brussels) (emphasis added).
254. Richard Caplan, International Diplomacy and the Crisis in Kosovo, 74 INT'L
AFF. 745, 748 (1998).
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using it as an engine to drive the dismemberment of the Yugoslav
state rather than to preserve its existing boundaries. 25
5
The same August 27 declaration by the EC also called both for a
peace conference and for the establishment of "an arbitration
procedure" to resolve the differences between the warring parties in
the SFRY.256 The peace conference convened on September 7, 1991,
under the chairmanship of Lord Carrington. 257 The EC charged the
conference with "ensur[ing] peaceful accommodation of the conflicting
aspirations of the Yugoslav peoples, on the basis of the following
principles: no unilateral changes of borders by force .... ,"258 That
policy was repeated at the conference in an October 4 meeting
attended by the Presidents of Serbia and Croatia: Minister van den
Broek held out to the participants the prospect of Western recognition
of the secessionist republics, based in part on "[n]o unilateral changes
in borders. '259 At the peace conference's October 25 meeting, Lord
Carrington proposed the creation of "[s]overeign and independent
republics with international personality for those that wish it,"
coupled with "[i]n the framework of a general settlement, recognition
of the independence, within existing borders, unless otherwise
agreed, of those republics wishing it."26 0
Alyosha:
Ah! So I imagine that you are going to try to persuade us that
Western powers were interpreting the idea of "self-determination" to
mean self-determination within the pre-existing boundaries of each
republic, rather than as self-determination by each ethnic group,
because the ethnic groups sprawled across the Yugoslav federations'
boundaries (as Tito had intended they should26 1). And in that case,
255. Commenting on this volte-face in policy near the time of its occurrence, two
scholars noted that it left the question "why the presumptive boundaries should not
have been those of the whole of Yugoslavia rather than those of its subdivisions which
were previously of no international significance." A.V. Lowe & Colin Warbrick, Current
Developments: Public International Law: Recognition of States, 41 INT'L & COMP. L. Q.
473, 476 (1992); see also MUSGRAVE, supra note 47, at 124 (noting the untraditional
nature of the West's revised position).
256. Weller, supra note 233, at 576 (citing Press Release, EPC Declaration of 27
August 1991, EPC Press Release 82/91).
257. Id. at 577.
258. Id. (citing Extraordinary EPC Meeting, Declaration on Yugoslavia of 3
September 1991, EPC Press Release (Sept. 4, 1991), The Hague) (emphasis added).
259. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to
Paragraph 3 of Security Council Resolution 713, annex II, § 1(c), U.N. Doc. S/23169
(Oct. 25, 1991).
260. Id. annex VI § 1.1(c), (e).
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self-determination for Kosovo should require the consent of the people
within the republic boundaries within which Kosovo fell, rather than
simply being left to the Albanian Kosovars as a distinct ethnicity
inhabiting an area that was not co-extensive with a former republic.
Dmitri:
Precisely. The West has viewed self-determination in Yugoslavia
as a civic or republican, rather than an ethnic, concept. 26 2 Indeed,
when Milosevic proposed in October 1991 that Yugoslavia's
boundaries be rearranged through popular referenda held on an
ethnic rather than a republican basis, the West showed no interest
whatsoever.
263
We can see the origins of the West's policy still more clearly
when we turn to the other track of the EC's August 27 declaration-
the work of the Arbitration Commission. Commonly known as the
Badinter Arbitration Commission (for its chair, the French judge
Robert Badinter), the commission consisted of judges chosen from five
Western European constitutional courts (France, Germany, Italy,
Spain, and Belgium) to advise the peace conference on legal issues. 264
And Ivan, you must permit me to say that in the work of this
commission, law was truly and successfully conscripted into the
service of power.
Smerdyakov:
You don't get to become the head of a constitutional court unless
you know how to dance to politicians' fiddles! Even Fyodor Martens,
the greatest international lawyer our Russian Empire ever produced,
trimmed his doctrines to please his Czar-why should these judges
have been any better?
265
262. For the distinction between "classical" and "romantic" theories of the self-
determination of peoples, see RADAN, supra note 46, at 8-23. The former conception is
based on a common statehood or territorial government, the latter on a common
ethnicity, language, or culture. Id.
263. GOW, supra note 231, at 58-59.
264. Badinter Commission, supra note 226, at 1488-89.
265. On Martens, see Vladimir Vasilievich Pustogarov, Fyodor Fyodorovich
Martens (1845-1909)--A Humanist of Modern Times, 312 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 300
(1996), available at http://www.icrc.orgWeb/Eng/siteengO.nsf/htm1/57JN52. Martens'
change of doctrine to suit the Czar's wishes has been dramatized in JAAN KROSS,
PROFESSOR MARTENS' DEPARTURE (Anselm Hollo trans., 1994) at 44-46, 48-52, 102-
03.
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Dmitri:
Between 1991 and 1993, the Badinter Commission handed down
some fifteen opinions relating to legal issues arising out of the
collapse of the SFRY. Of these, the most'relevant to us are Opinions
Nos. 1, 2 and 3. Taken together, they surgically dismantled the
SFRY in order to create new states for non-Serbs. But at the same
time, they denied ethnic Serbs the correlative right to secede from
these new non-Serb dominated states. Let me take each opinion in
turn.
Opinion 1. Opinion No. 1 responded to a request from Lord
Carrington whether (as Serbia maintained) the republics that had
declared independence were attempting "secession," or whether (as
those republics argued) the SFRY was in the process of
"disintegration or breaking-up. '266 The question was significant
because, in the case of dissolution (unlike that of secession), "there is,
by definition, no predecessor State continuing in existence whose
consent to any new arrangements can be sought. ' 267 From the West's
point of view, it was politically important to find that the SFRY was
being dissolved so that the West could avoid the imputation that it
was supporting secessionist movements and thus contributing to the
destabilization of other troubled areas of the world.268 Obligingly, in
its Opinion No. 1, the Badinter Commission found the SFRY "[was] in
the process of dissolution. '269 This finding was plainly erroneous:
even Slovenia and Croatia, in their declarations of independence,
seemed to acknowledge that they were seceding from the SFRY.270
However, the finding permitted the West to pursue its policy of
promoting the independence of the breakaway republics without
having to secure the SFRY's consent.
27 1
The EC was now in a position to set forth the terms on which it
would recognize these republics. Although "recognition" is normally
no more than the declaration that a putative state has met certain
common criteria for statehood 272 (conditions that, incidentally, the
266. Badinter Commission, supra note 226, at 1494.
267. CRAWFORD, supra note 211, at 390.
268. See MUSGRAVE, supra note 47, at 200-03 (discussing this characterization).
269. Id. at 200.
270. See id. at 200-03 (developing this and other criticisms of Opinion No. 1); see
also RADAN, supra note 46, at 204-16.
271. MUSGRAVE, supra note 47, at 203.
272. Convention on the Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 165
L.N.T.S. 19, available at http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/interwar/rights.htm
(setting forth the common criteria for statehood).
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Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina would surely not have met 27 3), the
EC decided to use recognition as a political and diplomatic tool.
Because recognition, even on the declaratory theory, is a
discretionary political act, I will concede that the EC was within its
rights to have made recognition conditional. 274 The EC's recognition
policy had two main goals, both "tailored to fit EC interests. ' '2 75 First,
the policy sought to extract commitments from the new states to
honor certain Western values regarding the rule of law,
democratization, human rights, and the protection of minorities-in
essence, what are called Helsinki norms;276 second, the policy
"internationalized" the conflict in Yugoslavia, thus permitting deeper
EC diplomatic intrusions into Yugoslav affairs without Belgrade's
consent and creating a legal predicate for possible future military
intervention if the Yugoslav federal army sought to change the new
states' boundaries. 277 "[A]s new states the former republics would
have sovereign rights and be entitled to a greater degree of
international protection, including collective military action taken in
defence of those rights. 278
On December 16, 1991, the EC issued its Guidelines on the
Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union,
together with a Declaration on Yugoslavia.279 These documents
announced the tests that the EC and its members required the new
states to meet in order to be recognized. The EC Guidelines included
a commitment of "respect for the inviolability of all frontiers which
can only be changed by peaceful means and by common
agreement. '280 In the accompanying Declaration on Yugoslavia, the
EC required the new republics to "accept[] the commitments included
in the ... Guidelines. 28' The new republics were invited to apply for
recognition by submitting applications through the Badinter
Commission.
282
273. See MUSGRAVE, supra note 47, at 206 (noting that Bosnia-Herzegovina
lacked a government capable of exercising sovereignty over large parts of their putative
population or territory).
274. Id. at 204.
275. Weller, supra note 80, at 588.
276. Caplan, supra note 68, at 749.
277. See MUSGRAVE, supra note 47, at 117 (discussing the latter objective).
278. Caplan, supra note 68, at 747-48.
279. Press Release, European Political Corporation, Declaration on Yugoslavia
and on the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States, Doc. P. 129/91 (Dec. 16, 1991),
31 I.L.M. 1485 (1992) [hereinafter Declaration of Yugoslavia and the Recognition of
New States]. The United States had adopted a similar recognition policy. See FOREIGN
POL'y BULL. Nov.-Dec. 1991, at 39, 42.
280. Declaration of Yugoslavia and the Recognition of New States, supra note
279, at 1487.
281. Id. at 1485.
282. Id. at 1486-87.
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Opinion 2. To this point, we have seen how the West used the
doctrine of "territorial integrity" or the "inviolability of frontiers"
offensively, to accomplish the dismemberment of the SFRY. Now we
shall see how Opinion No. 2 of the Badinter Commission used that
doctrine defensively, to defeat claims by minority ethnic Serbs to
secede from these new states-states where they were at serious risk
of oppression and persecution. On November 20, 1991, Lord
Carrington asked the Badinter Commission for its advice on the
question: "Does the Serbian population in Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina, as one of the constituent peoples of Yugoslavia, have the
right to self-determination?"
28 3
The question was obviously a fundamental one. Although the
Badinter Commission's finding that the SFRY was in the process of
dissolution had made it unnecessary to justify the secession of the
new republics on the ground of their people's right to self-
determination, there was obviously an argument that, just as the
Croats or Bosnians had a right to a state in which they formed an
ethnic majority, so, too, in fairness, had the ethnic Serbs of those
areas. Furthermore, by the early 1990s, the Wilsonian vision of the
self-determination of peoples, despite its potentially destabilizing
consequences, 28 4 was enjoying increasing support. 28 5 Moreover, the
SFRY's internal borders between its constituent republics had never
been intended as international frontiers (and might have been drawn
differently had that possibility been contemplated)-as Marshal Tito
put it, they were "only an administrative division." 28 6 Should they
nonetheless have been considered inviolable? Finally, a resolution
that permitted the Serbian populations of Croatia and Bosnia to
withdraw from those new states-even though it would have entailed
difficult and contentious exercises in drawing up appropriate national
boundaries and might have necessitated population exchanges-could
well have contributed to the peace of the former Yugoslavia. But the
Badinter Commission resolutely set its face against any such policy.
Instead, it adopted a full-throated form of the doctrine of the sanctity
283. Badinter Commission, supra note 226, at 1497-98.
284. See Pascal Boniface, Pandora's Box, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, Jan. 1999,
http://mondediplo.com/1999/01/19states.
285. See, e.g., ALLEN BUCHANAN, SECESSION: THE MORALITY OF POLITICAL
DIVORCE FROM FORT SUMTER TO LITHUANIA AND QUEBEC (1991) (developing a theory of
the conditions under which secession is morally justified); Avishai Margalit & Joseph
Raz, National Self-Determination, 87 J. PHIL. 439 (1990) (discussing the moral
justification for national self-determination). A robust but somewhat later argument in
support of the prima facie right of any group within a territory to a government of its
own is found in Daniel Philpott, In Defense of Self-Determination, 105 ETHICS 352
(1995).
286. RADAN, supra note 46, at 152.
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of borders, 28 7 with the modest caveat that minority groups and their
members have rights to "recognition of their identity" and nationality
of their choice. 288 Of course, the right to recognition of their identity
was a far cry from the right to recognition as an independent state-
or even as an autonomous, self-governing region within a multi-
ethnic state. The policy of preserving even newly-fashioned
international borders trumped even the least compelling forms of the
right of a people to self-determination.
Opinion 3. Finally, in its Opinion No. 3, the Badinter
Commission addressed Lord Carrington's question: "Can the internal
boundaries between Croatia and Serbia and between Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Serbia be regarded as frontiers in terms of public
international law? s28 9 In its brief answer, the Commission gave some
substance to its brief allusion in Opinion No. 2 to the doctrine of uti
possidetis:
The boundaries between Croatia and Serbia, between Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Serbia, and possibly other adjacent independent
states may not be altered except by agreement freely arrived at....
Except where otherwise agreed, the former boundaries become
frontiers protected by international law. This conclusion follows from
the principle of respect for the territorial status quo and, in particular,
from the principle of uti possidetis.
2 9 0
And relying on this doctrine, as you would have expected, my
Brothers, the Commission obliged Lord Carrington with the answer
he wanted-the internal boundaries of the SFRY could alchemically
become frontiers of new states.
Now, it would be easy for me to criticize the Badinter
Commission opinions, as many legal scholars have done. 291 For
instance, I could quarrel with the Commission's reading of the
287. See Badinter Commission, supra note 226, at 1498 ("Whatever the
circumstances, the right to self-determination must not involve changes to existing
frontiers at the time of independence (uti possidetis juris) except where the states
concerned agree otherwise.").
288. Id. at 1498-99.
289. Id. at 1499.
290. Id. at 1500. Opinion No. 3 continued stating that:
Uti possidetis, though initially applied in settling decolonisation issues in
America and Africa, is today recognized as a general principle, as stated by the
International Court of Justice in its Judgment of 22 December 1986 in the case
between Burkina Faso and Mali .... According to a well-established principle
of international law the alteration of existing frontiers or boundaries by force is
not capable of producing any legal effect.
Id. (citation omitted).
291. E.g., RADAN, supra note 46, at 204-43, 251-53.
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relevant ICJ case law; 292 or reject its reliance on the uti possidetis
doctrine, a construct developed in the context 'f decolonization;2 93 or
question whether it was applied here only as a tool of European
power politics, 294 or was instead ignorant of the realities of
nationalism; 295  or whether, in despair of these realities,
296  it
prematurely sought to settle the matter, 297 thus yielding boundaries
292. MUSGRAVE, supra note 47, at 234-35 (arguing that the Commission
misread and misapplied the ICJ's remarks in the Burkina Faso case on the subject of
uti possidetis); Hannum, supra note 138, at 55 (demonstrating a similar criticism);
Michla Pomerance, The Badinter Commission: The Use and Misuse of the International
Court of Justice's Jurisprudence, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 31, 55 (1998) (noting that scholars
have frequently questioned the commission's reliance on ICJ jurisprudence).
293. Arguably, a doctrine that public international law had developed to protect
the nascent Latin American republics of the early nineteenth century from European
predations, and that had then been used to safeguard the newly emerging African
states of the mid-twentieth century from each other, should not have been applied
outside the context of decolonization. See, e.g., Lowe & Warbrick, supra note 255, at
480.
The [Badinter Commission's] reliance on existing boundaries, ambiguous as
that is, is redolent of the reliance on colonial administrative boundaries in
decolonisation. They provide a practical starting-point and allow for the
creation of identifiable States, but here they may not bring even the precarious
stability that they have achieved in Africa.
Id.; see also Hannum, supra note 138, at 38 (noting the difficulty of arguing that
Slovenia or other secessionist states were in a "neo-colonial" relationship with
Serbia/Yugoslavia, and that they did not so contend); Hannum, supra note 138, at 55
("This [Badinter Commission] opinion is dubious if it purports to identify a rule of
international law requiring the maintenance of existing administrative borders outside
the colonial context.").
294. As one noted scholar wrote, "uti possidetis is not law, but political history
preserved in aspic." Thomas M. Franck, Friedmann Award Address, 38 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 5 (Apr. 12, 1999); see also Enver Hasani, Uti Possidetis Juris: From
Rome to Kosovo, 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 85, 92-93 (2003) (arguing that the
Badinter Commission's use (or abuse) of the doctrine merely reflects European balance-
of-power politics).
295. See Brilmayer, supra note 211, at 284 (questioning whether the
Commission operated under the "blindness [that] infects most Western discussions of
nationalism"').
296. See Lea Brilmayer, The Moral Significance of Nationalism, 71 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 7, 21 (1995) (asking whether the true explanation of the Commission's rulings
was that they were simply the product of despair: a sense that it was impossible to sort
out the merits of competing claims, and fatalism about its practical inability to
implement a just solution even if it could decide what it would be).
297. Arguably, greater flexibility over these still-unsettled boundaries has made
peaceful compromises more likely and inter-ethnic violence less so. The British
diplomat David Owen, one of the co-chairmen of the Steering Committee of the
Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, apparently thought so. He wrote that "[t]he
refusal to make these borders negotiable greatly hampered the EC's attempt at crisis
management in July and August 1991 and subsequently put all peacemaking from
September 1991 onwards within a straitjacket that greatly inhibited compromises
between the parties in dispute." DAVID OWEN, BALKAN ODYSSEY 33-34 (1995).
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no better in practical effect than a random revision of borders,2 98 and
indeed actually making matters worse.2 99 It may well be, as one
scholarly commentator observed in summation, that Europe's
approach to the Yugoslav conflict represents a one-time-only reaction to
secessionist demands based on no discernible criteria other than the
desire of some territorially based population to secede. The principle
that borders should not be altered except by mutual agreement has
been elevated to a hypocritical immutability and contradicted by the
very act of recognizing secessionist states. New minorities have been
trapped, not by any comprehensible legal principle, but by the historical
accident of administrative borders drawn by an undemocratic
government.
3 0 0
None of these criticisms, however valid they may be, is material to my
present argument.
Alyosha:
Surely these were difficult questions upon which reasonable
minds could differ, given their novelty and complexity. Instead, you
seem to want us to believe that the Badinter Commission's work was
so bereft of plausibility that it can only have been motivated by a
nefarious agenda.
Dmitri:
Indeed, for my basic point here is that, however defective the
reasoning and conclusions of the Badinter Commission may have
been, the Western powers accepted, defended, and enforced the
principle of territorial integrity in the Badinter Commission's
formulation throughout the process of Yugoslavia's breakup from
1991 onward, with the effect, and likely the purpose, of weakening
Serbia and Serbians living in the new states.
298. As yet another scholar suggests, was uti possidetis here a harmful (rather
than, as elsewhere, useful) "idiot rule" that mistakenly assumed that "no border is
more rational than another, or that the issue of borders is simply so complex and
emotional that states will always prove unable to reallocate territory peacefully"?
Steven R. Ratner, Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetis and the Borders of New States,
90 AM. J. INT'L L. 590, 617 (1996).
299. See Hannum, supra note 138, at 39 (arguing that by implying that the right
to secede is stronger in cases where the central government accords more autonomy to
regions and localities, the Badinter Commission's rulings "will encourage states to
resist granting precisely those political and economic rights which might constitute the
most realistic and effective response to [secessionist] claims for self-determination. In
effect, a state would be penalized if it addressed ethnic or regional concerns by
devolving power to autonomous regions."); Margalit & Raz, supra note 285, at 458
(questioning whether it would "generate a problem as great as it meant to solve" to
create "a large-scale new minority problem").
300. Hannum, supra note 138, at 55-56.
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Smerykov:
And, of course, now that the Albanian Kosovars seek
independence, when Kosovo was never a "republic" within the SFRY,
that Badinter Commission's work is consigned to the ash heap of
legal history, eh?
Dmitri:
I will simply note, Smerdyakov, that the West adamantly
insisted that the former internal administrative borders of
Yugoslavia were sacrosanct and could not be breached, no matter how
compelling the demands for their revision. Thus, in bringing the
hostilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina to a halt in 1995, the West rejected
the claims of the Bosnian Serbs to their own republic. Article I of the
General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina
(the Dayton Accords) specified that "the Parties shall fully respect the
sovereign equality of one another, shall settle disputes by peaceful
means, and shall refrain from any action, by threat or use of force or
otherwise, against the territorial integrity or political independence of
Bosnia and Herzegovina or any other State. '30 1 I will grant you that
the Dayton Accords effectively partitioned Bosnia and Herzegovina
among the main parties to the conflict there-the Serbs on one side,
the Bosnian Croats and Muslims on the other 302-and that, in fact, it
violated the Western ban on the acquisition of territory in Yugoslavia
by force. 30 3 Nonetheless, even as the Accords effectively created two
de facto entities, they also preserved "the de jure sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Bosnia- Herzegovina. ' ' 30 4 Once again, then, the
West was treating the principle of territorial integrity-as the
Badinter Commission had tendentiously redefined it-as the
controlling legal norm that was to govern the settlement of
international frontiers in the Yugoslav crisis.
Indeed, on crucial occasions, the West even persuaded the
Security Council to affirm the controlling character of this norm. For
instance, very early in the Yugoslav crisis, the West secured the
adoption of SCR 713 (1991), endorsing the West's peace conference for
Yugoslavia. 30 5 In particular, the Resolution specifically adopted the
CSCE's declaration "that no territorial gains or changes within
301. The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Bosn. & Herz.-Croat.-Yugo., Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 75, 89.
302. See FROMKIN, supra note 36, at 157 (discussing the ethnic partition created
by the Dayton Accords).
303. BOBBITT, supra note 33, at 465.
304. MUSGRAVE, supra note 47, at 121.
305. S.C. Res. 713, 14, U.N. Doc. SJRES/713 (Sept. 25, 1991).
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Yugoslavia brought about by violence are acceptable. '30 6 Then in
1995, in endorsing the Dayton Accords, SCR 1031 (1995) reaffirmed
the Council's "commitment to a negotiated political settlement of the
conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, preserving the territorial integrity
of all States there within their internationally recognized borders.
'30 7
Let me return finally to the question of Kosovo's right to secede.
That question, I submit, must be decided in light of the continuous
and consistent doctrine and practice of the Western powers in
relation to the former Yugoslavia from 1991 onward. I submit, Ivan,
that that record has established three things.
First, it has powerfully reinforced the general post-Charter view
of international law that the principle of self-determination counts for
little when weighed against the right of a state sovereign to preserve
its existing international boundaries.
Second, it estops the West from arguing for the application of a
different legal standard for Kosovo-a standard that was not applied
to any of the other attempted secessions in the former Yugoslavia.
Third, it supports my interpretation of the meaning and effect of
SCR 1244's reference to the territorial integrity of Serbia. That
reference cannot be understood, Ivan, as you understand it, as though
SCR 1244 stood alone. No, SCR 1244 cannot be read as a discrete
and isolated text. Rather, it must be seen as but one element of an
unfolding sequence of international legal instruments, including
SCRs 731 and 1031, that consistently applied the principle of
territorial integrity, as the Badinter Commission had understood it,
to the former Yugoslavia.
Alyosha:
Brother Dmitri, forgive me if I seem impatient, but you promised
at the beginning of your speech to discuss not only why Kosovo had
no right of secession but also why the West's support for Kosovo's
independence was illegal. Are you going to address that question?
Dmitri:
Yes, thank you,, Alyosha. My remarks on that subject will be
briefer. According to one distinguished legal scholar and jurist, there
is a general agreement in international law
that while States may give military equipment and financial or
technical assistance to a liberation movement, they are prohibited from
sending armed troops.... State practice and the spirit of the UN
Charter's basic provisions on the use of force do not allow third States
306. Id. 8.
307. S.C. Res. 1031, 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1031 (Dec. 15, 1995).
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to go so far as to send troops to assist peoples invoking the right to self-
determination. 308
That conclusion is supported by the ICJ's decision on the merits in
the Nicaragua case, when the Court stated that "assistance to rebels
in the form of provision of weapons or logistical or other support...
may be regarded as a threat or use of force, or amount to intervention
in the internal.., affairs of other states."30 9  According to these
opinions, even if I am wrong to claim the political and military
leadership of Kosovo had no "right" to secede from Serbia, the
Western powers were still acting illegally by intervening with force in
Kosovo's struggle for independence from Serbia.
To be clear, I am not referring now to NATO's 1999
"humanitarian" intervention, which surely was illegal, 310 but which
at least did not have the declared aim of destroying Serbia's
sovereignty over Kosovo. I am referring to the later intervention that
took place quietly, and under the form of legality, in February 2008.
That intervention coupled the deployment of substantial Western
military forces into Kosovo and the establishment of "EULEX
Kosovo," an EU bureaucratic arm to "assist" in administering the
state of Kosovo, 311 with the formal diplomatic recognition of the
Kosovar state. The ultimate purpose of this intervention is "to
integrate Kosovo in the long run within Euro-Atlantic
308. ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL
REAPPRAISAL 152-53 (1995).
309. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 103-04
(June 27). Even more sweepingly, Judge Schwebel stated:
[T]he right of self-determination, freedom and independence of peoples is
universally recognized; the right of peoples to struggle to achieve these ends is
universally accepted; but what is not universally recognized and what is not
universally accepted is any right of such peoples to foreign assistance or
support which constitutes intervention. That is to say, it is lawful for a foreign
State or movement to give to a people struggling for self-determination moral,
political and humanitarian assistance; but it is not lawful for a foreign State or
movement to intervene in that struggle with force or to provide arms, supplies
or other logistical support in the prosecution of armed rebellion.
Id. at 351 (Schwebel, J., dissenting on other grounds).
310. See, e.g., Richard A. Falk, Kosovo, World Order, and the Future of
International Law, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 847, 852 (1999) (explaining why the 1999 NATO
intervention was a rejection of legal standards); Jonathan I. Charney, Anticipatory
Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1231, 1231-32 (1999)
(discussing the illegality of the 1999 NATO intervention). But see Abraham D. Sofaer,
International Law and Kosovo, 36 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 1-2 (2000) (attempting to justify
the intervention).
311. See European Union Fact Sheet: Eulex Kosovo (Feb. 2008), available at
http://www.consilium.europa.eulcms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=1357&lang-en&mode=g
(describing the responsibilities of Eulex Kosovo).
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structures"312-in simpler terms, to colonize it. NATO is in Kosovo
not just to keep the Serbs out but also to keep the Kosovars down.3 13
The "state" of Kosovo is nothing but a Potemkin village--or
perhaps I should say a kind of Balkan Manchukuo. 3 14 It could not
survive without artificial life support, in the form of massive military,
administrative, financial, and diplomatic sustenance from the U.S.
and the EU. A 2007 report by the Institute for European Policy,
commissioned by the German Bundeswehr, accused the international
community of a "grotesque denial of reality" about Kosovo, which it
described as "a Mafia society" whose state had been captured by
crime syndicates.3 15 It predicted that "with resolution of the status
issue and the successive withdrawal of international forces the
criminal figures will come closer than ever to their goal of total
control of Kosovo. ' '316 And among the critical issues it identified was
the "inexhaustible supply of young people without a future and
therefore ready for violence. ' 317 Without substantial infusions of
Western aid, it would soon become a failed state in the middle of
Europe, exporting crime and terrorism to its neighbors.
3 18
So what does the West plan to do in order to sustain the fiction of
Kosovo's independence? According a February 2008 U.S. State
Department briefing held soon after the recognition of Kosovo, the
Western powers would keep Kosovo in what the State Department
312. Sophie Dagand, The Prospects for a Future Kosovo: The Role of Security
Sector Reform, 38 EUR. SECURITY REV. 1, 1 (2008).
313. The West has long been concerned with the possibility that an independent
Kosovo could become the core of a "Greater Albania," as dangerous in its own way as
Milosevic's "Greater Serbia." See generally Sofaer, supra note 310, at 12 (describing the
dangers of Milosevic's actions). A truly independent Kosovo could destabilize the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (which has a large ethnic Albanian minority
population) or seek to join itself to Albania. The presence of NATO forces for an
indefinite period of time in Kosovo guards against those dangers. As Lord Ismay once
said about NATO, it had been formed to "keep the Americans in, the Soviets out and
the Germans down." See This Week in Homeland Security, Europe and the Atlantic
Relationship, June 13, 2003, http://www.homelandsecurity.org/NewsletterArchives/
061303.htm (citing this Lord Ismay quote). Today he might say NATO's presence in
Kosovo is designed to keep the Europeans in, the Serbs, Albanians and Macedonians
out, and Kosovars down.
314. See Jonathan Eyal, Is Kosovo Really Independent?, ROYAL UNITED
SERVICES INSTITUTE, http://www.rusi.org/research/studies/european/commentary/ref:C
47B9782C8AAFD/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2009).
315. David Binder, Op-Ed., Kosovo's Grim Future: The World Denies Reality,
WASH. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2007, at A19 (quoting INSTITUTE FOR EuROPMISCHE POLITIK,
OPERATIONALISIERUNG VON SECURITY SECTOR REFORM (SSR) AUF DEM WESTLICHEN
BALKAN - INTELLIGENTE/KREATIVE ANSATZE FUJR EINE LANGFRISTIG POSITIVE
GESTALTUNG DIESER REGION (2007), http://www.balkanforum.org/IEP-BND/
iep0001.pdf [hereinafter INSTITUTE FOR EUROPEAN POLICY REPORT]).
316. Id. at A19.
317. Id.
318. See id. (discussing how the seed of crime and terrorism is planted in
Kosovo).
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euphemistically called "supervised independence. ' 319 This Western
effort would have two main prongs: military and administrative.
First, the West intended to maintain in Kosovo the present NATO
force (KFOR) of about 17,000 troops. 320 That force originally operated
under the authority of SCR 1244; henceforward, it would openly be an
operation by NATO alone. 321 NATO forces, which have occupied
Kosovo since 1999, would therefore remain in place indefinitely.
Second, the EU would introduce its civilian mission, EULEX Kosovo,
to take the place of UNMIK (which, like KFOR, had been authorized
under SCR 1244).322 Once it reaches full capability, the EULEX
Kosovo mission would have 1,900 international police officers, judges,
prosecutors, and customs officials and 1,100 local staff.323 EULEX
Kosovo's initial mandate would be for two years.324 Both the U.S. and
the EU have also provided enormous financial support to Kosovo. In
2008, the U.S. expected to furnish $335 million to Kosovo; in 2007, it
gave $77 million. 325 As of February 2008, the EU had given nearly C2
billion to Kosovo and planned to "allocate more resources to Kosovo
per capita than to any other place in the world (nearly £330
million) ."326
In short, the West is giving the secessionist movement of Kosovo
truly astonishing military, administrative, and financial support.
Clearly this assistance is of a level and kind that is well beyond what
international law allows third-party states to provide to rebels and
insurgents. In particular, the West's military intervention-
accomplished by transforming KFOR from a UN-sanctioned presence
into an unauthorized NATO presence-is an "armed attack" on
Serbia in violation of the UN Charter.
327
319. Telephone Interview with Nicholas Burns, Undersecretary for Political
Affairs (Feb. 18, 2008), http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2008/100976.htm.
320. Id.
321. See id. (discussing SCR 1244 and NATO operations in the region).
322. See UN, NATO Announce Plans to Reorganize Kosovo Security, SPIEGEL
ONLINE INT'L, June 13, 2008, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,
559471,00.html (discussing the deployment of the EULEX police mission).
323. Press Release, Council of the European Union, EU Rule of Law Mission for
Kosovo (June 2008), available at http://consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=
1352&lang=en.
324. Id.
325. Telephone Interview with Nicholas Burns, supra note 319.
326. Press Release, Council of the European Union, The EU in Kosovo (Feb.
2008), available at http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/080216TheEUin
Kosovo.pdf
327. U.N. Charter pmbl. (obligating all member states of the United Nations, in
order to achieve the organization's goals of international peace and security, "to
practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors, and to
unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and to ensure by the
acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be
used, save in the common interest.").
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Finally, the Western powers are attempting to sustain Kosovo by
diplomatic means. And those efforts constitute yet another
international wrong. As you all know, Brothers, international law
has usually distinguished two theories of "recognition," the
declaratory and the constitutive.3 28 On the declaratory theory (the
prevailing view), the act of recognition is legally neutral: it is merely
the acknowledgement of an established state of affairs, viz., the prior
existence of a state or government. 3 29 On the alternative theory,
however, the existence of a state is constituted by international
recognition. The act of recognition, on that theory, plainly has both
legal effects and normative implications: it serves to create a state
and also, in the present case, to redraw international boundaries.
330
No one could plausibly claim that, by recognizing Kosovo, the
Western powers were merely acknowledging the existence of an
accomplished reality-as happened, for example, when the United
States recognized the Soviet Union in 1933 or the People's Republic of
China in 1978.331 No, the Western powers were plainly attempting to
conjure the secessionist state of Kosovo into existence.
It is accepted international law that the recognition of a new
state may be wrongful. This is shown, for example, by the Security
Council's condemnation in SCR 541 (1983) of Turkey's recognition of
the purported Republic of North Cyprus. 332 In fact, the North Cyprus
case bears a significant resemblance to the Kosovo situation. In both,
an outside power or powers intervened militarily in order to protect a
national minority from the asserted risk of persecution at the hands
of an established government, supported that minority's efforts at
secession, sought unilaterally to redraw international frontiers, and
recognized a secessionist government that was dependent on the
invader's continuing military and administrative presence for its very
existence.
333
328. CRAWFORD, supra note 211, at 4-5, 19-26.
329. Id. at 4, 22-26.
330. Id. at 4-5, 19-22.
331. For a brief history of the U.S.'s recognition of the Soviet Union in 1933, see
United States Department of State, Recognition of the Soviet Union, 1933,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/id/86555.htm. For an account of U.S. actions in
recognizing the Peoples Republic of China in 1978, see Stanley Karnow, East Asia in
1978: The Great Transformation, 57 FOREIGN AFF. 589, 596-605 (1978).
332. S.C. Res. 541, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/541 (Nov. 18, 1983).
333. Another example is provided by the unsuccessful attempt of the province of
Katanga to secede from the former Belgian Congo in 1960, just eleven days after the
Congo had received its own independence. The mineral-rich secessionist province
enjoyed substantial outside support, although in the end no other government
recognized it. CRAWFORD, supra note 211, at 404-05. SCR 169 (1961), however,
"completely reject[ed] the claim that Katanga is a 'sovereign independent nation."' S.C.
Res. 169, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/Res/169 (Nov. 24, 1961).
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Alyosha:
Well done, Dmitri! Ivan, I see that you have been longing to
speak. Now it is your turn, so speak freely and forcefully.
Ivan:
Brothers, my answer to Dmitri can be summed up in one word.
That word is "genocide." I am using the term "genocide" in the way in
which the UN General Assembly understood it in GA Resolution
47/121 (1992). 334 The General Assembly condemned the human
rights abuses being committed at that time by Serbian forces in
Bosnia, in particular "the abhorrent policy of 'ethnic cleansing,' which
is a form of genocide.
'335
And what is ethnic cleansing-a term apparently first introduced
into wide currency in 1991-1992 to describe a practice in which the
Serb forces in Croatia and Bosnia were just then beginning to
engage? 336 According to the 1994 Final Report of the Commission of
Experts established by SCR 780 (1992), 337 it is "a purposeful policy
designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and
terror-inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or
religious group from certain geographic areas." Where and how did
the Serbs apply this policy in Bosnia in the early to mid-1990s?
The practice of "ethnic cleansing" is carried out in strategic areas
linking Serbia proper with Serb-inhabited areas in Bosnia and
Croatia.... The coercive means used to remove the civilian
population ... include: mass murder, torture, rape and other forms of
sexual assault; severe physical injury to civilians; [and so on]....
Many of these acts of violence are carried out with extreme brutality
and savagery in a manner designed to instill terror in the civilian
population, in order to cause them to flee and never to return.
3 3 8
In 1998 and still more in 1999, Serbian forces were committing
that very form of genocide against the ethnic Albanian population of
Kosovo, just as they had done earlier in Croatia and Bosnia. The
West intervened in order to prevent the genocide. In 2008, the West
recognized the independent state of Kosovo in part to prevent the
recurrence of that genocide. If Serbia were permitted to reassert its
sovereignty over Kosovo, the Kosovar Albanians would resist with all
the force they could muster. And there is a risk that in the ensuing
334. G.A. Res. 47/121, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/121 (Dec. 18, 1992).
335. Id. pmbl. (emphasis added).
336. See BOBBITT, supra note 33, at 439-41 (discussing the introduction of the
term "ethnic cleansing" into popular discourse).
337. The Secretary-General, Final Report of the Commission of Experts, 1 130,
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conflict, the Serbs would once again attempt to expel or destroy
Kosovo's Albanian population. That risk is unacceptable. Hence the
West has acted. There was no alternative. I can, and shall, say more.
But that is the essence of the case for the West.
Smerdyakov:
You should read the Genocide Convention, Ivan.339 First of all,
under Article II of that Convention, "genocide" requires an "intent to
destroy" a national, ethnic, racial or religious group "as such. '340 The
ICJ held in 2007 in Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and
Montenegro that "ethnic cleansing" does not meet this definition.341
It said that
[n]either the intent, as a matter of policy, to render an area "ethnically
homogeneous," nor the operations that may be carried out to implement
such policy, can as such be designated a genocide: the intent that
characterizes genocide is "to destroy, in whole or in part" a particular
group, and deportation or displacement of the members of a group, even
if effected by force, is not necessarily equivalent to destruction of that
group, nor is such destruction an automatic consequence of the
displacement.
3 4 2
So the policy of ethnic cleansing practiced in Bosnia was not a
genocide-and neither was it when practiced in Kosovo. Besides that,
the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY in Prosector v. Krstic also ruled
that "[t]he Genocide Convention, and customary international law in
general, prohibit only the physical or biological destruction of a
human group .... [F]orcible transfer does not constitute in and of
itself a genocidal act.
'343
Furthermore, the Genocide Convention does not authorize any
outside power to intervene when it decides that another state is
committing genocide. Not at all. Instead, it requires strict
compliance with the Charter's rules for the use of force. It says
plainly: "Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs
of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the
United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and
suppression of acts of genocide. '344 Did your Western friends have
the Security Council's approval when they intervened in Kosovo in
1999 to stop what they considered genocide? No, they did not. And
339. United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, Dec. 11, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
340. Id. art. II.
341. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 91, 190 (Feb. 26).
342. Id.
343. Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, I 25, 33 (Apr. 19,
2004).
344. Genocide Convention, supra note 339, art. VIII.
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did they have the Security Council's authorization when they
recognized Kosovo in 2008-for the purpose, as you say, of avoiding
the recurrence of genocide? No, again they did not! So what justifies
their conduct then, Ivan? If it is not law, and it is not mere hatred
and revenge, is it morality? And what does "morality" mean in
international affairs?
Dmitri:
Ivan, you listened to me patiently, and so I will listen to you.
But I must put a question to you now. I do not think that the Serbs'
practice of ethnic cleansing amounted to genocide: your accusation
overlooks, for one thing, that ethnic cleansing is a counter-guerrilla
method of warfare, not solely a political objective. 345 You also fail to
mention that Serbia itself was swollen with Serb refugees fleeing
from ethnic cleansing elsewhere-some 550,000 by 1992. In the
month of August 1995 alone, the Croatian Army-with support from
the United States--cleansed the Krajina of an estimated 200,000
ethnic Serb inhabitants. 346 (This was the operation that Ambassador
Richard Holbrook described as merely "a milder form of ethnic
cleansing.")347 All told, between 1991 and the end of 1995, the ethnic
Serb population of Krajina had been reduced from 570,000 to
90,000.348 Finally, you neglect to explain that Milosevic's plan to
cleanse Kosovo may have been motivated by the desire to resettle his
own Serb refugees there, not by the wish to eradicate the Albanian
Kosovars as a people.
34 9
But even supposing that Serbia did engage in a form of genocide
in 1999, when the Security Council took up the question of Kosovo
after NATO's war, the Council did not decide to sever Kosovo from
Serbia. Not at all. In SCR 1244, with the West's full consent, it
reaffirmed Serbia's sovereignty over Kosovo and remitted Kosovo's
final political status to negotiations between the parties. If Serbia's
"genocidal" actions in 1999 did not persuade the Council to grant
345. See Gow, supra note 231, at 41 (noting Mao Tse-Tung's remark that, in a
guerrilla war, the fighter is a fish swimming in the sea of the local population, and
observing that the Serbian forces viewed ethnic cleansing as a military strategy aimed
at draining off the water).
346. MccGwire, supra note 62, at 2-3. Radan places the figure at 150,000 ethnic
Serbs, displaced from the Krajina and Western Slavonia, in two campaigns, one in May
1995 and the other in August 1995. RADAN, supra note 46, at 182.
347. RADAN, supra note 46, at 250.
348. Id. at 250 n.16.
349. MANN, supra note 48, at 393. "The argument that Belgrade saw [the
expulsion of 800,000 Kosovar Albanians] as a manageable number which could be
balanced by the resettlement of the 600,000 Serbs expelled from Bosnia and Croatia is
plausible-except that those refugees had consistently chosen to settle elsewhere."
MccGwire, supra note 62, at 10.
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Kosovo independence then, what entitles the West, some nine years
afterwards, to make that decision on its own? Especially after Serbia
has complied with their wishes by democratizing its institutions and
surrendering Slobodan Milosevic for trial at the Hague!
Alyosha:
Brothers, brothers, be patient! Ivan has been kind enough to
give us his argument in an admirably succinct form. Now let him
develop it. I am sure he will have answers to your questions -
whether convincing or not, we shall see.
Ivan:
I will take the argument in five steps. First, I will show that
international law recognizes an exception from the general norm of
territorial sovereignty that Dmitri has outlined. Second, I will
establish that Serbia's past treatment of the Albanian Kosovars fits
that exception, thus permitting Kosovo's lawful secession. Third, I
will address Dmitri's claims about the West's commitment to the
principle of territorial sovereignty in the former Yugoslavia. Fourth
and fifth, I will respond to, respectively, Smerdyakov's and Dmitri's
objections.
1. The Exception. The sources that Brother Dmitri cites on the
subject of territorial integrity-the Aaland Islands decisions 350 and
the Quebec secession case 35 1-expressly permit an exception for cases
in which an ethnic minority has been severely oppressed by a host
government. Thus, the Supreme Court of Canada noted that a "clear
case where a right to external self-determination [i.e., secession]"
exists when "a people is subject to alien subjugation, domination or
exploitation outside a colonial context. ' 352 The Court pointed out that
the exception for that case is rooted in, among other things, the
landmark Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations.35 3 After reaffirming the right
of self-determination of peoples, Resolution 2625 stated:
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing
or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or
in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and
independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described
350. MUSGRAVE, supra note 47, at 36.
351. Reference re: Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.R. 217, 133 (Can.).
352. Id.
353. Id.; G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/7247 (Oct. 24, 1970).
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above and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people
belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, color or
creed.
354
The legal scholar (now ICJ Judge) Bruno Simma wrote that
a right of secession could.., be recognized if the minority
discriminated against is exposed to actions by the sovereign State
power which consist in an evident and brutal violation of fundamental
human rights.
3 5 5
There is thus a sound legal basis for secession in at least extreme
cases. Thus the question: Is Kosovo such a case?
2. Kosovo's secession as fitting within the exception. The word
"genocide" should not be taken lightly. I do not use it so. Serbia had
caused about 2,000 Kosovar Albanian deaths and displaced about
300,000 Kosovar Albanians from their homes in its counter-
insurgency campaign of 1998.356 In itself, that was perhaps not
attempted genocide, although one must remember that Milosevic and
his fellow Serb extremists had already been responsible for at least
100,000 Muslim and Croat deaths. 357 In 1999, before NATO's victory
brought it to a halt, Serbia forced nearly 1 million Kosovar Albanians
out of their homes-nearly 75% of Kosovo's pre-war total of 1.8
million ethnic Albanians. 358 Of that 1 million, roughly 800,000 people
were forced out of the country, primarily into Albania and
Macedonia. 359  Perhaps another 500,000 ethnic Albanians were
internally displaced within Kosovo, in many cases to hide outdoors. 360
The death toll is not known, but estimates ranging from 5,000 to
10,000 ethnic Albanians seem plausible. 3 61 Although the West did
not invoke the Genocide Convention against Serbia in 1999, both the
U.S. State Department and the German Defense Ministry raised the
possibility early in the war that genocide was in fact taking place. 362
What we now know establishes that it was.
354. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 353, annex, pmbl. (emphasis added). It
would be reasonable to read the Resolution's reference to "race" in a functional way, so
as to include ethnicity. Cf. Shaare Tefila v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 617-18 (1987) (treating
"Jewishness" as "race" for purposes of U.S. civil rights law).
355. See THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note
211, at 58 (specifically mentioning the Serbia government's ethnic cleansing efforts in
Kosovo in 1998-1999 as an illustration).
356. DAALDER & O'HANLON, supra note 81, at 12; see also S.C. Res. 1199, supra
note 77, pmbl. (stating that over 230,000 Kosovar Albanians had been displaced from
their homes).
357. DAALDER & O'HANLON, supra note 81, at 12.
358. Id. at 108-09.
359. Id. at 109.
360. Id.
361. Id. at 110.
362. Id. at 111-12.
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In our post-Holocaust world, there is no international crime more
heinous than genocide. The prohibition on genocide is not merely a
matter of convention. No, that prohibition is a matter of jus cogens,
and every state is called on to cooperate in its suppression. 36 3 The
West's 1999 intervention in Kosovo can be, should be, justified on
that basis. Likewise, this justification extends to its "intervention"
(as you call it, Dmitri) in February 2008. The legitimacy of Serbia's
claim to sovereignty over Kosovo was discredited by the
humanitarian intervention in 1999; the West is now merely following
through on the logic of that intervention.
364
You will tell me, Brothers, that I am not giving Serbia credit for
a change of heart. After all, did it not render Slobodan Milosevic to
the ICTY for trial? Has it not democratized its institutions? Are not
the leading Serb political parties and factions now eager for their
nation to join the EU?
Smerdyakov:
Yes, Ivan! Aren't you forgetting what the indictment and trial of
Slobodan Milosevic were about? He was prosecuted before the ICTY
for the crimes he was said to have committed against the Kosovars!
365
And that trial was supposed to be an object lesson for Serbia and the
Serbs. You are seeking revenge for the Kosovars, Ivan, not justice.
Ivan:
There was no injustice, Smerdyakov, in putting Milosevic on trial
for his crimes. And there is no injustice in demanding that the
Kosovars have political independence. It would be impossible to
expect the Albanian Kosovars to forget the past-including the very
recent past. And neither should we. The 1999 genocide was not an
isolated event: as one Kosovar Albanian jurist put it, a "river of blood"
has coursed through the history of the Serb and Albanian peoples.
366
Suspicion is justified. And even focusing narrowly on the pre-war
363. See Jorgic v. Germany, 2007 Eur. Ct. H.R. 583, 68 ("[P]ursuant to Article
I of the Genocide Convention, the Contracting Parties were under an erga omnes
obligation to prevent and punish genocide, the prohibition of which forms part of the
jus cogens.").
364. See Viola Trebicka, Lessons from the Kosovo Status Talks: On
Humanitarian Intervention and Self-Determination, 32 YALE J. INT'L L. 255, 260
(2007).
365. See generally Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Second
Amended Indictment (Oct. 29, 2001) (detailing the crimes allegedly committed by
Slobodan Milosevic against Kosovars in Serbia).
366. Hajredin Kugi, The Legal and Political Grounds for, and the Influence of the
Actual Situation on, the Demand of the Albanians of Kosovo for Independence, 80 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 331, 344 (2005).
[VOL. 424'5
THE KOSOVO CRISIS: A DOSTOIEVSKIAN DIALOGUE
period from 1990 to 1999, one historian observed that "[t]o produce an
adequate survey of the human rights abuses suffered by the
Albanians of Kosovo... would require several long chapters in
itself."
36 7
3. The West's view of territorial sovereignty in the former
Yugoslavia. Brother Dmitri, the essence of your legal argument is
that the West long ago codified the principle of treating the former
Yugoslavia's internal borders as international frontiers, and insisted
that, as such, they be held inviolable. Fair enough. But treating
Kosovo differently from the Serb republics in Croatia and Bosnia is
amply justified. The Serbs of Croatia and Bosnia inflicted far more
suffering on their Croatian and especially Muslim neighbors than
they suffered at their hands.368 And, in any case, whatever wrongs
they endured are simply not commensurable with the sufferings that
Serbia and Serb extremists inflicted on Kosovo. Genocide stands
apart from all other war crimes. The Kosovar Albanians were
targeted for genocide; the ethnic Serbs of Croatia and Bosnia were
not. Hence Kosovo has a claim to independence that the Serb
republics did not have.
You also allege, Dmitri, that an independent Kosovo is a sham
state, a fiction created and nourished by the West. Well, what if that
were so, Dmitri? If the Western military and administrative presence
in Kosovo is there to prevent both the renewal of war with Serbia and
the internal collapse of Kosovo's own political structure, is that not a
benefit to all concerned-including not only Kosovo and the West but
also Serbia and Russia? How can it be wrong to prevent the
emergence of a radical, perhaps violent Islamist narco-state in the
heart of Europe? And in doing so to preserve the peace of the
Continent? If there is any troubling fiction at work here, Dmitri, it is
your fiction that Serbia's claim to rule Kosovo has some meaning left
to it.
4. Reply to Smerdyakov's objections. Smerdyakov, your first
objection is that I am collapsing "ethnic cleansing" into "genocide,"
when both the ICJ and the ICTY have carefully distinguished the
two. Perhaps so, but again, what of it? Like the General Assembly, I
may be using the term "genocide" in a political rather than a legal
sense. The heinousness of the atrocity would remain. But I do not
agree that I am speaking politically rather than legally. Courts and
scholars divide on the question whether ethnic cleansing is "genocide"
367. MALCOLM, supra note 32, at 349.
368. See BOBBITT, supra note 33, at 444-47 (refuting claims that suggested that
Bosnian Muslims and Serbs were equally complicit in atrocities plaguing the region);
id. at 465 (citing the lack of evidence that Bosnian Serbs were at risk in a multi-ethnic
Bosnian State).
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in the strict sense of the Convention. The European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR) reviewed the situation in its 2007 judgment in Jorgic
v. Germany.369 It found that, although the ICJ and the ICTY had
ruled as you say, the national courts of Germany, including its
greatly respected Federal Constitutional Court, had interpreted the
Convention and its implementing statute in Germany more broadly,
so that "genocide" encompassed ethnic cleansing. 370 It also found that
scholarly opinion was split on the question of whether the ethnic
cleansing committed by the Serbs in Bosnia constituted genocide.
371
Finally, it upheld a criminal conviction of a Bosnian Serb defendant
for genocide under Germany's implementing statute, ruling that the
German national courts' interpretation of both their statute and
Article II of the Convention was reasonable. 372 So you are with the
ICJ and the ICTY; I am with the UN General Assembly and the
Federal Constitutional Court of Germany.
Second, Smerdyakov, you argue that, even if the West was
attempting to suppress genocide in Kosovo in 1999, it nonetheless
failed to comply with the Charter's strictures on the use of force. I
concede that; but what of it? As I have said, the international order
as a whole is committed to suppress genocide and other crimes
against humanity: a violation of the peremptory norm against
genocide (or other crimes against humanity) is a violation of a duty
erga omnes. Call it morality rather than law, if you will. But the
intervention was justified.
5. Reply to Dmitri's objections. Let me say, Dmitri, that once
again you have offered a primitive and unyielding account of the law.
You assume that just because SCR 1244 did not immediately demand
the separation of Kosovo and its independence, no such result was
foreseen. Indeed, you seem to consider the Resolution as the
Albanian Kosovars' remedy of last resort for the historic violations of
universally accepted human rights norms committed against them by
the terrorist r6gime in Serbia.
373
My argument here is in three parts. First, I maintain that in
1999, after the Serbs' genocidal campaign had been brought to an
end, the Albanian Kosovars were entitled to independence. 374 I think
you come near to conceding as much, Dmitri, when you suggest that
369. Jorgic v. Germany, 2007 Eur. Ct. H.R. 583, 68.
370. Id. 6-45.
371. Id. 47.
372. Id. 1 103-108.
373. See Brilmayer, supra note 211, at 283 (suggesting that secession can be
viewed as a remedy for human rights violations).
374. Cf. Rubin, supra note 225, at 269 ("In the immediate aftermath of
atrocities, no resolution is feasible and the only moral course seems to be to allow
people to separate themselves into communities that refuse to deal with those each
considers evil.").
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the Security Council Resolution might have, but did not, approve
Kosovo's independence at that point. The case-for independence even
then was based on a wrong of historic proportions, a murderous
campaign last seen in Europe when the Nazi Third Reich attempted
to exterminate the Jews. Is the case of the Kosovars really any
different now from what it was in 1999?
A wrong begets the right to a remedy. Serbia's pattern of brutal
atrocities against the Kosovar Albanian people entitled them, under
prevailing international legal standards, to the remedy of self-
determination. I will assume, as you do, Brothers, that the remedy of
self-determination does not in every case equate with secession.
Secession is perhaps the most drastic remedy available in a case such
as this. But the test to be applied is whether that remedy is
necessary and proportionate to the wrong endured. That test was
satisfied in 1999 and is satisfied today as well. Only national
independence for Kosovo could begin to repair the devastation Serbia
inflicted. Only national independence could provide the Kosovars
with true security against a repetition of Serbia's oppressions and
atrocities. If the colonized peoples of Africa and Asia had the right to
secede in the post-War period from the European empires that had
held them down, so too Kosovo has the right to escape from Serbia's
cage.
3 75
Second, I maintain that the course of implementing SCR 1244
does not constitute a waiver either of the Kosovar people's right to the
remedy of independence or of the erga omnes rights of other states to
intervene in Kosovo on their behalf.376 I have called it an erga omnes
"right"; I might well have called it instead their duty under the
emerging "responsibility to protect. '377 In interpreting the failure of
SCR 1244 to provide for secession as the immediate remedy so as to
bar secession at a later date, you ignore fundamental principles of the
law of remedies.
Third, Serbia's actions in Kosovo in 1998-1999 must be seen as
an impermissible and unlawful use of force against the people of
375. See Peter Radan, The Definition of 'Secession,' (Macquarie Law Working
Paper Series, Paper No. 2007-3, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1011833 (denying the tenability for legal analysis of the
distinction between the creation of new state from an overseas colony formerly
belonging to an empire and the creation of a new state through the secession of a
territorial part of a pre-existing state).
376. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J.
3, 32 (Feb. 5) (suggesting universal human rights obligation in respect to treatment of
one's own nationals are erga omnes in character, that is to say, assertable by third
parties on behalf of foreign nationals).
377. 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, 138-140, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 16, 2005); see also INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION
AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 11-19 (2001), available at
http://www.iciss.ca/report-en.asp (articulating an emerging responsibility of
governments to protect their citizens as a rationale for humanitarian intervention).
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Kosovo. By analogy to Article 51, that people had an "inherent" right
of self-defense that nothing in the Charter could impair.378  By
further analogy, the West had a right to join them in collective self-
defense. Declaring independence is but one more legitimate and
proportional measure of lawful self-defense.
Alyosha:
When you speak of legal analogies, Ivan, I find it harder and
harder to follow you. Surely it is sign of the weakness of your
position that you have run out of better arguments. Perhaps this is
one of your dreams and you are imagining international law rather
than applying it.
Smerdyakov:
No, no, Alyosha. Give Ivan some rope here, because if I
understand where he is going, we may all have the pleasure of seeing
Ivan hang himself with it.
Ivan:
Thank you for that vote of confidence, Smerdyakov. But let me
proceed. I rather think that, as usual, I am a chess move or two
ahead of you.
Let me explain. If we are correct that the Kosovars were entitled
to self-determination in 1999, then the initial U.S. proposal that the
Resolution provides the Kosovars with right to a referendum on
independence within three years makes perfect sense, because it
would have given the Serbs three years then to make the necessary
adjustments to give the Kosovar people confidence that the Serbs
would not resume their genocidal campaign. Surely restoration of the
Kosovar people's entitlement to confidence in their future
expectations of Serbian human rights performance would have been a
central part of any appropriate remedy for a human rights violation
of this magnitude. But the inclusion of such a time-limited
opportunity for the Kosovars would have given the Kosovars, I will
concede, an incentive not to cooperate in any Serb efforts at restoring
such confidence. Thus, the deletion of any time-certain referendum-
or any right to a referendum at all, which would have invited the
same debate during implementation as to an end-point for
cooperation and thus created the same incentives for noncooperation
378. U.N. Charter art. 51.
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for both sides 3V--makes perfect sense in the rational design of SCR
1244 as an attempt to facilitate a remedy for the wrong committed by
the Serbs against the Kosovars.
Now, let me say I acknowledge that analogy to the law of self-
defense, at first blush, seems improper. But it too provides a
coherent and consistent account of SCR 1244 as a remedial measure.
Consider that, if the Kosovar people had declared their independence
in 1999, and had their new state been recognized at that time, then
the Kosovar state would have been entitled to the right of individual
and collective self-defense under customary international law-an
"inherent" right, recognized as such by the Charter. 380  This would
have permitted other states to rise to Kosovo's defense by "necessary
and proportionate" means. 38 1 At that stage in the process, would it
not have been permissible for the Kosovar state, and states rising to
its defense, to be free to experiment with temporary modes of
association with Serbia to test the good faith of Serbia's assurance
that it would not renew its use of force against the Kosovar people?
Thus, as you can see, both from the standpoint of a people's
entitlement under international human rights law, and from
standpoint of a state or territorial unit's freedom from a use of force,
SCR 1244 can be understood as a provisional remedy, pending further
elaboration of the facts.
Smerdyakov:
Now the trap is sprung, Brother Ivan, because, having conceded
that the matter is governed by the Security Council, is it not now the
Council's responsibility to determine that a "more intrusive remedy,"
as you prefer to call it-the dismemberment of Serbia, as Dmitri
might claim-is now required?
Ivan:
I imagine you derive some kind of perverse joy in appearing to
catch me in a contradiction, Smerdyakov, but sadly you will not have
the pleasure for very long. It is precisely because Kosovo (which
379. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 220 (1994)
(noting the need for rules that give the parties proper incentives throughout their
relationship).
380. U.N. Charter art. 51.
381. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 905 (1987) (stating that otherwise unlawful countermeausures including the use of
force, if proportionate, may be taken to terminate, prevent, or remedy violations of
international obligations). The principal of erga omnes also applies. Id. cmt. (a). Thus,
these remedies are available to any state party against a state party violating the
agreement, even if the violation did not affect nationals of the claimant state or any
other particular interest of that state. Id. §§ 703(2), 703 cmt. (a).
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could have claimed independence in 1999) and its supporters (which
could have recognized that claim to independence) agreed to give the
Security Council an opportunity to achieve a remedy through
implementation of SCR 1244 that Kosovo and the West reserved all
the rights they might have had under customary international law to
seek their own remedies. The Resolution, properly construed, in fact
acknowledges this by setting forth a set of principles to be
implemented. Can anyone say that, through implementation of the
Resolution, the status quo ante has been restored, and that Serbia's
wrongs against Kosovo have been remedied?38 2 The Resolution
contemplated a remedy. Having failed to secure that remedy, the
situation reverts to the state of affairs that existed prior to adoption
of the Resolution.
Indeed, let me now get to what I regard as the dispositive point:
any other interpretation of SCR 1244 so as to preclude independent
action by Kosovo and supporting states once the terms of the
Resolution are not fulfilled would discourage future entities like
Kosovo and other states from cooperating in initial efforts through
the Security Council to provide the least drastic remedies possible in
such situations. Surely you would not have our interpretation of the
Resolution-in light of the need to synthesize it with foundational
human rights principles, the international law of remedies, and
parallel principles of self-defense law-take a form that discourages,
rather than promotes, international cooperation. Don't we want, as I
suggested at the beginning of this part of our debate, a synthesis of
the law of the Charter and the background principles upon which it
sits, to serve humanity rather than be served by humanity?
Alyosha:
Brother Ivan, I am struck by your argument that SCR 1244
sought to remedy the injustice that the Albanian Kosovars had
suffered at the hands of the Serbs and that the Resolution accordingly
permits Kosovo unilaterally to choose secession as a necessary and
proportionate remedy for that injustice if the consensual process that
the Resolution contemplated should fail. But what I am unsure of is
how you understand the kind of justice that the Resolution, on your
interpretation, sought to provide.
382. Cf. Chorzow Factory (F.R.G. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 47
(Sept. 13) ("[Reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the
illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if
that act had not been committed.").
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Are you saying that the Resolution sought to give the Kosovars
corrective justice?3 83  In that case, it seems to me, you should
maintain that the transfer of sovereignty over Kosovo from the Serbs'
hands to the Kosovars' is a remedy to which the Kosovars are
entitled, regardless of the Serbs' conduct in the years since 1999. In
other words, since the Kosovars were entitled to the remedy of
secession after the Serb onslaught in 1999, and the Resolution
withheld that remedy from them temporarily, then it should not
matter now whether or not Serbia had reformed itself in the
meanwhile-all that should matter is whether in 2008 the Kosovars
still wanted secession or not. The debtor's note had become due, as it
were; the intervening conduct of the debtor, even if commendable,
could not annul the debt. On the other hand, perhaps you see SCR
1244 as having forward-looking remedial functions, such as
deterrence or preventing the Serbs from repeating their injustices. In
that case, it would seem that your view should be that the Kosovars
were not entitled in 1999 to secession, but only to some kind of self-
determination-which might or might not be eventual independence.
And in that case the subsequent behavior of the Serbs would seem
relevant to deciding now whether the Kosovars' secession was a
necessary and proportionate remedy, or whether some less drastic
remedial measure would have been adequate.
Ivan:
Brother Alyosha, of course I think that the Resolution aimed to
shape the future conduct of Serbia and thus was designed to deter or
prevent injustice. I view the Council's work as designed, quite
pragmatically, to influence the future conduct of states and so create
a more rational world order, not to see that back debts (as you call
them) are paid by one state to another. Thus, the Resolution was
framed to give Serbia incentives to purge its leadership, democratize
its politics, and reform. But I also believe that the Kosovars had the
right to choose secession in 1999, because even then that was an
appropriate remedy. The Resolution did not deny the legitimacy of
the Kosovars' claim to secede; rather, it gave them, in effect, an
election of remedies, while delaying for a while their ability to choose
between them. After the negotiations contemplated by the Resolution
had run their course, the Kosovars could either declare their
independence (as they had a right to do in 1999) or choose some form
of continuing association with Serbia that both sides found
acceptable.
383. For a discussion of the centrality of claims of either corrective or
restitutionary justice to arguments for the transfer of resources (including sovereignty)
from one national group to another, see Brilmayer, supra note 296, at 12-14.
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Alyosha:
Dear Ivan, I am grateful for your clarification. Whether or not
we finally agree with you, I find you persuasive in arguing that
statehood for the Kosovars would be a last-resort remedy to a grave
international wrong. I cannot help but notice the similarity to the
just war theory's effort to limit the international use of force to those
cases in which no lesser remedy for evil can be found.
384
Dmitri:
Brothers, I am only a plain, blunt soldier, and I cannot fathom
Ivan's subtle profundities. Let me say only this.
First, if the Security Council had intended in 1999 to sever
Kosovo from Serbia-or even to make Serbia's continued sovereignty
over Kosovo contingent on Serbia's good behavior-the Council could
have said so. SCR 1244 could easily, for instance, have provided for a
referendum on independence in Kosovo within a fixed period, unless
Serbia met certain benchmarks within that time. It did nothing of
the kind. Ivan's interpretation of SCR 1244 as a provisional remedy
for Kosovo's wrongs is creative; but it bears no resemblance to the
text of that Resolution. Nor does it reflect the careful balance of
interests that the Council struck: it overlooks the fact that the
Council clearly recognized in 1999 that the Serbians, not only the
Albanians, have equities in Kosovo-- which, after all, explains why
the government of Serbia has fought so long and so tenaciously to
keep the province. The new "balance" struck by the unilateral actions
of the Kosovar Albanians and their Western sponsors gives far too
little weight to the important interests of Serbia and the Serbians-
historical, religious, cultural, and demographic-in the future of
Kosovo. Furthermore, even if SCR 1244 had been designed as a
remedy for the Kosovar Albanians, the purported inadequacy of that
remedy would not have justified their recourse to self-help. When it
comes to the use of force-which Kosovo's secession plainly entails-
the ICJ's Corfu Channel case, among others, teaches us that
international law is most emphatically hostile to measures of self-
help. 38 5 Finally, why should we think of SCR 1244 as a kind of
"remedy" for the Kosovars at all? Why is the Resolution not more
analogous to a simple armistice between opposing military forces
384. For an explication of the so-called last resort criterion in Just War Theory,
see, e.g, National Conference of Catholic Bishops (1983 and 1993), The Challenge of
Peace: God's Promise and Our Response, reprinted in THE ETHICS OF WAR 669, 673
(Gregory Reichberg et al. eds., 2006) (collecting documents).
385. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 32-35 (Apr. 4).
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than to a judicial remedy that one litigant has secured against
another?
Second, I deny that the existence of an erga omnes right to
prevent an ongoing genocide (if that is what an ethnic cleansing is)
confers the right on third-party states to invade another state's
political sovereignty or territorial integrity without specific
authorization from the Council in accordance with Chapter VII's use
of force rules. The Genocide Convention itself, as Smerdyakov has
pointed out, makes that plain. And even if the practice of genocide
violates jus cogens, so too does the use of force contrary to Charter
rules. Indeed, the ICJ has said that the latter prohibition is a
"conspicuous example" of jus cogens.386
Furthermore, I deny that that the erga omnes right entitles
third-party states to dismember another state because of the asserted
fear that another genocide might otherwise take place. If the right
does not justify unauthorized intervention to prevent an ongoing
genocide, it can hardly justify intervention to prevent an anticipated
one. Moreover, there could be no Serbian genocide in Kosovo so long
as the United Nations' mission-KFOR and UNMIK-remained in
place. But who wants the UN presence removed? The West. Hence
the West's claim that Kosovo's independence is the only realistic
alternative to the recurrence of genocide is simply false.
Third, the idea that the Kosovar Albanians were acting in self-
defense in declaring their independence is specious, and even more
specious is the idea that the West is engaged in collective self-defense
alongside them. Ivan, do us the courtesy of simply reading Article 51
of the Charter. It speaks of a right of self-defense "if an armed attack
occurs against a Member of the United Nations. '38 7 Kosovo was not,
is not, and (until Serbia agrees) will not be a 'Vember of the United
Nations." The Charter expressly sees the right of self-defense as a
right of states, not of peoples. That makes perfect sense, if only for
the reason that there is no agreed understanding as to what
constitutes a people. The Supreme Court of Canada's decision on
Quebec's secession ducked that issue, and understandably so.
38 8
What we have, after all, is a Charter of the United Nations, not of the
United Peoples. What is more, the ICJ's decision in the Wall case
indicates that even a member state of the United Nations may not
386. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 190
(June 27); see also U.N. Charter art. 2, 4 ("All Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations.").
387. U.N. Charter art. 51 (emphasis added).
388. See Reference re: Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.R. 217, 126-139
(Can.).
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have an Article 51 right of self-defense as against a non-state actor.38 9
Are you claiming nonetheless, Ivan, that a non-state actor has a right
of self-defense as against a state? The paradox would be intolerable.
Finally, Ivan, let me question your idea that the oppression that
the Kosovar Albanians have suffered under the Serbs entitles them to
the remedy of secession. Do you think that that test would make for
a wise and quieting rule of law in international affairs? How would
you apply it? Was the secession of Bangladesh justified under your
test, while that of Biafra was not? Or were secessions both justified?
Or neither? Would your test apply to the Kurds of Iraq and Turkey?
To southern Sudan? To Nagorno-Karabakh? To South Ossetia or
Abkhazia? 390 It is all very well for your Western friends to insist that
Kosovo is a unique and unrepeatable case. But the justifications that
are offered for Kosovo's secession are generalizable; and, if they are
generalizable, as Smerdyakov quite rightly reminds us, other cases
may fit under them, with no hope of legal stability. 391
Smerdyakov:
So, we face contradictory jus cogens principles-the right to
suppress genocide as against the duty to respect the territorial
integrity and political independence of states. Or to put it more
generally, there is "a fundamental contradiction," is there not,
between "the legal principles of state sovereignty and human
rights"?3 92 We are also uncertain whether states have rights of self-
defense against peoples and whether peoples have rights of self-
defense against states. And we do not even know whether the
international legal order derives ultimately from the nations that are
the members of the United Nations or from the "peoples of the United
Nations" who spoke in Article 1 of the Charter. 393 Do nations create
peoples, or do peoples decide what nations there are to be? A fine
pickle!
389. See Legal Consequences of Construction of a Wall in Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 194-95 (July 9).
390. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text (reporting Russian
recognition of these secessions).
391. Compare Nikolas K. Gvosdev, Kosovo and Its Discontents, FOREIGN AFF.,
Jan.-Feb. 2006, at 169, 169 (arguing that the case for Kosovo's independence applies
elsewhere), and Ignacio Ramonet, Kosovo, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE (July 2007),
available at http://mondediplo.com/20O7/O7/01lkosovo (suggesting that Kosovo's
declaration of independence could lead to similar action by similarly-situated
territories), with Charles A. Kupchan, Serbia's Final Frontier?, FOREIGNAFFAIRS.ORG,
Mar. 12, 2008, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080312faupdate87276/charles-a-
kupchanserbia-s-final-frontier.html (rejecting the "domino theory" of independence).
392. W. Michael Reisman, Why Regime Change is (Almost Always) a Bad Idea,
98 AM. J. INT'L L. 516, 517 (2004).
393. U.N. Charter art. 1.
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Alyosha:
Dear Brothers, please be patient and open your minds, for as we
will soon see, "there are more things in heaven and earth ... than are
dreamt of in your philosophy.
'39 4
394. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 1, sc. 5.
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Act IV: The United Nations Charter as the "Constitution" of the
World's Legal Order
Alyosha:
Your discussions have glanced at metaphysical and theological
questions, Brothers, but I still feel we have not properly discussed all
the non-theological and non-metaphysical considerations that might
be addressed before we confront these more fundamental grounds of
disagreement. Let us keep the conversation going a bit longer, if
possible, and in that spirit, let me begin to attempt to summarize
your positions in as charitable a way as possible.
I believe I asked you each of you how you would decide the
question if the Security Council Resolution were not controlling. You
have done so fairly. But Smerdyakov asked you what can only be
regarded as synthetic questions, requiring you to state your
understanding of the relationship between Charter law and
background principles of international law. Smerdyakov's questions
ultimately posed for us the issue of how much of their traditional
sovereignty the member states have granted to the international
organs created by the Charter. For instance, should we assume that
if a Security Council resolution is silent or ambiguous on the question
of the secession of a province from a member state, then third-party
member states retain their traditional power to recognize the
independence of the breakaway province or not, as they see fit? Or
should we instead assume that those states have delegated away
much of that power to the Council, which must decide whether that
secession is permissible, or to the General Assembly, which must
decide whether to seat the new claimant, before they can legitimately
recognize it? Or again: may we find that the practice of states can
operate to revise the Charter-as the putatively emerging doctrine of
humanitarian intervention is supposed to be revising the Charter's
use of force rules-or must we hold that the Charter's written rules
remain in effect until the Charter is formally amended? In both of
these cases, we have problems concerning the true relationship
between the United Nations and the states that compose it.
Furthermore, I think that Smerdyakov is inviting us to reflect on the
relationship between the human rights norms that have become
increasingly prominent since the Charter was adopted, especially
those that are now thought to embody peremptory norms, and the
norms set forth in the Charter itself. For if the Charter is a kind of
constitution of the world legal order, can it be that there are higher
norms than those it incorporates, so that in the event of conflict the
Charter is not supreme law? And what if those peremptory norms
should conflict with each other?
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Perhaps we cannot answer all of Smerdyakov's questions, but I
think I can see, Brothers, how you might answer some of them. It
appears to me that, in cases of doubt, Ivan thinks that the principle of
self-determination trumps sovereignty when the UN is silent, but
also empowers decision makers under the Charter to constitute a new
state out of the territory of an existing member state. Dmitri, on the
other hand, thinks that in those same cases sovereignty trumps self-
determination, not only when the UN is silent, but even in the face of
a UN decision favoring self-determination, because the Charter
organs are merely creatures of the member states that created them
and have no independent power to recognize a self-determination
claim inconsistent with the sovereignty of a member state.
Dmitri:
Brother Alyosha, I see that they teach you some legal subtleties
at your seminary! Perhaps you are not quite as unworldly as we,
your brothers, have thought.
I will acknowledge that there is room for legal creativity in
decisions of the Security Council, which fashioned a whole new theory
of enforcement action when it delegated its enforcement powers
under Chapter VII to a coalition of member states in the First Gulf
War;3 95 conferred powers on an international organization arguably
beyond the powers that organization had under its own statute;
3 96
created international courts that have changed legal relations in
civil,3 97 criminal, 398 and terrorism-related matters arising between
states and between states and sub-state entities;39 9 determined the
boundary between Iraq and Kuwait;40 0 withheld collective recognition
of Serbia's claim that it was the legal continuation of the former state
of Yugoslavia for all relevant purposes following its dissolution;
40 1
395. See Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict, 85 AM. J.
INT'L L. 452, 459 (1991) (concluding that such authorizations may well be consistent
with both Articles 42 and 51).
396. See S.C. Res. 687, § C, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (Apr. 3, 1991) (creating
UNSCOM and assignment responsibilities to IAEA to perform inspections beyond the
scope of the IAEA Statute and its Inspections Agreement with Iraq).
397. See id. § E (establishing Iraq-Kuwait Compensation Fund).
398. See S.C. Res. 827, 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 29, 1993) (establishing
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia).
399. See S.C. Res. 1373, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2002) (requiring
states to criminalize terrorist-financing).
400. See S.C. Res. 806, 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/806 (Feb 5, 1993) (approving
demarcation of Iraq-Kuwait boundary, as determined in report of U.N.'s Iraq-Kuwait
Boundary Commission).
401. See S.C. Res. 777, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/777 (Sept. 19, 1992) (requiring the
FRY to apply for admission to the United Nations); see also S.C. Res. 757, pmbl., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/757 (Dec 6, 1992) (determining that the FRY's claim to succession of the
SFRY's seat was not generally accepted); see also G.A. Res. 47/1, 1, U.N. Doc.
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and partially granted at least Russia's claim to serve as the
continuation of the Soviet Union by accepting the credentials of its
representatives at the Security Council.
40 2
But never has the Security Council, over the objection of a
member state whose sovereignty was being fractured, created a new
state.40 3 Nor has the General Assembly ever admitted a member-
not even Bangladesh 4 4-over the objection of the member state from
which it had seceded. If the United Nations organs could exercise
such a power, then could they not do the same in the Middle East,
with cataclysmic consequences?
The Charter may have evolved, as some might argue, in
accordance with an interpretation that is dynamic and flexible.
40 5
But it is still the same Charter as it was in 1945.
Alyosha:
Thank you, Dmitri. Now, Ivan, can you clarify why you believe
self-determination has become so important a principle of
international law that it warrants an interpretation of SCR 1244 that
permits the EU to recognize Kosovo?
Ivan:
Dmitri's views evidence a fundamental misconception about the
role of international law, because he does not have the proper theory
about the current meaning of the Charter and the relevance of that
meaning to interpreting a Security Council resolution.
A/RES/47/1 (Sept. 22, 1992) (affirming the Badinter Commission's judgment that the
SFRY was in the process of dissolution); Blum, supra note 33, at 800-03 (reviewing
history of the FRY's claims to have succeeded the SFRY).
402. See generally Edwin D. Williamson & John E. Osborne, A U.S. Perspective
on Treaty Succession and Related Issues in the Wake of the Breakup of the U.S.S.R. and
Yugoslavia, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 261, 273 (1993) (discussing the legal issues raised by the
dissolution of these nation states).
403. See Rubin, supra note 225, at 259 ("To date, [the authority of the Security
Council] has not been used to support any self-determination or secessionist
movement ... ").
404. Press Release, The Asian Human Rights Comm'n, Bangladesh: UN General
Assembly Urged to Reject Bangladesh's Human Rights Council Bid (Apr. 21, 2006),
available at http://www.ahrchk.net/statements/mainfile.php/2006statements/492/.
405. See Jose E. Alvarez, The Once and Future Security Council, WASH. Q.,
Spring 1995, at 5, 6 (noting that the Charter never worked as intended and that,
contrary to popular wisdom, it is not working even in the aftermath of the Cold War as
it was originally intended); cf. Edwin M. Smith, Understanding Dynamic Obligations:
Arms Control Agreements, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1549, 1553-56 (1991) (relying on contract
law scholarship, especially IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT (1980), to
articulate a theory of changing meaning in treaties to accord with changing
circumstances).
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Alyosha:
Please explain this new theory of yours, for I fear you are taking
us to yet another level of abstraction.
Ivan:
It seems to me, as many have suggested, that we are living in a
new legal world today: one in which the Charter's references to self-
determination and human rights must be given greater weight than
its references to the "domestic jurisdiction of states" and "sovereign
equality." Some have suggested that a new "constitution" for
international society has emerged in the aftermath of the Cold
War;40 6 or that such a new constitution was at least proposed during
that period;40 7 or that we are still in the midst of a process of
constitutional change. Indeed, it has been argued that NATO's
humanitarian intervention in Kosovo in 1999 was the beginning of
this new global constitutional order.408 Now, this is not the time or
the place to explore fully the arguments that would need to be made
to establish that we are living in a fundamentally different
406. BOBBITT, supra note 33 at 636-39 (arguing that the Charter of Paris in
1990 constituted a treaty of peace closing the epochal war between parliamentary
democracy and its fascist and communist competitors, in which the internal
constitutional principles of what Bobbitt calls "market states" were confirmed as the
new constitutional principles of the international system).
407. Antonio F. Perez, On the Way to the Forum: The Reconstruction of Article
2(7) and the Rise of Federalism Under the United Nations Charter, 31 TEX. INT'L L.J.
353, 402-04 (1996) (suggesting that the UN Security Council Declaration approving
the Secretary-General's "Agenda for Peace"-describing self-determination and
democracy as emerging central principles in the post-Cold War international legal
system--operated as the proposal for a newly amended Charter).
408. See GERRY SIMPSON, GREAT POWERS AND OUTLAW STATES 194-223 (2004).
Simpson raises the question of whether NATO's 1999 intervention in Kosovo was the
"foundational moment" of a project of international "regime building" in which the
West sought to overthrow the UN Charter as the "constitution" of the world legal order
and to install a r6gime of regional hegemony instead. Id. at 194. Simpson sees the
great European peace settlement at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 as establishing a
kind of international constitution akin to the UN Charter of 1945. Id. at 177. He then
compares NATO to the Holy Alliance of the early nineteenth century, led by Russia and
joined by Prussia and Austria. Id. at 199-222. The Holy Alliance was committed to a
policy of armed intervention (in Spain, for instance) to protect monarchist institutions
from revolution. The Alliance's policy seemed to other nations (Britain and the U.S.) to
threaten the foundation of the Congress of Vienna's international legal order, which
rested on the idea of the equality of sovereign states and their freedom from outside
interference. Id. at 91-131. NATO's intervention in Kosovo in 1999 likewise
represented a revolution against the constitutional principles of the UN Charter,
especially the requirement that non-self-defensive uses of force be sanctioned by the
Security Council. Id. at 199-222. Fascinatingly, Simpson compares the "mystical"
Prime Minister Tony Blair to the Russian Czar Alexander I, the founder of the Holy
Alliance (and President Bill Clinton to Austria's Count Metternich, who joined the Holy
Alliance for opportunistic reasons). Id. at 202-03.
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international legal order from that of 1945. But with so many
scholars and practitioners expressing the view that something
important has changed, I am prepared to accept this new reality as
the basis for a more purposive way of interpreting the work of the
Security Council, so that it may accord more perfectly with the
principles of human rights and self-determination.
Smerdyakov:
I can see, Ivan, why you do not wish to pursue that way of
thinking in any detail: you come forward as a lawyer but you are in
fact a revolutionary. If you say that NATO's armed intervention in
Kosovo in 1999 in support of the human rights and self-determination
of the Albanian Kosovars marked the beginning of a new, post-
Charter constitutional epoch in international affairs, then the vigor of
our debate today should have underscored that the international
community as a whole has yet to accept that new world order. Let me
tell you why the non-Western powers will resist your revolution.
Neither in 1999 nor in 2008 was the West's intervention in
Kosovo truly humanitarian. 40 9 Surely not even you, Ivan, would
claim that the purported constitutional revolution in favor of human
rights and self-determination is being driven by the West's love of
suffering humanity. If the West had cared about the fate of the
Albanian Kosovars in 1999, why did the EU nations not act on the
French writer Jean Chesneaux's proposal to issue the Kosovar
refugees with "European identity cards"?410 Why did the Western
powers choose war in Serbia, which meant taking innocent Serb and
Kosovar lives through high-altitude bombing, rather than seeking to
re-settle the Kosovar refugees in Paris, Vienna, or Chicago?411 And
the intervention in favor of Kosovo in 2008 is truly more about
protecting Europe from the Kosovars than protecting the Kosovars
from the Serbs. Indeed, is not the new constitutional epoch of which
you speak merely a matter of the West's lawless and destructive
restlessness under the Charter r6gime, which accords more power to
409. See Mccgwire, supra note 62, at 12-18 (arguing that the 1999 War in
Kosovo was not a "humanitarian" intervention but rather represented the NATO
powers' attempt to forestall a war of "national liberation" between the KLA, which by
late 1998 had grown significantly in power, and Serbia; other factors influencing
NATO's decision for war included the desire to demonstrate the vitality of the alliance
on the eve of its fiftieth birthday and the U.S. wish to use NATO as a means of
bypassing the need for Security Council "use of force" authorizations).
410. ETIENNE BALIBAR, WE, THE PEOPLE OF EUROPE? REFLECTIONS ON
TRANSNATIONAL CITIZENSHIP 4 (James Swenson trans., 2004).
411. The United States as well as its European allies failed to react to the mass
deportation of Kosovars from their homeland "by concentrating on resettling them
elsewhere and providing them with the means to start new lives for themselves,"
choosing military intervention instead-"a course of action that involved loss of life."
FROMKIN, supra note 36, at 182.
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Russia and China than the West would wish them to have? Far more
than self-determination or human rights, the West cares about
extending its regional hegemony throughout the whole of post-
Communist Europe, and perhaps elsewhere. Kosovo is just a
Western salient.
Alyosha:
Let me ask you, Ivan, to assume Dmitri and Smerdyakov are
correct in rejecting your claim that the international political process
has amended the international constitution, however that might be
described. Do you concede?
Ivan:
Why, of course not. Dmitri's understanding of international law
remains too primitive and fatalistic. He posits a theory in which the
law is a given and accepts the world as it is. Law, in short, follows
society. If I may offer an analogy, the Anglo-American common law
in such areas as contract and tort has often been understood to reflect
social custom and mores or morality, as the case may be. Some have
called it order without law, 412 although I prefer to call it bottom-up
law. Under Dmitri's view, the task for the international legal theorist
is to understand how the written law should conform to social reality,
and his interpretation of the law is designed to accord with the social
fact of Serb supremacy over the Kosovars. It is essentially a static,
status quo vision of the role of law.
But there is something between the "ordinary" international law,
reflected in treaties and custom, and "higher order" international law,
reflected in the Charter or peremptory norms. There is space for
discretion in adopting interpretive modes that, over time, will lead to
a better and more rational world order. My approach is to recognize
that our legal theory must be chosen to enable policy makers to make
the right decisions about the future of the planet,413 not to
accommodate ourselves to an existing state of affairs, however
unreasonable or unjust. Yes, the Charter remains the "constitution"
of the world legal order; but our theory of Charter interpretation
should be dynamic, adaptive, and flexible. It should enable decision
412. See ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES (1991) (showing how social norms can develop in ways that make law
unnecessary or merely a ratification of the socially-accepted status quo).
413. See MYRES McDOUGAL & FLORENTINO FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER vii-xiii (1961) (locus classicus for a policy-oriented, purposive
conception of international law); see also PHILIP BOBBITT, TERROR AND CONSENT 16-17
(2007) (emphasizing the need for a coherent international "legal strategy" in the war
against terror).
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makers to incorporate policy-based considerations into the very
constitution of the international order-namely, the identity, size,
and borders of sovereign states; the reach and limits of their
jurisdictions; their regional groups; and the ways in which sovereign
entities interact in performing various functions.414 So, to be explicit,
if the relevant decision makers find that Kosovo is the right-sized
unit of governance for the Kosovars, or that some governmental
functions for Kosovars would be better performed at the EU level
rather than at the nation-state level of Serbia, then interpretation of
the Charter-and of Resolutions issued under it, such as SCR 1244-
should not undercut that policy choice.
Smerdyakov:
I must admit Ivan's idea has a certain appeal-but only if I get to
be a decision maker! And what guarantee is there of that? Perhaps
there is a guarantee for the EU and U.S., since they currently
monopolize the world's wealth. But aren't they contriving a
constitutional theory, a legal strategy, if you will, that merely serves
their own interests in promoting liberal capitalism and EU
enlargement? Choose the decision makers and you have chosen the
policy. Will Russia also be an equal member of this group? Will
China? What about the emerging powers, Brazil, India, and
Indonesia? The idea is a Pandora's box.
Dmitri:
Yes, dangerous. But, even worse, it is simply wrong. Ivan
describes my approach to constitutional theory as static and bottom-
up. But isn't that precisely what a constitutional theory is supposed
to be? Do the few have the right to make law for the many? Let the
states of the world amend the Charter if they feel it must be
amended. Let us not delegitimize the only agreed global forum we
have to resolve our differences in order to pursue short-term
advantages of doubtful plausibility.
Alyosha:
I must admit that I, too, am troubled. What of our cultures as
reflected in our current states? Aren't those cultures of value? And
make no mistake about it; it is through states that cultures are
preserved and that peoples live on. Just ask the Zionists, who judged
that the survival of the Jewish people required a Jewish nation-
414. See ALBERTO ALESINA & ENRICO SPOLAORE, THE SIZE OF NATIONS 6-10
(2003) (discussing "right-sizing' of nations from economic point of view).
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state.415  If a constitutional theory does incorporate substantive
values, such as Ivan's conception of efficiency in the allocation of
governmental jurisdictions, is it not also important that it make room
for cultural differences, or what some call global diversity or
pluralism? 4 16 Isn't each culture a part of the world as we know it, a
world in which we must discover the richness and diversity of life, one
that allows us to pursue wisdom, finding the good in each form that
has survived? I cannot imagine a world in which we have all the
knowledge necessary to- make and remake cultures in accordance
with our limited knowledge about the future. This is the height of
arrogance.
Ivan:
All fair objections, Brothers. But now that you have been
properly prepared through my own humble efforts, let me now
introduce a friend of mine, an astonishingly frank fellow, I will admit,
but persuasive nonetheless. He will reveal to you the true nature of
SCR 1244, the Charter, and the whole international legal order, if you
are prepared to open your eyes.
Dmitri:
I will, of course, oblige; provided, of course, that you grant me the
last word. For having endured your betrayal of Slavic heritage with
your corrupted Western ideologies, I demand the right to invite my
own champion to reveal the root of your error.
All the Brothers:
So be it.
415. See STEPHEN M. WYLEN, SETTINGS OF SILVER: AN INTRODUCTION TO
JUDAISM 392 (2000) ('The political Zionists conceived of Zionism as the Jewish
response to anti-Semitism. They believed that Jews must have an independent state as
soon as possible, in order to have a place of refuge for endangered Jewish
communities.").
416. See GEORGE KENNAN, MEMOIRS 1925-1950, at 449-69 (1967) (advancing a
pluralist conception of international society).
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Act V: New and Old Believers' Eschatologies
Part One: Speech of the Grand Inquisitor: European and
Super-European
Honored hosts: I am deeply pleased to be a part of your
company! I have made this long journey from Spain for the sake of
my dear friend Ivan, my pupil-may I even say?-my son.
I know that Ivan has troubled your hearts in offering you his
views as to the legal issues arising from Kosovo's secession. But let
me help you through this difficulty, for it truly is hard to leave aside
the childish obsessions that have prevented you from seeing the
wisdom of Ivan's vision of the future, of a world free from the barriers
of nationalism and any other primitive obsessions, such as religion,
that impede humanity's material and psychological growth and
development. 417 Let me first show you what is wrong with Dmitri's
perspective, because his interpretation of the forms of the law
throughout is premised on what he holds to be the practical necessity
and moral worthiness of nationalism. Then I will show you why
Ivan's contrary interpretation of the various legal forms is rightly
motivated by the need to overcome Dmitri's childish fantasies and to
reach a new understanding of what it means to be human. Only
under Ivan's view, I shall argue, can humanity finally, at long last,
reach freedom and maturity.
The New Europe. I am a man of some ninety years, born in the
year the First Great War in Europe ended. I was a teenager when my
own country was torn apart by its Civil War, and a young man of
twenty-one when the Second Great War in Europe broke out. In my
long life, I have seen war in all its horrors-the planes small as flies
in the distant sky, dropping destruction and carnage on the cities
below, the camps, the death trains, the anguished faces of children
searching for their missing parents, old men and women sobbing for
their dead daughters and sons. I appear before you as a witness to all
the grief and misery that the peoples of Europe can inflict on
themselves. So it is fitting that I start my discourse with a reflection
417. See SIGMUND FREUD, THE FUTURE OF AN ILLUSION (1927), reprinted in THE
STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD,
1927-1931, at 5, 43 (James Strachey trans., 1961).
Religion would thus be the universal obsessional neurosis of humanity; like the
obsessional neurosis of the children, it arose out of the Oedipus complex, out of
the relation to the father. If this view is right, it is supposed that a turning-
away from religion is bound to occur with the fatal inevitability of a process of
growth ....
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on the cause of those horrors, which during the Yugoslav Wars
seemed to be descending on us Europeans again. I mean, of course,
the nation state-what Nietzsche rightly called "the coldest of all cold
monsters."41 8 What I offer you, in opposition to the idea of the nation
state, is the idea of Europe.
419
You have puzzled over the relations between states and peoples.
Those two ideas are fused together in the concept of the nation state.
The nineteenth-century Italian nationalist Giuseppe Mazzini issued
the slogan: "Every nation a state, only one state for the entire
nation."420 Like most nationalists, Mazzini assumed that the nation,
the people, pre-existed the state that they were entitled to form.
421
Each nation or people was to have its own state; all the members of
that people were to be gathered into that state; and only that people
were to inhabit that state. Perhaps Portugal and Iceland-if even
those-have been the only European states in modern times in which
this perfect fusion of a people and their state has occurred. Even
Mazzini's Italy was itself a collection of disparate peoples, often
barely intelligible to each other, whom the Italian state attempted to
fashion into one. Nonetheless, Mazzini's slogan announced what for
many remains a compelling ideal.
We should distinguish between tribal states, which embody
Mazzini's conception of the nation state in its pure form, and pluralist
states, which most states more or less are in fact. 42 2 The recent
history of Yugoslavia, let us say from Marshal Tito's death in 1980 to
the present, has been a trajectory in which a pluralist state has
broken down into tribalist ones. And the history of Serbia since 1989
has repeated, in miniature, the same trajectory-from a single state
in which different peoples lived (Serbs, Albanians, Magyars, Croats)
into two states, one for each of its main peoples.
Why should anyone want a tribal state, if he or she already lives
in a pluralist one? Why did Yugoslavia disintegrate? 423 We can, I
418. Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, On The New Idol, reprinted
in THE PORTABLE NIETZSCHE, 160, 160 (Walter Kaufman trans., 1976).
419. "Europe," of course, is a polymorphous term. When the Inquisitor speaks of
"Europe," he usually means the lands and peoples of historic Latin Christianity, the
Protestant Reformation, and the Enlightenment. But the "idea of Europe" refers to an
emerging reality that includes the Orthodox-Muslim-formerly-Communist lands and
peoples of the European continent as well.
420. JONATHAN GLOVER, HUMANITY: A MORAL HISTORY OF THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY 143 (1999).
421. See id. (describing nationalists' views).
422. STUART WOOLF, NATIONALISM IN EUROPE 1815 TO PRESENT 9-10 (1996)
(classifying 19th century nations based on Mazzini's conception of the nation state).
423. The Grand Inquisitor's speech is indebted in part to the writing of the
philosopher JONATHAN GLOVER, supra note 420, in part to that of the political scientist,
JOHN HERZ, POLITICAL REALISM AND POLITICAL IDEALISM (1951), and in part to that of
the historians Herbert Butterfield, HERBERT BUTTERFIELD, HISTORY AND HUMAN
RELATIONS (1951), and his precursor, G. LOWES DICKINSON, THE EUROPEAN ANARCHY
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think, identify two reasons--one having to do with security, the other
with self-expression. Or, if I may put it so, one having to do with the
ideas of Thomas Hobbes, 424 the other having to do with those of
Johann Herder. 425 Let me start with security.
When a tribe (or, if you will, an ethnic group or a people)
suddenly and unexpectedly finds itself, like the Serbs in Croatia, in
the midst of a state dominated by another tribe, and there has been a
history of rivalry or hatred between the two tribes, then the members
of the smaller tribe will begin to fear for their own safety. What is to
stop the larger group from persecuting and plundering them, or from
treating them with dishonor and disrespect? So they seek to form
their own state, dominated by their own tribe. What the political
theorists and historians, following Hobbes, call the "security
dilemma" of states 426 finds itself reproduced on the level of peoples.
(1916). Each of these four very different thinkers is in turn deeply indebted to the
seventeenth-century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes, who is discussed at greater
length infra.
The Grand Inquisitor's speech attempts to answer the question posed in the text at
a very high level of generality. But at least three more specific kinds of explanation
have been offered by politicians, social scientists, journalists, and others: first, that the
ethnic wars in the former Yugoslavia stemmed from ancient and immutable hatreds;
second, that they were the effect of nationalist politicians using modern media to
exploit popular antagonisms and fears; and third, that they were waged by small
groups of armed thugs. For a survey of these approaches and a defense of the last, see
John Mueller, The Banality of "Ethnic War," INT'L SECURITY, Summer 2000, at 42, 42
(2000). For a sophisticated critique of these three theories, including Mueller's, see
MANN, supra note 48, at 358-61.
424. See THOMAS HOBBES, THE LEVIATHAN (1651), reprinted in HOBBES'S
LEVIATHAN (1909).
425. English translations of Herder's works are unfortunately few, but see
JOHANN GOTTFRIED HERDER, ANOTHER PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY AND SELECTED
POLITICAL WRITINGS (Ioannis D. Evrigenis & Daniel Pellerin trans., 2004). A
sympathetic recent study of Herder and the contemporary influence of his ideas is
found in Richard White, Herder: On the Ethics of Nationalism, 18 HUMANITAS 166
(2005). For a balanced appreciation of Herder's "cultural nationalism" that emphasizes
his debts to the Enlightenment and reviews earlier scholarship. See Royal J. Schmidt,
Cultural Nationalism in Herder, 17 J. HIST. IDEAS 407 (1956). Probably the leading
English-language study remains, SIR ISAIAH BERLIN, THREE CRITICS OF THE
ENLIGHTENMENT: VICO, HAMANN, HERDER (2000); see also William A. Wilson, Herder,
Folklore and Romantic Nationalism, 6 J. POPULAR CULTURE 819 (1973).
426. See HERZ, supra note 423, at 203 (stating that "international affairs are the
field in which the "law of nature" (in the Hobbesian sense) rules supreme"); see also
BUTTERFIELD, supra note 423, at 21 (describing Hobbesian fear). Herz's insight, which
lies at the foundation of "realist" analyses on international relations, see JOHN J.
MEARSHEIMER, THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS 35-36 (2001), has been
applied to intra-state conflicts, including those in the former Yugoslavia, as well as to
inter-state conflicts. See Barry R. Posen, The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict, 35
SURVIVAL 27, 35-38 (1993) (applying concept of "security dilemma" to intra-state
ethnic conflict in Yugoslavia and elsewhere); see also Paul Roe, The Intrastate Security
Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as a 'Tragedy?, J. PEACE RES., Mar. 1999, at 183, 188-92
(1999) (review of literature and critique of Posen); Paul Roe, Former Yugoslavia: The
Security Dilemma That Never Was?, 6 EUR. J. INT'L REL. 373 (2000) (articulating a
narrow conception of "security dilemma" in which intentionality is critical).
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But there is another reason to want a tribal state, a more
affirmative or positive reason, having to do with joy rather than with
fear. Herder taught that each people had its own distinctive genius,
its own unique and invaluable way of expressing "the human
essence."4 27 Travel within Spain, and you will see it. One region
speaks Castilian, another Basque, a third Catalan. There are
recognizable styles of architecture, of dancing, of food, of dress. You
will hear bagpipes played on the streets of Galicia4 28 but not on those
of Andalucia. Often there are different stories and songs, poems and
myths, collective memories or imaginations. And these different
ways of a people are, or may be, constitutive of its identity, its sense
of itself. Indeed, they are, or may be, constitutive of the identity of
each individual, for our sense of our personal identity may draw on
our sense of belonging to a particular people or group. And so the
public expression of the ways of a people may be an important, even
essential, element of individual flourishing and richness of life.
4 29
So one may want a tribal state in order to be able to live as a
person of a certain kind. A Croatian Serb may want a Serb Republic
of the Krajina, not only to guard against the insecurity of living in a
Croat-dominated state, but also to be able to live fully as a Serb-to
worship in an Orthodox church, not a Catholic one; to read street
signs written in Cyrillic characters, not in Roman ones; to mark the
great events of Serbian history with public holidays; and to see
statues of Serbian saints and heroes, not Croat ones, in the village
square. But perhaps, you may say, to be a Serb is not so very
different in reality from being a Croat. Are Serbs and Croats not both
Slavic people, speaking the same Serbo-Croat language? To this the
nationalist has a ready reply: "It does not matter; here, what is
imagined is also real. 4 30
Such is the dream of the tribal state: a political form that
provides both security and self-expression. But, you will say, the
pluralist state can also provide both of those goods. And that is true;
but it is not so simple. Where there has been conflict between two
groups or tribes, they may need, as Hobbes contended, a "Leviathan"
427. Herder affirms the ontological priority of the different peoples or nations of
the world. "It is nature which educates families: the most natural state is, therefore,
one nation, an extended family with one national character." He argues that each
nation is the embodiment of a unique culture and a particular way of life, and in this
way each culture may be viewed as a unique expression of humanitat (or the human
essence). White, supra note 425, at 171.
428. See James R. Oestreich, Revealing the Soul in Soldierly Bagpipes, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 16, 2006, at B9 (discussing a Galician bagpipe player).
429. See White, supra note 425, at 167 (explaining that Herder believed the
identity of an individual is dependent on his or her culture).
430. See BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE
ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALIsM 5-7 (2006) (defining a nation as "an imagined
political community ... imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign").
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to provide them with security from each other.4 31  Often that
Leviathan takes the form of an empire. 43 2 In the Balkans, that
Leviathan was for many centuries the Ottoman Empire. Then, over
much of what became Yugoslavia, it was the Austrian one. In post-
World War II Yugoslavia, the Leviathan was Tito's r6gime; of late, it
has been the United Nations, or NATO--or no one. Leviathan
answers the security problem, if Leviathan is prepared to use
overmastering protective force on behalf of any of its subject tribes
against any of its others. But the problem with this solution is that,
although Leviathan may inspire fear, it often inspires little loyalty or
love. So too, although the Habsburg dynasty served the peoples of its
dual monarchy, Austria-Hungary, faithfully and well, it came to feel
their detestation.
433
The pluralist state can also provide its peoples with the
satisfactions of self-expression. For one thing, it can encourage a
vigorous, if also peaceable, measure of self-expression for different
cultures (what we now call multiculturalism). For another, it can
grant a substantial degree of regional or local autonomy, as in Spain
or Canada. 434  For a third, it can offer significant legal and
constitutional guarantees for its minority populations-not merely
protections against persecution or oppression, but also affirmative
rights, such as the right to education in the minority's own language.
The liberal-capitalist European order of the nineteenth century
at least adumbrated a system of pluralist states of this kind. That
Europe was born in one great revolutionary war-the French
Revolution, including the Napoleonic wars-and came to an end a
century later in the First Great War.4 35 Now, after the "short"
431. See Peter J. Ahrensdorf, The Fear of Death and the Longing for
Immortality: Hobbes and Thucydides on Human Nature and the Problem of Anarchy,
94 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 579, 581 (2000) (explaining how Hobbes envisaged "Leviathan"
as an answer to the problem of civil war).
432. See MICHAEL W. DOYLE, EMPIRES 19-138 (1986) (discussing the
characteristics and attributes of empire); see also HERFRIED MiNKLER, EMPIRES: THE
LOGIC OF WORLD DOMINATION FROM ANCIENT ROME TO THE UNITED STATES 4-9
(Patrick Camiller trans., 2007) (describing the characteristics of an empire).
433. As Ernest Gellner noted, they took their ruler's two titles, Kaiser (Emperor)
and K6nig (King), and called their country Kakania (Land of Shit). ERNEST GELLNER,
LANGUAGE AND SOLITUDE: WITTGENSTEIN, MALINOWSKI, AND THE HAPSBURG DILEMMA
(1998).
434. See Pablo Lucas Murillo de la Cueva, Rights in a Pluralist State: The Case
of Spain, in CITIZENSHIP AND RIGHTS IN MULTICULTURAL SOCIETIES 153, 153-68
(Michael Dunne & Tiziano Bonazzi eds., 1995) (describing pluralism in Spain); see also
Patricia K. Wood & Liette Gilbert, Multiculturism in Canada: Accidental Discourse,
Alternative Vision, Urban Practice, 29 INT'L J. URB. & REGIONAL RES. 679, 679 (2005)
(describing multiculturalism in Canada).
435. See W.G. Runciman, Has British Capitalism Changed Since the First World
War?, 44 BRIT. J. Soc. 53, 53 (1993) (discussing the change in capitalism since the First
World War); see also Imanuel Wallerstein, The French Revolution and Capitalism: An
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twentieth century of seventy years (1914-1989),436 we are seeing the
return of a higher, more durable form of that liberal continental
order. But before we turn to that, let us briefly examine the
intervening period of the short century-for that story is the key to
what comes later.
The older liberal-capitalist order collapsed in two stages: first in
the political crisis caused by the First Great War, then in the
economic crisis of the Great Depression. These two crises combined
to produce a new form of political and economic organization in the
heart of Europe, in Germany: the "national-socialist" state. As its
very name signifies, this form of organization consciously rejected
both liberalism and capitalism as they had existed in places such as
the pluralist empire of Austria-Hungary. 437  The new form of
organization drew much of its inspiration-and, for many, much of its
attractiveness-from the romantic nationalism of the nineteenth
century.438 It was, in other words, an attempt to return to, or
perhaps create, a tribal state.
Hitler's program of creating a tribal German state seemed at
first to have the sanction of Woodrow Wilson. As you have observed
in your conversation, Wilson had announced self-determination in
this form as a war aim.439 It is true that Wilson's Secretary of State
Robert Lansing was bitingly critical of the idea, that Wilson himself
soon came to abandon it, and that it was not inscribed in the
Versailles Treaty.440 Nonetheless, the principle served the Peace
Conference as the basis for recognizing or creating some new states-
Poland, Czechoslovakia, a much-reduced Hungary-and fueled
others' demand for independence, such as Ireland. 441  But the
principle was applied with indefensible inconsistency. Why could
Explanatory Schema, 1 PRAXIS INT'L 1, 5 (1985) (describing the relationship between
the French Revolution and capitalism).
436. LUKACS, supra note 28, at 1-3. See generally ERIC HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF
EXTREMES: THE SHORT TWENTIETH CENTURY, 1914-1991 (1994).
437. FRITZ STERN, THE FAILURE OF ILLIBERALISM: ESSAYS ON THE POLITICAL
CULTURE OF MODERN GERMANY 199-200 (1972).
438. Id.
439. Allen Lynch, Woodrow Wilson and the Principle of 'National Self-
Determination': A Reconsideration, 28 REV. INT'L STUDIES 419, 419 (2002).
440. See FROMKIN, supra 36, at 126-28 (describing Wilson's use of the phrase
"self-determination").
441. FROMKIN, supra 36, at 130.
According to [Wilson's close adviser] Colonel House, Wilson's pledge of self-
determination brought to Paris many and diverse delegations from Europe,
Asia, and Africa. They were the most picturesque as well as the most ill
informed and unreasoning of all those who gathered around the historic center
where the peace was made.
Id. Wilson responded to these demands by limiting the scope of the principle of self-
determination to the territory of the powers defeated in the war. Id. at 131.
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Austria and the other ethnically German parts of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire not now merge into Germany, if their peoples so
wished? The inability of the victors to provide a coherent answer
seemed to underscore their vengefulness and their opportunism.
So Hitler rode to power by his appeals to German nationalism
and German resentment of Versailles. And once in power, he showed
what the creation of a tribal state in the heart of Europe would entail.
Think of the situation, my Russian friends, as if Central Europe were
like one of your Russian dolls, the matryoshkas.44 2 Within the Polish
or Czech doll, there was a smaller German doll. But perhaps within
that German doll there was a still smaller Polish or Czech doll. You
could not take the small German doll and put it inside the larger
German doll unless you also put an even smaller Polish or Czech doll
inside the big German doll too. And so the claim to be curing an
injustice to Germans entailed doing the very same injustice to non-
Germans.
And anyway, Hitler was not interested in doing Wilsonian
justice-few, if any, nationalists really are. 443 He was interested, as
are they, in domination. 44 4 Hitler's tribal German state would not
include mere traces of non-German elements. Rather, it would
include untold numbers of non-Germanic peoples and vast stretches
of their lands. What starts as a tribe's self-defense (the Croatian
Serbs' attempt to protect their own security) or as its demand for
equal justice (Germany's annexation of the Sudetenland) swiftly
turns into the desire to subjugate, oppress, or destroy other tribes.
Herder, that son of the Enlightenment, believed as ardently in
pacifism as he did in nationalism. But Herder's values proved hard
to combine, 445 and his "bad aestheticism"-his desire "that the world
442. The matryoshka doll, which has become a fixture of popular Russian
culture since the 1890s, was created by two Russian craftsmen who were fascinated by
a nesting doll that had been imported from Japan. They substituted the figure of a
Russian peasant woman for the bald old man of the Japanese original. It contained
eight different wooden dolls, one within another, and represented a united and happy
family. BILLINGTON, supra note 3, at 148-49.
443. For possible explanations of this tendency in nationalism, see ERNEST
GELLNER, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM 1-2 (1983); see also Roe, supra note 426, at 194-
95.
444. This is not a merely Germanic impulse. In seeking to promote Italian
nationalism, Machiavelli reminded his readers that the Romans also understood the
need to find ways to channel "the ambitions of the populace" into foreign conquest and
glory. See NICOL6 MACHIAVELLI, THE DISCOURSES 113-15 (Bernard Crick ed., Leslie J.
Walker trans., 1970) ("[E]very city should provide ways and means whereby the
ambitions of the populace may find an outlet, especially a city which proposes to avail
itself of the populace in important undertakings.").
445. For possible explanations, see Jamie Mayerfeld, The Myth of Benign Group
Identity: A Critique of Liberal Nationalism, 30 POLITY 555, 557 (1998) (arguing that
"nationalism in any form tends to encourage aggression against foreigners and violent
conflict between nations"). For an opposing view, see generally YAEL TAMIR, LIBERAL
NATIONALISM (1993).
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be made up of manifestly different groups"-can easily "serve as a
preparation of the sentiments for armed tribalism. '44 6 So in our
Europe, wherever the sense of national identity is strong, the peace
between different peoples is fragile, as you well know: your Latvian
and Estonian neighbors can hardly bear to share their lands with
their Russian minorities. Indeed, groups of any kind soon show
themselves willing, once they have the power, to wreak injustices on
other groups.447 And this tendency to inflict oppression and harm
may be especially true of groups that have a keen and anguished
sense of the injustices done to them.4 48 As the poet W.H. Auden said
of Hitler's Germans: "I and the public know / What all schoolchildren
learn, / Those to whom evil is done / Do evil in return."
449
And so a Second Great War in Europe came. Although we have
all seen it, either with our own eyes or in the horrifying images from
the period, we can still hardly imagine its fury, its devastation, its
destructive power. Europe emerged from it shattered and barely
alive. Europe's people and statesmen resolved that a war such as
that must never, never come again. And Europe correctly understood
that the cause of the horrors was, somehow, the idea of the tribal
state.
From that deep and lasting insight, the post-War idea of Europe
was born. Although the Cold War may have obscured the fact, you
will immediately agree, my Russian friends, that the Communist
bloc, no less than Western Europe, rejected the idea of the tribal state
446. George Kateb, Notes on Pluralism-Liberalism, 61 SOC. RES. 511 (1994)
(pointing out that human beings find not only psychological relief in group
membership, but also the pleasures of animosity and feelings of superiority, and that
identification with a national group is typically also identification with an armed
group).
447. See PHILIP ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT: UNDERSTANDING How GOOD
PEOPLE TURN EVIL 1-257 (2007) (describing famous psychological experiment with
Stanford undergraduates who were asked to assume roles of prisoners and their
guards; within days group identities had solidified and "guards" began persecuting
"prisoners," so that the experiment had to be cut short). Zimbardo's experimental
results have been taken to suggest that any group, however transparently fictive or
flimsy its identity, will tend to persecute or demean any other group over which it is
given unlimited power.
448. See Mayerfeld, supra note 445, at 569.
Journalists covering the war in Yugoslavia tell the same story over and over
again: each side is driven by the furious certainty that it is the aggrieved party.
This is true not least of the Serbs, who suffer the added injury that the whole
world has turned against them .... The Nazis built much of their support by
appealing to the German sense of victimhood, by promising to stand up for the
nation that had been "stabbed in the back" in 1918, humiliated at Versailles,
and historically snubbed by the great powers.
Id.
449. W.H. Auden, September 1, 1939, available at http://www.poemdujour.coml
Septl.1939.html.
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and sought in its own way to transcend ethnic differences. Indeed,
the Communist state of Yugoslavia and the USSR itself stood as
models for that rejection: the repression of ethnic violence for forty
years in both nations was "probably the greatest achievement of
Communism, unmatched by later democratizing countries. '450 But
for now, I am more concerned with what happened in the post-Cold
War West.
The post-War European project, undertaken slowly at first, has
acquired a growing boldness and even a sense of inevitability.
Undoubtedly, it has had important economic ends: to promote intra-
European trade, enhance competitiveness, and promote efficiency.
Undoubtedly too, it was originally (and largely remains) an alliance
between France and Germany. But at its core, the European project
is political: it is an attempt to prevent the recurrence of wars of tribal
nationalism. Nationalism, not Communism, was "[t]he main political
force in the twentieth century. '45 1 And so destructive did European
nationalism prove to be that the peoples of Europe finally determined
to break it. So, as a former judge on the European Court of Justice
has explained, the guiding purpose of Europe's post-War integration
has been "to prevent the evils of nationalism. '"452 Or, as an U.S.
philosopher more starkly put it, "[t]o want nationhood ... is to want
war and death.
'453
Now traditional European national identities cannot be wholly
eradicated; our sense of nationality is far too entrenched for that. It
may indeed be true that "[niations are fiction: [t]heir bonds tend to
degenerate into kitsch, which favors crime and aggression. '45 4 But it
would be hard indeed to persuade ordinary English or French or
Danish people, the heirs to sturdy traditions of nationhood, that their
national identities are utterly spurious. Nonetheless, those identities
can be softened or diluted, and their hard edges blunted. In
particular, the "sovereignty" of the German or French or Italian
states can be encased within a more encompassing European
sovereignty: national dolls within a bigger, supranational doll. 455 As
I say, the Communists tried to do something like this in their own
way in the East. In the West, the project appealed, for different
450. MANN, supra note 48, at 354.
451. LUKACS, supra note 28, at 4.
452. Robert J. Delahunty, The Battle of Mars and Venus: Why Do American and
European Attitudes Toward International Law Differ?, 4 LOY. U. CHI. INT'L L. REV. 27-
28 (2006).
453. George Kateb, Hobbes and the Irrationality ofPolitics, 17 POL. THEORY 355,
382 (1989).
454. Id. at 381.
455. The EU is widely, and rightly, thought to exemplify "a new type of
sovereign statehood . . . which is qualitatively different from the modern state."
GEORGE S6RENSEN, CHANGES IN STATEHOOD: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 87 (2001).
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reasons, to both Liberals and Catholics, secularists and believers. It
had roots in the Enlightenment, in Kant's idea of a perpetual peace
brought about by a league or confederation of republics. 456 But it also
had roots in pre-Enlightenment ideas about natural law and the jus
gentium. 45 7 So it was, truly, not only an idea for Europe, but the idea
of the European peoples.
We know that the identity of a people or tribe only sometimes,
perhaps rarely, exists prior to that of their state. I mentioned
Mazzini before; the historian Eric Hobsbawn mentions another
nineteenth century Italian, a member of the first parliament of the
new kingdom of Italy. He said: "We have made Italy, now we have to
make Italians. '458 Who made the Italian people, then? The Italian
state. Serbian nationalism likewise can be seen as the artifact of a
doctored version of history instilled by the Serb state.4 59 "We got the
children," a Serb schoolmaster once said, "[and] made them realize
they were Serbs. We taught them their history. '4 60 I am arguing, in
other words, that nationalism can often be seen as "a political
program which has as its goal not merely to praise, or defend, or
strengthen a nation, but actively to construct one, casting its human
raw material into a fundamentally new form. '46 1 But if the Italian
and Serb states can construct the Italian and Serb peoples, can the
European supra-state construct a European people? The task may be
harder, but I am confident that the answer will be "yes." There will
be new styles of architecture, new cuisines, new songs, new myths,
revised memories, a new people. Even if the history of "something
called 'Europe' has not been written yet,46 2 it will be.
456. See IMMANUEL KANT ET AL., TOWARD PERPETUAL PEACE AND OTHER
WRITINGS ON POLITICS, PEACE, AND HISTORY 69-109 (David L. Colclasure trans., 2006)
(setting forth Kant' notion of "perpetual peace"). Kant's core idea was that humanity
(or at least European humanity) could make measurable progress toward solving the
problem of inter-state violence by forming a federation of allied, liberal rgimes. Id. at
79-81. Later scholarship has revived Kant's idea, based in part on empirical evidence
that democratic states are unlikely to go to war with other democratic states (the
"democratic peace" thesis). See DEBATING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE (Michael E. Brown,
Sean M. Lynn-Jones & Steven E. Miller eds., 2001) (including essays by Michael Doyle,
the leading exponent of the thesis, and others); see also PERPETUAL PEACE: ESSAYS ON
KANT'S COSMOPOLITAN IDEAL (James Bohman & Matthias Lutz-Bachmann eds., 1997)
(discussing Kant's idea of perpetual peace).
457. See Delahunty, supra note 452, at 26, 30 (describing the effect of natural
law and jus cogens on European countries and the United States).
458. E.J. HOBSBAWM, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM SINCE 1780: PROGRAMME,
MYTH, REALITY 44 (1992).
459. See MANN, supra note 48, at 360 (discussing genocide as being a result of
planned, conscious policy decisions made by the Serb establishment).
460. MACMILLAN, supra note 36, at 112.
461. DAVID A. BELL, THE CULT OF THE NATION IN FRANCE: INVENTING
NATIONALISM, 1680-1800, at 3 (2001).
462. J.G.A. Pocock, Some Europes in Their History, in THE IDEA OF EUROPE
FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE EUROPEAN UNION 55, 69 (Anthony Pagden ed., 2002).
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Now in the course of this birth of a new Europe and a new people
of Europe, much that is old will have to die. And it is likely that the
death of the old will be accompanied by violence-which brings me
back to Kosovo. One thing that must die is Serb nationalism. It is
tribal, and therefore deadly. That kind of tribalism has no place in
contemporary Europe except among soccer hooligans-and even then,
not always. 463 If the Serbs insist on remaining the soccer hooligans of
Europe, as they were throughout the 1990s, then Europe will punish
them mercilessly. When armed groups persist in being "teams that
cannot bear to think that they are playing,"464 then they must be
suppressed by force or ridicule or indignation, as the case may be.
What the Serbs did, or attempted to do, in Kosovo in 1998-1999
left Europe no choice but to intervene. The entire basis of the post-
War European project, as I have explained, is the rejection of national
tribalism, with its glorification of race and history, its negation of
"otherness," its genocidal violence, its ineradicable tendency to
atrocity and mass murder. Europe watched, stunned but helpless, as
this deadly Serb fury worked its will on Bosnia. But it could no
longer stand by and watch with Kosovo. The parallels with the Nazi
period were too palpable and too close. To have let the genocide
continue would have dishonored, indeed defeated, the entire
European idea.
I admit that Europe (or Latin-Protestant-Enlightenment Europe)
hardly recognizes Kosovo or even Serbia as European. 46 5 But even if
Europe wished to let Kosovo and Serbia go their own way, at this
point it cannot do so. The Serbs and the Albanian Kosovars have
demonstrated that they cannot resolve their differences. Serbia,
whether it will admit it or not, cannot hope to reconquer Kosovo. But
Kosovo cannot stand on its own-it would swiftly become either a
failed state or a criminal enterprise. If only for its own sake, then,
Europe cannot permit the future of the western Balkans to fall into
the hands of Kosovo's gangsters and Serbia's soccer hooligans, Islamic
radicals and Christian thugs. There can be neither a Greater Serbia
463. See FRANKLIN FOER, AN UNLIKELY THEORY OF GLOBALIZATION: How
SOCCER EXPLAINS THE WORLD 7-34 (2004) (discussing links between soccer
hooliganism and ethnic hatred in Serbia).
464. Kateb, supra note 453, at 382.
465. See Pocock, supra note 462, at 60.
The lands to which the term "Europe" was originally applied-Thrace,
Macedonia, Illyria, the more modern Bulgaria, Albania, and Serbia-those
which the Byzantine emperors considered their European "themes" or
provinces-are in our minds only marginally European, inhabited by uncouth
warring tribes whose history is not ours and whose problems are none of our
business.
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nor a Greater Albania. Both Kosovo and Serbia must be inducted
into the Greater Europe.
4 66
You will remind me that I have said that empires collapse
because they cannot summon up the love and loyalty of those they
govern. Is not the EU a type of empire? And is it therefore not
subject to the same infirmities? Do we not already see the signs of
that in the common complaints about the EU's "democratic
deficit"?467 I admit that the problem is very serious, perhaps more
difficult than Ivan would have you believe. Yet I am also confident
that the future will be different this time.
The New Humanity. Now, I have spoken of constructing a new
European identity. Yet, the European project cannot finally succeed
unless it finds a solution to the problem of war and peace, a problem
that is rooted not in nationalism alone but also in the biological and
psychological characteristics of our species. And if the tendency to
war is inscribed in what, for lack of a better word, I will call human
nature-as it may well be-the project must require an alteration in
the very nature of human beings. To prevent war, therefore, we must
change human nature so that it no longer seeks glory or fame after
death. We must create a humanity that longs for lives that are
comfortable rather than lives that are saintly, heroic, or virtuous. 468
Humanity must be reformed to become timid, concupiscent and risk-
averse. It must cease to be troubled by questions of meaning that it
cannot answer-or as you once wonderfully said, Ivan, our minds
must become "Euclidean" and "three-dimensional. '46 9 And let me be
466. See Ismail Kadare, /1 faut europianiser les Balkans, LE MONDE, Apr. 10,
1999 (arguing that the question whether the Balkans "can be civilized, that is,
europeanized," ["si les Balkans peuvent 6tre civilizis, autrement dit europdanisis"] had
become "fundamental and urgent").
467. See Andreas Follesdal & Simon Hix, Why There is a Democratic Deficit in
the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik, European Governance Papers No. C-05-
02 (2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=924666
(surveying democratic deficit literature and offering a partial defense of the EU); see
also Jargen Habermas, After the Wheels Stopped Turning, SPIEGEL ONLINE INT'L, June
18, 2008 (analyzing causes of voters' rejection of proposed Lisbon Treaty, namely that
"[t]he divide between the political decision-making authority granted to the EU in
Brussels and Strasbourg on the one hand, and the nation state-bound opportunities
provided by participatory democracy on the other, has become too large.").
468. Thus it is that "the price of peace may seem [to be] the nearly complete
sacrifice of the distinctively or eminently human." Kateb, supra note 453, at 375.
469. The Inquisitor is alluding to a colloquy in The Brothers Karamazov between
Ivan and Alyosha, in which Ivan speaks of the discovery of a non-Euclidean geometry
in which two parallel lines meet in infinity. Ivan tells Alyosha that he cannot
understand that concept, and that:
I have come to the conclusion that, since I can't understand even that, I can't
expect to understand about God. ... I have a Euclidean earthly mind, and how
could I solve problems that are not of this world? And I advise you never to
think about it either, my dear Alyosha, especially about God, whether He exists
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candid: if someday we find that this shall require biochemical or
cybernetic interventions, then so be it. 470 If we take humanity in that
direction, then the great problem of war and peace can be solved.
Humanity must become post-human.
47 1
So I must speak now of something even harder and more
ambitious than the construction of a new Europe: the construction,
for now without biological or cybernetic engineering, of a new
humanity. Nietzsche seems to have envisaged exactly the change I
have in mind when he wrote, despairingly, of the emergence of the
"Last Men. ' 472 What Nietzsche himself may have wanted was the
formation of a self-consciously archaizing aristocracy in Europe, the
renewed ascendancy of the noble, masterful human type such as he
had found in the epics of Homer and the histories of the Italian
Renaissance. But such an aristocracy will not be born again.
Instead, if we are exceptionally fortunate, we will live to see the
triumph of the very Last Men whom Nietzsche viewed with such
disgust and despair. For those post-human human beings-fearful,
ignoble, and herd-like animals as they are-will also be the bearers of
universal peace.
The effort at constructing such a post-humanity has been
underway now for several centuries. Perhaps we can say that the
project began with Hobbes, who boldly declared that- "the first, and
Fundamentall Law of Nature... is, to seeke Peace and follow it.
'473
Perhaps we can say that it is intrinsic to the liberal idea, as Hobbes'
great successors Locke, Rousseau, Kant, Constant, Bentham, and
Mill developed it. Indeed, we might even venture to say that the
desire to create a new humanity is something that liberalism shares
with both Nazism and communism-but liberalism has been quieter,
stealthier, and more successful. In any case, Hobbes' programmatic
aim was to discover the conditions in which peace, not war, becomes
entrenched-to show how the seemingly inevitable cycle of war and
or not. All such questions are utterly inappropriate for a mind created with an
idea of only three dimensions.
DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 210, at 216.
470. For a discussion of the issues arising from efforts in this direction see
FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, OUR POSTHUMAN FUTURE: CONSEQUENCES OF THE
BIOTECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION (2002).
471. See Ahrensdorf, supra note 431, at 586.
The goal of the modern, Hobbesian state, the goal of peace and security,
ultimately requires us to suppress not only our religious hopes and longings but
also, to some extent, our very reason. The state that is based on our fear of
violent death is based on a forgetting, not only of eternity but also of mortality.
Id.
472. NIETZSCHE, supra note 418, Prologue, § 5.
473. HOBBES, supra note 424, at 190.
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peace can be broken.4 74 Part of his answer was that human nature
must be reconstructed so that we are irresistibly drawn to peace, not
war. What draws us to war? Not only the fear of others, but also,
Hobbes observed, the desire for glory and esteem-most especially for
a fame that will outlast our lives and thus confer on us a kind of
immortality. And fame of that kind is chiefly won in war. So, he
reasoned, we must find a means to control, even extinguish, that
desire. 475  But desires are not extinguished merely by being
suppressed; no, they must be supplanted by (or transformed into)
stronger, better desires.476 What can supplant or transform the
desire for glory and fame? The desire for wealth, ease, amenity,
comfort. 477 "The Passions that incline men to Peace," Hobbes wrote,
include the "desire of such things as are necessary for commodious
living" and "a Hope that by their industry to obtain them. '4 78
We must, and can, defeat the furies of our existence. The
antidote to those destructive passions is the rule of "interest": the love
of wealth, amenity, and ease rather than the more primitive
emotions. There is no reason why through reason war cannot become
474. Hobbes himself was more concerned with identifying the causes of civil
war, and then eliminating them, than he was with those of foreign wars. Indeed, he
appears to have been something of an English nationalist, and may have sought to
suppress civil war precisely so that an internally unified England under a powerful
monarch or executive would have been able to wage foreign wars effectively. See Kateb,
supra note 453, at 376-81 (discussing Hobbes's view that the main goals of a ruler
should be to maintain civil peace and defend his people against foreign enemies). If
that is so, it is a deep flaw in Hobbes' "clement rationalism," for it would be a "supreme
irony" for Hobbes to have "encourage[d] nations to be what he warns individuals not to
be: activist, uncontented, and ambitious." Id. at 380-82. Nonetheless, as Kateb argues,
Hobbes' prescriptions for avoiding civil war can be applied to all wars, civil or foreign.
Id.
475. See Ahrensdorf, supra note 431, at 581.
There, are, then, two sides of human nature [for Hobbes]: the anxious, death-
fearing side and the spirited or vain, honor-seeking side .... Both sides lead to
a state of war. Just as the proud desire for honor-namely, that others honor
you more than they honor themselves-leads humans to attempt "to extort"
honor from others by force, so the anxious desire for security leads humans to
subdue or kill preemptively anyone who might possibly threaten their life ....
In order to induce humans to quit the state of war, the natural desire to
preserve oneself, or the fear of death, must be inflamed and instructed, while
the natural desire for honor must be weakened and controlled.
Id.
476. See SIGMUND FREUD, THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY (1905),
reprinted in THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF
SIGMUND FREUD, vol. xx (James Strachey trans., 1968) (articulating the theory of
"sublimation," under which, at the risk of oversimplification, libido, or psycho-sexual
energy, is redirected towards higher-order endeavors).
477. To be more faithful to Hobbes, both the fear of death and the love of comfort
are means to overcoming the destructive passions for fame and glory. Ahrensdorf,
supra note 431, at 582.
478. HOBBES, supra note 424, at 188.
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obsolete, exactly as dueling has done. Why did men once duel?
Because their honor had been offended. But what if any sense of
honor is extinguished? Then it becomes impossible to offend
another's honor. And if it is impossible to offend another's honor,
then honor cannot be vindicated in a duel. The institution of dueling
loses its reason for being-it become pointless, ridiculous. As dueling
has been abolished by extinguishing the passion for honor, so might
war be abolished by redirecting the passions for glory and
domination.
479
But just as society and law turned their faces away from the
duel, to eliminate war and allow space for "interest" to prevail, we
must organize international society in accordance with specific
political and legal forms.
The New International Law. Historically, empires have
established the conditions in which great wealth can be accumulated
and the beneficent habits of acquisitiveness and consumption
instilled.48 0 In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the state had
similar purposes and effects, but in contemporary conditions, a form
of political organization closer to the empires of the past serves
better. The EU is such a latter-day empire. Empires offer peace, not
merely within a limited territory, but on a continental, perhaps
eventually global, scale. They bring the law and order, the stability
and predictability, the freedom from predation, that capital formation
requires. They build roads, post offices, courthouses, markets, and
useful infrastructure of all kinds; they eliminate borders, customs,
and barriers to trade. Goods, investment capital, even what we have
now come to call "human resources" can be moved rapidly to the
places where they can be used most efficiently.
We must understand international law in the light of the grand
aims of Europe's transformative, revolutionizing project.
International law must be made subordinate to the purpose of
creating a continental island of order, stability, and wealth-and
hence of peace. Once that object is achieved on the European
continent, it can be replicated elsewhere. Europe must become the
model of governance for the other regions of the world: in that,
indeed, lies our true mission civilatrice. Europe, which is itself
already moving "towards the Kantian world of perpetual peace," now
has the essential task "to show the way from the Hobbesian planet to
479. See JOHN MUELLER, THE REMNANTS OF WAR 162 (2004) (arguing that war,
like dueling, is an institution that is grounded in custom rather than in nature and
thus can be, and is being, abolished).
480. M.C. Howard & J.E. King, Whatever Happened to Imperialism?, in THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IMPERIALISM: CRITICAL APPRAISALS 19, 19-40 (Ronald H.
Chilcote ed., 2000).
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the Kantian 'universal unification of the hman species.' 48 1 The
decisions of the United Nations, including the Resolution we have
been discussing, must be read and applied so as to serve that
overriding telos. Legal primitivism must yield to legal pragmatism.
Europe is offering Kosovo and Serbia the chance to join in its
project of creating peace and wealth. It wants to awaken them from
the nightmare of history, to free them from the unending cycle of
violence, remembrance, and retaliation. It urges them to forget the
faiths that divide, the myths that kill. Ivan's -interpretation of the
legal forms has shown you the vehicle through which these new
dreams can be realized. How can the Kosovars and Serbia refuse this
gift?
Part Two: Speech of Father Zossima: A Pilgrimage to Pristina
Good Friends and Brothers, Alyosha my dearest, honored guest
from Seville: I have listened to the speech of the Grand Inquisitor
with attention and even reverence. For I hear in his words a deep
and aching pity for the world. He has looked at human history and
seen in it "the record of people throwing their lives away. '48 2 His soft
heart is wounded by the sight of human suffering, and he has
searched for many years to find some cure for mankind's desperation,
destructiveness and folly. Even in counseling us to turn away from
the noble to the ignoble, he is seeking our good. He comes to us as
one who longs for peace, and who thinks he has found the way to it.
For this, indeed, I would give him a soft kiss "on his bloodless aged
lips," in imitation of my Master.
4 83
Yet, the great difference between the Inquisitor and myself is
summed up precisely in that word, "peace." The peace the Inquisitor
holds up to you is a negative and empty peace: it is the absence of
war, of violence, of disorder. That indeed is peace, but of a poor kind.
The peace that I will urge you to seek, on the other hand, is not the
absence of war, but its overcoming; not the cessation of violence, but
its transformation; not the end of disorder, but the coming of a higher
and richer order. Both he and I wish to see mankind escape from the
cycle of violence and retaliation in which it seems forever to be
481. ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, EUROPE: AN UNFINISHED ADVENTURE 40 (2004).
482. Kateb, supra note 453, at 374.
483. See DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 210, at 243 (in which, in Ivan's telling, the
legend of the Grand Inquisitor ends with Christ imparting on the Grand Inquisitor a
soft kiss "on his bloodless aged lips").
Nicolas Berdyaev observes that Dostoievski "thought that rebellion against God...
might arise from [man's] feeling for righteousness and pity." BERDYAEV, supra note 28,
at 204. At the same time, Berdyaev notes, Dostoievski regarded the "spirit of
antichrist" represented in the Grand Inquisitor as "above all hostile to freedom and
contemptuous of man." Id. at 207. In the speech given to him in the text above, Father
Zossima understands the Grand Inquisitor in light of these two Dostoievskian beliefs.
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trapped. He thinks that by the skillful and far-seeing use of human
reason, we can escape, in a decisive leap, from that trap. I believe
that we can never escape from it, at least not by our own efforts. But
I also think that our tragic predicament can be, and sometimes is,
made better through the stirring of grace within our souls. He would
save humanity by debasing it, making it into something lower than it
is. I would remind you that the angels, although they will always be
wiser and more beautiful than we are, envy us because, unlike them,
we can repent and forgive.
Friends, Brothers, you are masters of international law, and so I
will express my teaching in the medium that you understand so well.
We have gathered here to seek a solution, in the realm of law or
perhaps even of justice, to a crisis in international affairs. That crisis
has already led to one war; without God's help, it may yet lead to
another. Much, therefore, is at stake. You have earnestly peeled off
the layers of the onion, as lawyers seem so inclined to do, seeking to
reveal ever deeper levels of truth. But I fear that your method may
leave you with nothing in your hands-for onions have no core!
4 84
Instead, let me invert the order you have followed in your
conversations. I will begin with the most general and proceed
downward to the particular-to the case of Kosovo. I shall attempt to
explain to you first why the Inquisitor is wrong in his understanding
of the telos of our continent and thus of international law; then I shall
try to give you a truer and better understanding of both. In my
discourse, I shall draw on three themes: the theme of history, the
theme of sacrifice, and the theme of forgiveness. Reflection on history
and sacrifice will show us why the Inquisitor is wrong in his view of
what he calls the European project: for that project fails to satisfy the
need for ties to the past through history and to the future through
sacrifice. But it is not enough, of course, merely to convince you that
his project's inability to face these difficult challenges condemns it to
failure; I must try to offer you something better-a foundation on
which to build a legal order for states and peoples. To achieve that, I
must ask you to consider an even more difficult task, forgiveness.
History. The Grand Inquisitor is in a cruel dilemma. He can
find "nothing that grounds human meanings," but at the same time
he cannot help but feel an "agonized pity" for human suffering that he
484. Grushenka-Dmitri's bane and beloved-tells Alyosha the tale of the onion,
speaking metaphorically of herself. In the tale, a wicked old woman dies "and did not
leave a single good deed behind," sending her into the fiery lake of hell. DOSTOEVSKY,
supra note 210, at 330. When her Guardian Angel reminds God that she did once pull
an onion out of a garden and give it to a peasant women, God responds: "You take that
onion then, hold it out to her in the lake, and let her take hold and be pulled out." Id.
But the onion broke as the old woman, kicking and screaming, pushed off the other
sinners in the lake who tried to hold on to her also to be pulled out. Id.
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thinks "can only be dealt with by a systematic policy of minimizing
[it], denying it and educating human beings to look for swift and
unambiguous solutions where it appears."48 5 Thus, the theory of
international law that the Grand Inquisitor has given us is, perhaps,
not so very grand at all; indeed, in all charity, I must say that it is
quite impoverished. For his theory of law derives from a view of
history that makes room only for material and economic forces. It
thus sweeps aside the spiritual and cultural riches that have played
so important a part in forming the Slavic vision of history, which I
would also describe as a Christian vision. 48 6 After surviving for seven
decades under a system that recognized the reality of nothing but
economic and material forces, we Russians may be permitted to
return, and we should return, to our Slavic Christian roots. But
before discussing that, let me first try to explain why the Grand
Inquisitor's theory must fail on its own terms.
What, after all, Grand Inquisitor, is your avowedly post-human
idea of Europe? As the historian J.G.A. Pocock put it, it demands
"the subjugation [to the global market] of the political community and
perhaps of the ethnic and cultural community also; we are to give up
being citizens and behave exclusively as consumers." 48 7 But how can
a political community survive without citizens, except as a r6gime of
masters and slaves? Do we want the Europe of the future to be a
despotism, even if it is a benign one? Furthermore, as Pocock asks, is
not the attempt to create a sovereign that is not a sovereign bound to
be self-defeating? "An organization designed to break the will of the
state to govern itself necessarily reduces its own will to use military
power to police its own frontiers, notably when these lie in parts of
the world where only will can establish where those frontiers lie."
48 8
So even when it came to the genocide in Kosovo--where, as you have
said, the very future of the European project was at stake-Europe
could defend neither the Kosovars nor itself without the aid of its U.S.
Praetorian Guard.
And what if your materialism is doomed to failure because it
holds up a false conception of the individual's good that makes it
antagonistic to the good of the whole? Is it not true that the
demographic crisis now suffered by Russia is a direct result of
decades of Marxist-Leninist materialism and the spiritual
impoverishment of our people? Is it not also true, as has been widely
reported, that the established members of the EU are suffering a
485. WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 78.
486. See GEORGE WEIGEL, THE CUBE AND THE CATHEDRAL: EUROPE, AMERICA,
AND POLITICS WITHOUT GOD 29-32 (2005) (attributing this approach to Vaclav Havel
and Karol Wojtyla, later known as Pope John Paul II).
487. Pocock, supra note 462, at 70.
488. Id.
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demographic catastrophe of historical proportions? 48 9 If, in fact, all
that the EU can see is the material dimension of life, and its
populations are unable even to reproduce themselves, then perhaps
this explains why the EU must expand or die, for only then can its
way of life survive. Could it be that the "demographic suicide" of
Europe is rooted in the absence of any spiritual or cultural reason for
re-creating European peoples that will carry their ways of life into the
future?490 Could it be that the need to extend a culture into the
future must be predicated on a shared understanding of that culture's
past, one rooted in a common history and a set of beliefs about that
culture? And what if it is precisely the need for an understanding of
a culture's past that provides the resources necessary to guarantee its
future?
In reflecting on these questions, I would draw your attention to
the seminal work of the writer George Weige149 1 and the
international law scholar J.H.H. Weiler.492 Weigel and Weiler share
the belief that the decision not to include a reference to the Christian
sources of European intellectual and cultural history in the preamble
of the proposed Lisbon Treaty (amending the Treaty of European
Union) left that Treaty radically incomplete. 49 3 Inquisitor, you would
surely approve the Lisbon Treaty's historic amnesia; I would call it
Orwellian.
Now, do not misunderstand me. I am a Russian Orthodox monk,
Weigel is a Roman Catholic, and Weiler is an Orthodox Jew. But
while I have always believed that it is through Russian Orthodoxy
that the soul of Russia must be saved, 494 I will acknowledge that in
Europe today, we believers have more in common with each other
than each of us has with the non-believers. Yes, there was a time
when some Slavophile thinkers, Dostoievski himself among them,
saw Roman Catholicism as a form of Western "rationalism. ' 495 But
given modern Catholicism's commitment to the union of reason and
489. See generally PHILLIP LONGMAN, THE EMPTY CRADLE: How FALLING
BIRTHRATES THREATEN WORLD PROSPERITY AND WHAT To Do ABOUT IT 151-96 (2004)
(arguing that the world population may be shrinking, due to modern medicine, reduced
fertility, and the threatened collapse of the free market system).
490. WEIGEL, supra note 486, at 20-21.
491. See id. at 56-71 (relying extensively on J.H.H. WEILER, UN'EUROPA
CRISTIANA: UN SAGGIO EXPLORATIVO (2003)).
492. See WEILER, supra note 491, at 177-84 (asserting that Europe must not
ignore its Christian past as it looks to the future).
493. See id. (proposing that the inclusion of a reference to Diety, Christianity or
religion is indispensable); WEIGEL, supra note 486.
494. See BILLINGTON, supra note 3, at 107-08 (describing the role Russian
Orthodoxy has played in defining Russian identity).
495. See BERDYAEV, supra note 28, at 42-43 (describing the belief of many
Slavophils that Western rationalism, traced back to Catholic scholasticism, was "the
source of all evils").
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faith,496 Orthodoxy and Catholicism are today no longer in radical
opposition, even if they are often quarreling brothers suffering from
ancient resentments and natural competition. 497 What we believers
have in common now is our rejection of the idea that secular
rationalism is an adequate basis upon which to build a society, be it
domestic or international. More to the point, it has never been, and
never will be, the basis for Europe. Rather, it is an idea that, as
Dostoievksi saw, is both deeply sinful and deeply false, and that will
lead to the destruction, not the renewal, of European culture.
498
How much of the shame about Europe's past reflects an
ideological agenda or simple ignorance of the truth of that past is not
a matter I wish to explore here. My central point is that an accurate
understanding of the role the Christian sources of European culture
played in the emergence of democracy and human rights would make
it a source of pride, not something that needed to be repressed.
499
496. John Paul II, writing in the preamble to his encyclical on the relationship
between faith and reason, affirmed that "[f]aith and reason are like two wings on which
the human spirit rises to the contemplation of truth; and God has placed in the human
heart a desire to know the truth." Letter from John Paul II, Encyclical Letter Fides et
Ratio of the Supreme Pontiff John Paul II to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the
Relationship Between Faith and Reason (Sept. 14, 1998) available at
http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/john-paul-iiencycicals/documentshfjp-ii-enc-151
01998_fides-et-ratioen.html; see also GEORGE WEIGEL, WITNESS TO HOPE: THE
BIOGRAPHY OF POPE JOHN PAUL II 841-42 (1999) (discussing this encyclical).
497. See BILLINGTON, supra note 3, at 53, 73 (suggesting the Orthodox Church is
seeking to limit the influence of other faiths from the new Russia).
498. According to noted English theorist of international relations (and
biographer of Dostoievski) E.H. Carr:
[T]here had appeared a work whose historical significance far exceeds its small
literary merit, a novel by the radical publicist Chernyshevsky entitled What is
to be Done? It is the picture of a Utopian state of society in which perfect
happiness is attained by everyone pursuing untrammeled the satisfaction of his
own rational desires. In the eyes of Chernyshevsky, a pupil of J.S. Mill, reason
and self-interest are the sole sanctions of morality; man commits evil actions
only through misapprehension of the true nature of his interests; and
intellectual enlightenment is the infallible road to right conduct. The Memoirs
from Underground are an answer to the philosophy of Chernyshevsky.
E.H. CARR, DOSTOEVSKY 119-20 (Henderson & Spalding eds., 1949) (1931). In these
Memoirs from Underground, which "mark then a stage in the growth of Dostoevsky's
thought," Dostoievski argues that "[m]an may love to build, like the ant in his ant-hill;
but he also loves to destroy. He loves to indulge his caprice, to sin deliberately against
his own interests merely in order to free himself from the tyranny of reason." Id. at
120-21.
499. As Weigel observes:
The recovery of a mature cultural confidence in the West requires that we be
able to defend western commitments to civil society and democracy
philosophically; it also requires us to be able to defend those commitments
historically. That is, we must reclaim the history of the West, including its
modern democratic politics, as an outgrowth of the distinctive culture that was
formed from the fruitful interaction of Jerusalem, Athens, and Rome: biblical
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Such pride about Europe's past would serve as the basis for faith in
its future. So do not think I am an enemy of Europe-not at all! Like
Dostoievski himself, I hold it "sacred. 50 0
At the root of the matter is the question of how we view the
wellsprings of salvation. For it is in the workings of history that "the
one true God made himself known to his people and empowered them
to lead lives of dignity, through intelligence and free will with which
he has endowed them in creation."50 1 Weigel suggests that it was in
the Trinitarian conception of God that the West was able to develop
the notion of pluralism.50 2 Likewise, he argues, the "ideas and
institutions for self-government were laid before in the European
universities" (which were "entirely Christian in their origins"), in the
"direct, democratic election of superiors in Benedictine monasteries,"
and in the "pilgrimage tradition by which the men and women of an
emerging Europe met and came to understand themselves as
members in a common civilizational project. ' 50 3 The separation of
church and state in the West originated, Weigel says, in the
investiture controversy; while the traditions of caesaropapism in the
Orthodox lands, Weigel believes, may help explain the difficulties
those societies have experienced in their transition from communism
to democracy. 50 4 It may or may not be that all the rich traditions of
the Orthodox Church-which have always formed in one way or
another a recurring theme in the spiritual and cultural history of the
Slavic peoples 5 5-should be preserved without adaptation. But it is
religion, philosophical rationality, and law. The Whig theory of history-which
tells the story of the West as if the freedom project in contemporary western
public life only began with the Enlightenment-is mistaken, as a matter of the
history of ideas. It also plays into the hands of jihadist ideologues, who are all
too eager to claim that democracy, civil society and the rule of law as we
understand those terms are the by-products of decadent, godless cultures.
GEORGE WEIGEL, FAITH, REASON, AND THE WAR AGAINST JIHADISM: A CALL TO ACTION
112 (2007).
500. In The Diary of a Writer, Dostoievski wrote:
Europe-is not this a terrible and a sacred thing-Europe? Do you know,
gentlemen, how dear to us it is, to us dreamers, to us Slavophils, to us who in
your opinion are haters of Europe? That same Europe, that country of 'holy
wonders'-you know how dear to us are those wonders and how we love and
revere them with more than brotherly love.
BERDYAEV, supra note 28, at 70.
501. WEIGEL, supra note 486, at 46-47.
502. Id. at 141.
503. Id. at 106.
504. Id. at 100-02. The Orthodox Christian Berdyaev also criticizes aspects of
the Russian tradition of caesaropapism, saying that, under it, "God's things were
rendered to Caesar." BERDYAEV, supra note 28, at 10.
505. See BILLINGTON, supra note 3, at 107-08 (arguing that Orthodox Church
traditions have played a large part throughout history in the lives and culture of Slavic
peoples).
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only through reaching into the spiritual and cultural history of the
Slavic peoples that true freedom and salvation are possible for us,
certainly not as subject races of a faceless and heartless "European"
future.
What has this to do with international law, Inquisitor?
Everything! I hope it is becoming clear that your foundational
premises lead to a distorted view of law that rejects both our Slavic
culture and history and the Christian culture and history of Europe.
Your premises drive you to a relentless expansion of the EU that is
intended to break down, absorb, and finally destroy the distinctive
features of our Slavic culture, along with the cultures of all other
peoples of Europe. 50 6 For you, the self-determination of the Kosovar
people is a mockery-it is merely the freedom to be swallowed up by
the EU, for outside the EU there is no salvation. And soon thereafter,
only within the EU will there be salvation for the Serb people. Is this
because you wish the EU to expand into the Russian sphere of
influence to weaken Russia and ultimately to absorb her? Is not your
"humanitarian intervention" in Kosovo a form of bad faith, a lie you
tell yourselves to conceal and repress the darker motives that truly do
explain your expansionist policies?
Sacrifice. Friends and Brothers, let me offer you a different way
to think of the world's legal order, a way that unites history and
futurity, entwining memory with purpose, through the possibility of
sacrifice. Where there is no sacrifice, there is no futurity; where
there is no futurity, there is no life, but only the semblance of it. For
truly it has been said: "[U]nless a grain of wheat falls into the earth
and dies, it remains alone; but if it dies, it bears much fruit.
50 7
Let me ask you, Ivan, whether you would not agree that the
meaning of your life is the thing for which you are prepared to
sacrifice it? In helping Ivan to consider his answer, Grand Inquisitor,
you assist me by drawing our attention to the practice of dueling. For
506. See LUKACS, supra note 28, at 180-81.
For Europe the true alternative to nationalism is not some kind of
bureaucratic, materialist and abstract internationalism, but the kind of
internationalism that develops from an increasing understanding [and,
consequently, from an increasing cultural symbiosis] of its different
nations .... A key ingredient of nationalism is xenophobia, the dislike and
fear of foreigners. But the proper and desirable opposite of xenophobia is not an
undiscriminating xenophilia, a thoughtless and abstract kind of
broadmindedness. It is, rather, a discriminating xenologia, a comprehensive
and compassionate understanding of others, of foreigners.
Id.
507. John 12:24. This is, in fact, the opening quotation of The Brothers
Karamazov, prefiguring its central theme of salvation through sacrifice. DOSTOEVSKY,
supra note 210, at xii.
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in my dissolute younger years it was in a duel that I discovered the
meaning of my life. It was a foolish venture, a challenge I made out
of resentment that another man had won the affection of a lady-an
offense, as I conceived it, to my honor. And shortly before the duel, I
repented of the wrongfulness of my conduct. But I also saw that the
only way for me to show why my path had been wrong was to allow
my adversary to fire the first shot and only if I survived to reveal my
reformation; for, if I had withdrawn from the duel before permitting
my adversary to take the first shot, my action would have been seen
as cowardice rather than wisdom. I needed to be prepared to sacrifice
in order to gain the moral authority necessary to persuade others that
they, too, needed to reform their lives. 508 The memory of that deed
has shaped my life. And perhaps a great sacrifice will also change
your life, Dmitri. For you have taken the right path in our
discussion, although for reasons that you at most dimly
understood. 509
As it is for individuals, so it must be for communities. 5 10 Great
and selfless acts define the moral purpose, the telos, for which a
community exists. The memory of such acts and the willingness to
repeat them forge a community in which a people pursue the common
good and, as much as can be in the City of Man, prepare them for
salvation in the City of God. 511 But for what is the EU prepared to
risk its existence? The answer would reveal its telos.5 12 The EU had
508. DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 210, at 274-80.
509. Zossima's recounting of his youthful dissoluteness and moral
transformation foreshadows Dmitri's sacrifice-his submission to wrongful prosecution
and punishment for a murder committed by Smerdyakov. Id. at 623-716.
510. THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV, in fact, closes with a scene relating to this
theme. Young Ilusha has died, and after his funeral Alyosha speaks to Ilusha's
classmates:
Let us make a compact, here, at Ilyusha's stone that we will never forget first,
Ilyushechka, and second, one another. And whatever happens to us later in life,
if we don't meet for twenty years afterwards, let us always remember how we
buried the poor boy at whom we once threw stones .... And so in the first
place, we will remember him, boys, all our lives. And even if we are occupied
with most important things, if we attain to honor or fall into great misfortune-
still let us always remember how good it was once here, when we were all
together, united by a good and kind feeling which made us, for the time we
were loving that poor boy, better perhaps than what we are .... What's more,
perhaps that one memory may keep him from great evil and he will reflect and
say, "Yes, I was good and brave and honest then!"
Id. at 733-34.
511. See ST. AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD 5-6 (Henry Bettensen trans., 1972)
(formulation of a distinction that may have paved the road for the emergence of
separation between the spiritual and temporal realms, between church and state, in
Western culture).
512. Cf WEIGEL, supra note 486, at 65 (citing WEILER, supra note 491, for the
idea that a constitution prescribes "the ethos and telos, the cultural foundations and
aspirations, of a given political community").
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neither the strength nor will to fight for Kosovo. But if an individual,
a group, a state, community of states, cannot sacrifice itself, it cannot
live.
In saying this, I am of course rejecting the fallacy that one
invents one's values-instead, one discovers them. Values that are
transparently nothing but the artifacts of human desire are empty
and meaningless; they fail to explain why we should desire what we
do. Rather, the meaning and telos of our lives is chosen for us. And
that mystery is as true for states and peoples as it is for individuals.
So I cannot agree that the EU's choice of bread and water is as wise
or valid as its choice of bread and wine would be. The states and the
peoples must choose bread and wine, not bread and water, to find
their true telos.
Yes, it is very, very difficult to ask statesmen and rulers to
sacrifice the interests of the states and peoples they govern for the
sake of bread and wine. In any decision involving responsibility for
others, are we free to choose a course that requires sacrifices from
them, risking the very existence of the state in which they find a
home, in order to pursue moral purposes of a transcendent
character? 513 Surely the kingdom of Heaven cannot be built by
human statecraft! Do we not live under the "order of necessity," in
which there can be no escape by purely human means from the
unending cycle of violence and retaliation?
514
Indeed, the Kingdom cannot be built by human hands. We have
been taught to pray, "Thy Kingdom come."'515 And by that teaching
we are instructed that it is not in our power to make the kingdom
come. We must wait; all in God's time. But we have also been taught
to pray: "Forgive us as we forgive those who have sinned against
us."516 And to seek and grant forgiveness do lie within our power. In
a certain understanding of forgiveness, I think we may at last see the
true answer to our problem of law.
Forgiveness. In the 1860s, during Doestoievki's lifetime, the jury
system was introduced from the West into Russia. Dostoievski
observed that Russian juries were irresistibly drawn to acquit any
accused criminal, no matter how grave the offense or how clear the
evidence of guilt.517  In a passage in The Diary of a Writer,
Dostoievski tried to explain the Russian jurors' state of mind:
513. See generally REINHOLD NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY: A
STUDY IN ETHICS AND POLITICS 23-50 (1932) (arguing that reason enables man to
rationalize selfishness in order to pursue greater goals of power and control).




517. Berdyaev noted the same phenomenon:
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We sit in the jurors' box and perhaps we think: "Are we ourselves better
than the defendant? Here we are, rich and secure; but if we were to
find ourselves in the same position as he, perhaps we should do even
worse than he-so we will acquit."
' 5 1 8
And Dostoievski added:
Perhaps even it is good that we should feel thus; it is sincere
mercifulness. It is perhaps the pledge for some sort of higher
Christianity which the world has not yet known.
5 19
Think of the international community, most of all the great
powers that are the permanent members of the Security Council, as if
they were such a Russian jury.520 And think of Serbia as if it were an
accused criminal, and Kosovo its victim. What should the jury do?
The crime is grave, and Serbia's guilt is incontestable. So, no doubt,
the jury should not simply acquit Serbia-although what great power
does not have bloodstained hands? But the world is surely not ready
yet for that old Russian form of Christianity. Then should the jurors
simply find Serbia guilty, and punish it? But punishment may serve
only to deepen Serbia's sense of grievance and to strengthen its desire
for vindication and revenge. Consider the effects of Germany's
"punishment" after the First World War. Would it not be best, then,
if the jurors gave Serbia the chance to grasp in all its fullness the
very great wrong it had done and, in time, humbly to seek the
Kosovars' forgiveness? Mindful of their own deep wrongs, should not
the great powers counsel Serbia to reflect on its need to repent and to
consider the ways in which it might secure forgiveness from those
whom it had injured? Should not Russia, as Serbia's friend, take the
lead in offering such counsel? You will remember, my Brothers, that
our common Serbian and Russian Orthodox faith, unlike Latin
Christianity, calls for public, rather than private, confession. 521 How
can we fail to draw on that heritage to transcend the current political
and legal impasse? May we not read the Security Council's
Resolution in a way that permits and encourages the ripening of
Serbia's reflections? And because such reflections will be painful,
Among the Russians and it may be among the Russians only, there exists a
doubt about the righteousness of punishment. This is in all probability
connected with the fact that the Russians are people with a community spirit,
though they are not socialized in the Western sense, that is to say they do not
recognize the supremacy of society over man.
BERDYAEV, supra note 28, at 52-53.
518. CARR, supra note 498, at 296.
519. Id.
520. Father Zossima is speaking here of the Security Council as a "jury" that can
express the moral conscience of the international community. In a distinct sense not
relevant here, the Council may also resemble a "jury" in serving as an impartial finder
of facts as suggested in HANS BLIX, DISARMING IRAQ 218 (2004).
521. BILLINGTON, supra note 3, at 107.
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much patience and time may be needed. But should not the president
of Serbia-when the time has come-visit an Albanian village in
Kosovo that the Serbs had destroyed, and kneel on the ground before
its inhabitants, and beg their forgiveness for himself and for his
people? And he must do this, realizing all the time that 200,000
Serbs have had to flee their homes in Kosovo.
5 22
Friends, Brothers: my elder brother died as a very young man,
scarcely more than a boy. As his illness grew worse, his joy in the
world became ever more intense, even ecstatic. And as death drew
nearer, he said to my mother, "[M]other, every one of us has sinned
against all men, and I more than any. '52 3 And she smiled and wept
and said to her dying boy, 'Why, how could you have sinned against
all men, more than all? Robbers and murderers have done that, but
what sin have you committed ted, that you hold yourself more guilty
than all?"524 And he replied to her tenderly, "[L]ittle heart of mine,
my joy, believe me, everyone is really responsible to all men for all
men and for everything. 5 2 5
International law can guide the states and peoples of the world
on the path to peace only if it awakens in them the realization that
each of them is guilty before each of the others. Yes, there are
nations that are like murderers and robbers, and perhaps there might
even be some that are more like innocent, dying boys. But all nations
are guilty before all, all stand in need of repentance and forgiveness,
all must acknowledge and confess their brokenness. I do not say that
the international law alone can bring them to that realization, for the
action of grace in the soul of a nation is as needful as it is in the soul
of each individual. So, indeed, it may be that international law can
perform its highest service for us only after we have reached the point
at which we no longer need it. But it is only through seeking and
granting forgiveness that states and peoples can have any hope of
breaking the cycle of violence and retaliation.
522. Carr writes that Dostoievski believed that
the sense of sin, an awareness of the lower instincts of one's own nature, was
the key to salvation, and that it was through the antithesis of good and evil
within him that man arrived at the divine synthesis. In The Brothers
Karamazov, he works out this doctrine in the person of Dmitri, who seeks
salvation through sin and through suffering accepted in order to expiate it.
CARR, supra note 498, at 295. In that spirit, Father Zossima argues that peace can
come to Kosovo only if Serbia is prepared both to atone for its sins against the Kosovars
and at the same time to forgive the Kosovars' sins against the Serbs. Whether the
Kosovars respond by insisting on independence or agreeing to reunification would then
be for them to say.
523. DOSTOEVSKY,supra note 210, at 268.
524. Id.
525. Id. The theme repeats itself in many voices, including that of Zossima
himself and an older "mysterious visitor." Id. at 280-91. It is without doubt the most
challenging concept in Zossima's teaching and Dostoievsky's novel.
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These are, of course, not the ways in which the world has been
ruled or the affairs of the nations governed. But perhaps it is time.
And if it is time, then international law should be applied, not to
accuse and to punish, but to heal and to bind.
